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The Insolvent Life Care Provider: Who Leads the
Dance Between the Federal Bankruptcy Code and
State Continuing-Care Statutes?
NATHALIE D. MARTIN*
Continuing-care retirement communities provide seniors with an attractive
option to traditional nursing homes. These arrangements allow seniors to live in
a pleasant, independent environment for as long as possible, and then receive
life time nursing care when it is needed. Residents of these communities pay a
large upfront entry fee in exchange for the promise of life time nursing care.
When continuing care facilities file for bankruptcy, however, residents risk
losing their large upfront entry fee, which drastically reduces the value of these
arrangements to consumers. In this Article, Professor Nathalie Martin analyses
these risks against a host of state statutes purporting to regulate this industry.
She concludes that despite many laws on the books, this industry remains largely
unregulated, and residentfees are still at great risk of loss in most states.
In the Article, Professor Martin analyses the relationship between state
statutes and the Federal Bankruptcy Code, and discusses the Supremacy battle
that results when state and federal statutes conflict. She analyses the specific
provisions of the various state continuing-care statutes and suggests ways that
the state statutes could be improved. She then concludes that because the
Bankruptcy Code preempts some of the provisions of these state statutes, and
because the state legislative process is inefficient and unpredictable, to fully
protect residents form the loss of their life care investments, the Bankruptcy
Code should also be amended to preclude rejection of life care contracts, to
provide rejection damage claims with higher priority, or to otherwise protect
resident claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
Let's face it. None of us is getting any younger. People are living longer,'
younger people are leading more complicated lives,2 and everyone is seeking
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I See Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future,
42 HASTINGS LJ. 719, 721 (1991).
2 See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
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high-quality, dignified care for the elderly.3 Due to changes in the family
structure, many older people today eventually find themselves in nursing homes
and other long-term eldercare facilities 4 In the last twenty years, a new nursing
care alternative has become available, through which elderly people pay a
substantial up front fee in exchange for a promise of guaranteed nursing care for
the rest of their lives.5 The facilities providing this care are known as life care or
retirement communities. 6 Contracts with such a facility often allow residents to
live independently in their own apartments at the facility for as long as possible,
and later move into various levels of assisted living, all for a prepaid fee.7 This
new option provides older people with a way to live independently for many
years, while at the same time insuring against the risk that their nursing care
costs will eventually exceed their available finds.8
Despite their many benefits, continuing-care facilities ("CCFs") are
particularly susceptible to insolvency. 9 Once insolvency occurs, the prospects for
residents can be grim. In Idaho, after one facility failed, some residents lost their
life savings.' 0 According to testimony given to the Idaho legislature, "two [of
the] women who had used life savings for [the new living anangement] learned
that... they were, in a word, paupers. These were people who had worked and
3 See Onderdonk v. Presbyterian Homes of NJ., 425 A2d 1057, 1064 n.5 (NJ. 1981)
(stating that adequate housing and health care for the elderly has become one of society's most
pressing needs); see also Administration on Aging, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
President Clinton and Vice President Gore: Strengthening Families That Need Long-Term
Care (ast modified Jan. 4, 1999) <http://www.aoa.dhhs.gov/aoa/ltcl-4-99.html> (on file with
the author).
html>. The aging population is increasing because Americans age 65 years or older will double
by the year 2030, from 34.3 million to 69.4 million. The White House has revealed a proposal
to support a long-term care initiative, which addresses elderly health care needs. See id.
4 See Marsha King, Agents for the Aged: Care Managers Serve as Troubleshooters, THE
SEATrnE TIMEs, May 20, 1999, at Al. It has become more common that adult children of
elderly parents are scattered across the country and are not able to care for their aging parents.
The need for nursing homes and other facilities catering to geriatric care has become prevalent
in today's society.
5 See infra notes 40-102 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text.
8 See id.
9 See infra notes 59-85 and accompanying text. The financial health of a life care
provider will depend upon as many factors as any other business, as well as on the provider's
accuracy in predicting the nursing care costs and life span of residents, investment success, and
ability to jump through the necessary hoops to obtain various federal funds.
10 See Hearing on H. 626 Before the House Health & Welfare Comm. (Idaho 1988)
(statement of Lorraine Gunderson).
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saved during their younger years in order to be independent." 1 In addition to the
loss of life savings, "the loss in self-esteem to the residents and dread of the
future cannot be calculated in dollars. '12 Recent changes in Medicare
reimbursement policies will almost certainly result in more CCF insolvencies
than ever.13
When a provider fails financially, it has a number of legal options, none of
which are very satisfactory for residents. 14 First, it can cease its operations and
hope the state has provided for the transfer of the residents. 15 Another option is
to file a state insolvency proceeding, which will normally require liquidation, but
which may permit a rehabilitation of some sort.16 Finally, it could file a federal
bankruptcy proceeding, which has one immediate advantage over state
proceedings, namely a regular method of reorganizing under the provisions of
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.17 Under Chapter 11, the provider can
continue to operate without the immediate appointment of a trustee, and will also
receive the benefits of a plethora of specialized bankruptcy provisions that aid
rehabilitation. 18
I I See id
12 See id.; see also Kapp, supra note 1, at 719 (noting that "[tjhe greatest single threat to
the financial security of the elderly is the cost of long-term care"). Even courts have
acknowledged that the emotional upheaval caused by a CCF insolvency far exceeds the
damage done in dollars. See In re The Brethren's Home, 24 B.R. 336, 343 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982).
13 Until recently, Medicare paid unlimited rehabilitation and therapy for senior citizens in
nursing homes and CCFs, but the federal government is now severely limiting these
reimbursements. As a result, huge numbers of nursing homes are failing financially, and CCFs
can be expected to follow suit. See, e.g., Chris Adams, GAO: Medicare Changes Making
Nursing Homes More Selective, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 1999, Harold J. Adams, Another
Nursing Home Goes Bankrupt. Mariner Joins Sun Healthcare and Vencore, THE COURIER J.,
Jan. 19, 2000, at 14B; Garmen Shiu, Nursing Home Residents Left Homeless: Bankruptcy
Shuts Down Reseda Care Center Without Warning, (visited Jan. 20, 2000)
<http://www.cbs2.com/news/stories/news-970927-103926.htn-l> (on file with the author); Bob
LaMendola, Bankrupt Chain Keeps S. Florida Sites Open, SUN SENTINAL, Feb. 4, 2000, at ID;
Scott Thurston, Nursing Home Operator Seeks to Reorganize its Finances, ATLANTA J. &
CONsT., Jan. 18, 2000, at D3.
14 See infra notes 264-90 and accompanying text.
15 Florida, for example, covers some of the costs of moving residents to another facility,
from a general state fund. See FLA. STAT. ch. 651.119 (West 1996). Most states, however, have
not so provided.
16 Many state continuing-care statutes permit a facility to file a state liquidation or
rehabilitation proceeding and also permit the state official in charge to institute such a
proceeding against a facility. See infra notes 236-55 and accompanying text
17 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
18 See infranotes 236-55 and accompanying text.
2000]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURTAL
If the Bankruptcy Code makes rehabilitation easier for a debtor, it obviously
does so at the expense of other interested parties in a case. One of the primary
benefits a debtor obtains in bankruptcy is the ability to reject prepetition
contracts, including those executed by CCF residents, for which some residents
may have paid their life savings.' 9 Prepaying for anything is risky, but the risks
are particularly great for parties to continuing-care contracts. Residents whose
contracts are rejected receive only bankruptcy claims for their losses, which are
typically paid at extremely low rates, and for which replacement services cannot
be obtained.20
These increased risks for continuing-care residents have caught the attention
of state legislatures, who have enacted a variety of state statutes to address these
risks.21 While the precise goal of enacting this legislation is to protect residents
from the loss of their savings, many statutes do not achieve this goal because
they are preempted by the Bankruptcy Code.22 Thus, states have tried to help
CCF residents, but have instead caused more harm than good, and have given
residents a false sense of security.23
Using the continuing-care cases as an example of what works best and most
efficiently when state and federal laws clash, Part II of this Article discusses the
history and importance of continuing-care contracts in light of the aging
population.24 Part Im discusses the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution as
applied to the Bankruptcy Code, and analyzes some of the many provisions
states have enacted to protect residents from CCF insolvencies. -5 While some
attempts by states are clearly unenforceable and ineffective under the Supremacy
Clause, others have been extremely creative. Maine, for example, has legislated
that CCFs constitute insurance companies under state law and are thus ineligible
for bankruptcy protection under section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code.26 While it
is unclear whether this attempt to preclude this industry from bankruptcy
protection is effective, the possibility raises interesting questions. Should states
be allowed to determine which industries are eligible for bankruptcy? Do the
states talk to one another about their legislation, and do they know the effects of
federal legislation on these enactments? After considering these issues, Part II
concludes that, because state statutes vary, and are currently preempted on the
19 See infra notes 289-330 and accompanying text.
20 See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 170-283 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 200-256 and accompanying text.
23 See id.
24 See infra notes 40-102 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 103-283 and accompanying text.
26 SME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6225 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999).
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issues of insolvency and bankruptcy, amending the Bankruptcy Code is a more
efficient way to protect all CCF residents in the event of insolvency than
enacting state statutes.27
Part IV discusses the possible forms that these Bankruptcy Code
amendments could take. First, this Part reviews various provisions of the existing
Bankruptcy Code and discusses the unique problems these provisions create for
CCF residents. 28 Specifically, this Part reviews section 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code, which allows the debtor to reject the contracts of residents, as well as
virtually all other contracts, under the lenient business judgment test. It discusses
a debtor's unique capacity to overreach as a result of this provision. 29 This Part
then considers, by way of example, several types of contracts that Congress
chose to protect from rejection, to determine if a similar provision could be
helpful to life care residents.30 Part IV also considers whether residents could
benefit if their rejection damage claims were given priority or secured status, 31
and briefly discusses the possibility of making CCFs ineligible for bankruptcy
under section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code.32 Part IV ultimately concludes that
various provisions could be added to the Bankruptcy Code to protect the
residents of continuing-care facilities.33 Part IV argues that one or more of these
amendments would provide much needed protections to residents of CCFs,34 and
would eliminate the need for state legislatures to enact inconsistent and often
ineffective state laws.35
Part V discusses what we can learn about the legislative process from the
intersection between state continuing-care statutes and the Bankruptcy Code.36
Part V concludes that while state legislatures appear somewhat uninformed about
existing federal legislation when they propose conflicting or preempted state
legislation, the federal legislative process is not necessarily more rational.37 The
Bankruptcy Code amendment process suffers from its own deficiencies,
27 See infra notes 277-83 and accompanying text
28 See infra notes 284-305 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 291-305 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 306-89 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 390-400 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 401-05 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 380-400 and accompanying text.
3 4 See id
3 5 See infra notes 103-283 and accompanying text While I ultimately conclude that
enacting valid statutory liens on a state by state level is one of the best ways to protect
residents, I am not sure how to accomplish this in time to protect residents. See infra notes
390-400 and accompanying text.
3 6 See infra notes 410-15 and accompanying text
37 See infra notes 413-16 and accompanying text.
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including narrow, piecemeal legislative goals which add confusion and
complexity to the Bankruptcy Code.38 Ultimately, however, Part V favors
amending the Bankruptcy Code to protect CCF residents, as a necessary means
of making these facilities safe, efficient investments for people who want to use
them. 39
II. UNIQUE FiNANCIAL IssuES FACaNG LIFE CARE PROVIDERS
In 1900, only twenty-five percent of Americans lived to be over sixty-five.4 0
By 1985, seventy percent of the population reached age sixty-five.41 This
number is increasing, and as a result, the number of elderly persons living in
America is at an all time high.42
Although extensive efforts have been made to reduce aging and even cure
the causes of aging and death, 43 nothing has worked so far, leaving each of us
with a vested interest in issues related to aging. Not surprisingly, as we age we
become even more interested in how we will get along toward the end of our
lives.44 As the population has aged in the past two centuries, society has changed
in many other ways as well.45 Many adult children no longer live near their
parents, and few are willing or able to care for aging parents in their increasingly
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See Kapp, supra note 1, at 720.
41 See id.
4 2 See Lisa Steams et al., Continuing-Care Retirement Communities: Lssues in State
Regulation, 8 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 245, 245 (1989). By the year 2020, the elderly
population is expected to double to 51.A million. See id.
43 From facelifts to anti-aging supplements to cryonics suspension, there is no end to the
efforts in which society will engage to stay young, or avoid death altogether. For a fascinating
look at all these efforts, see Life Extension Foundation Web Page, (visited Mar. 29, 2000),
<http://www.lef.org/index/.shtml>.
44 See id. We have plenty of reason to be concerned. Economically there are unlikely to
be enough resources, public or private, to care for this growing population, and as this growth
exceeds the growth of the population in general, there will be fewer workers to support this
aging population. See id.; see also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURITY, THE FINANCING
AND DELIVERY OF LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES: A REVIEW OF CURRENT PROBLEMS AND
POTENTIAL REFORM OPTIONS 3 (1991).
4 5 See Christine A. Semanson, The Continuing Care Community: Will It Meet Your
Client's Changing Needs?, DEr. C.L. REV. 771,772 (1990).
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busy lives.4 6 Moreover, many people choose not to have children at all, leaving
them without offspring to provide caretaking services for them in their old age.47
These factors, among others, have led to the proliferation of CCFs,4 8 which
provide elderly persons who can still live independently with a unique form of
security 4 9 Typically, CCFs obtain a large lump sum amount from residents who
live independently in an apartment, but contract for the right to be transferred to
a nursing homelike environment within the same facility when their health
deteriorates.50 While the residents continue to pay for the apartment and
whatever meals and extra services they have contracted for, paying a large up
front lump sum fee ensures the resident that they will have a place to live, with
full nursing care provided, for the rest of their lives.51 While these housing
46 See id. at 774. Today's modem American family is extremely mobile, leaving many
elderly people without anyone geographically close upon whom they may rely for care. See id.
at 772.
4 7 See Steams et al., supra note 42, at 253 (noting that 34% of CCF residents in 1989 did
not have children).
4 8 In 1986, there were 600-700 CCFs serving 100,000-200,000 residents. See STEARNS
ET AL., supra note 42, at n.11 (citing Eileen J. Tell et al., New Directions in Life Care: An
Industry in Transition, 65 MiLBANK Q. 551-52 (1987)). At the time, it was predicted that by
the late 1990s there would be over 1,500 CCFs with over 450,000 residents. See id. at 247.
This proliferation of CCFs has resulted in a similar proliferation of writing about CCFs. See
Michael D. Floyd, Should Government Regulate the Financial Management of Continuing
Care Retirement Communities?, 30 ELDER LJ. 29, 29 n.1 (1993) (citing more than 30 sources
written about CCFs). Most scholars who have written about these facilities call them, to my
mind euphemistically, continuing-care retirement communities, or CCRCs. I prefer CCFs
because these are businesses, not merely "communities" of individuals. See id.; see also Joan
E. Fairbanks, Lifetime Care Contracts: Are Senior Citizens Putting All Their Eggs in One
Basket?, 4 PRoB. & PROP. 4 (1990); STEARNS ET AL., supra note 42, at 246 (quoting William
B. Fisher, Continuing Care Retirement Communities: A Promise Falling Short, 8 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 47,47 (1985)).
49 See Semanson, supra note 45, at 775. The goal of the CCF community or "Life Care"
community is to provide an environment in which elderly residents can maintain their highest
level of independence for as long as possible and also be sure progressive nursing care will be
available for them when they need it. See id. The arrangements also ensure that elderly persons
will have a place to live where they will be taken care of for the rest of their lives. See Fisher,
supra note 48, at 48.
50 See Fisher, supra note 48, at 47; Floyd, supra note 48, at 37-38. Floyd reports that as
of 1988, median entrance fees for CCFs ranged from $32,800 for a studio apartment to
$85,000 for units larger than two bedrooms. Such fees are undoubtedly far higher today. See
also Semanson, supra note 45, at 775. As commentators have noted, charging a higher up front
fee allows the older person to live independently now and also to "age in place.' STEARNS ET
AL., supra note 42, at 246.
51 See Fisher, supra note 48, at 49 (noting that 'te central purpose and promise of
[CCFs] is that they will provide security and certainty for the resident through the end of his or
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arrangements pose a number of problems, they can be very attractive to people
who are not sure they can maintain their lifestyle in the family home. The peace
of mind that comes from independent living and guaranteed future nursing care
is hard to beat, and is a good way to insure against unpredictable risk.52
The services and facilities provided by CCFs vary greatly, but many offer a
combination of housing, health care, and insurance. 53 While the people who sign
CCF contracts cannot be stereotyped, they tend to be over seventy-five,
educated, somewhat well off, and more often than not, female.54 While the
services that such individuals seek vary, individuals often look for things other
than nursing care, including intermediate services, such as assistance with
everyday tasks or communal living, without around-the-clock nursing care.55
her life"); Semanson, supra note 45, at 775.
5 2 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 35-36; see also STEARNS Er AL., supra note 42, at 247
(noting that the CCF contract can act as a hedge against impoverishment due to unforeseen
long-term care costs).
53 See Steams et al., supra note 42, at 246. CCFs are typically defined as retirement
facilities that provide shelter, care, and services, including nursing home services, for as long as
the resident lives in the facility. Residents receive services in return for a one-time entrance fee
(generally between $15,000 and $200,000) and monthly fees of $250 to $1,300. Today, fees
are far higher. See infra note 60.
54 See Steams et al., supra note 42, at 253-54. These authors describe the typical CCF
user under the following prototype:
[The prototype [CCF] resident is an independent, female, former school teacher living
alone. These essential characteristics are drawn from the following data on recent
residents of [CCFs]. More than seventy-five percent of [CCF] consumers are over
seventy-five years of age; just under fifty percent are married; seven percent have never
been married; over seventy percent are women; thirty-four percent have no children;
sixty-five percent have no children living near the prospective [CCF]; over ninety-five
percent are white; forty-eight percent have been professionals; seventeen percent have
been managers or proprietors; twenty-three percent have been sales or clerical workers;
six percent have been primarily housewives; forty-eight percent are college graduates;
forty-nine percent have an annual income of over $30,000; eighty-six percent feel it is
unacceptable to depend on family; and eighty-seven percent feel confident about their
ability "to make plans work."
Id. at 253-54 (citing Morris et al., Characteristics of Residents of Continuing Care Retirement
Communities 2-3, paper presented at the 39th Scientific Meeting of the Gerontological Society
of America, Chicago (Nov. 1986) (available from Columbia Law School Legislative Drafting
Research Fund)) (presenting data that represent the response rates of persons residing for less
than a year in the CCFs sampled); Eileen . Tell et al., Assessing the Elderly's Preferences for
Lifecare Retirement Options, 27 GERONTOLOGIST 503, 503-08 (1987) (providing a profile of
the typical CCF resident undifferentiated by length of residence).
55 See Kathie M. McDonald, Note, Residents' Rights in a Life Care Retirement
Community: The Need for Improved Legislation, 23 J. FAM. L. 583, 586 (1985). These
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Other available services may include meals, housekeeping services,
transportation, and social activities.56
The "insurance" component in such a package is one of the most desirable
attributes of the arrangement.57 Most residents are guaranteed some future level
of nursing care, ranging from contracts that provide for full nursing care into the
future with little or no increase in the monthly payments, to guaranteed nursing
care up to a certain dollar cap, to virtually no nursing care except that the care
paid for in cash at the time that services are rendered.58
Continuing-care, however, is a financially complicated business. Financial
vulnerability is a very real concern in this field, which has been notorious for
financial failure.59 These failures are easily explained by the structure of the
financial relationship between the CCF and its residents. Residents are charged
up front based on physical exams and amortization schedules.60 These fees are
facilities recognize that retirement occurs in two phases. First, there is a phase of healthy and
productive independent living, followed by a phase in which the elderly become more
dependent on outside assistance for everyday tasks, as well as medical needs. See id. During
the second, or assisted-living phase, three levels of skilled care have been recognized in the
literature: (1) "skilled nursing care," which involves the most expertise and is offered by skilled
professionals, twenty-four hours a day; (2) "intermediate care," which provides health related
services on a less than twenty-four hour basis; and (3) "personal care," which typically
involves only assistance with daily tasks, such as meals, dressing, bathing, and other personal
needs. See id. at n.17.
5 6 See HENRY E. WNKLEVOSS & ALWYN V. POWELL, CONTNUING CARE REIEMENT
COMMuNIEs: AN EMPIRICAL, FINANCLAL, AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 54 (Richard D. Irwin ed.
1984); see also Fisher, supra note 48, at 48 (noting that some CCF communities also offer
excursions, films, lectures, and religious services).
57 See Mark R. Greene, Life Care Centers-A New Concept in Insurance, 48 J. RISK &
INS. 403,419 (1981).
58 See Stearns et al., supra note 42, at 246-47 (noting that in 1987, about 64% of all
CCFs charged an up front fee and thereafter guaranteed certain long-term, continuing-care
services at little orno extra cost).
59 According to one 1988 study of 109 facilities, more than 40 reported either a negative
net income or a negative net worth. See Hirsh S. Ruchlin, Continuing Care Retirement
Communities: An Analysis of Financial Viability and Health Care Coverage, 28
GERONTOLOGIST 156, 159 (1988). As one would expect, facilities that offered full nursing care,
at essentially one up front cost, were in the worst financial condition. See id. In a well-known
magazine article, one author noted that of the 50 CCFs that were financed with tax exempt
bonds since 1980, 10% defaulted on their debts and 14% failed to meet their occupancy rates.
See Denise M. Topolnicki, The Broken Promise of the Life-Care Communities, MONEY, April
1985, at 150.
60 Actually, there are a number of different financial models through which life care can
be arranged or "purchased," though most arrangements do include an up front fee, that ranged
from $15,000-$200,000 in 1990. See Fairbanks, supra note 48, at 6. A study done at the
University of Pennsylvania in 1980, concluded that the range of up front fees at that time was
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used for a number of things, including building a facility for new CCFs and
improving the existing facilities for established CCFs.61 How these entrance
funds are managed will in large part determine the financial health of the
facility.6 2 Another factor in financial health is the balance between the up front
fees (typically ranging from $40,000-$250,000) and the monthly fees.63 Unless
investments are extremely successful, large up front fees cause the facility to rely
$1,000-$187,000, with $35,000 being average. See WINK.Evoss & POWELI, supra note 56, at
34. Like most of life's expenses, these entry fees continue to increase; the current average up
front fee for entrance into a California CCF is over $800,000. See Telephone Interview by
Brian Col6n, research assistant of Professor Nathalie Martin, with Bill Woodward, Chief,
Continuing-care Contracts Branch, Continuing-care Liscensing Division, State of Cal. Dep't of
Social Servs. (July 23, 1999). In Connecticut, fees range from $39,818 to $455,900. See
ELDERLY SERVs. DIv., CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF SOCIAL SERVS., CONTINUING CARE
REIREMENT COMMUNrmIs V (1997).
While it is recognized that using actuarial information is critical to charging residents a
sufficient up front fee, see Steams et al., supra note 42, at 256, CCFs tend to misuse this
information. See WINKLEVOSS & POWELL, supra note 56, at 235-37.
61 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 37 (noting that entrance fees may provide capital to build a
new facility or to upgrade an existing facility). I found it surprising to learn that CCFs could
use up front fees to finance new facilities, assuming these fees had to be invested for the future
healthcare needs of residents. It seemed far more appropriate to finance new construction
through the more typical means, such as conventional or tax free bonds. Apparently, however,
this industry is considered too risky to generate much interest in the lending or tax free bond
markets. See STvE R. EASTAUGH, FINANCING HEALTH CARE 181 (1987). Moreover, as it
turns out, most states require very little reserves from the up front fees, and only 20 states
require any reserves at all. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text.
62 As Professor Floyd notes in his extensive article on the regulation of CCFs, a portion of
the up front fees "may go to fund the resident's future nursing care needs." Floyd, supra note
48, at 37. This is surely an understatement. Under the most typical model, in which most of the
fees are paid up front, it is absolutely critical to a CCF's survival that it set aside a large
percentage of the up front fees for residents' future long term care. See infra notes 189-92 and
accompanying text.
63 While not all CCFs charge a monthly fee, in addition to the up front fee, a failure to
charge such a fee should raise a "red flag" for prospective residents. See Fairbanks, supra note
48, at 6. Regardless of how accurate an actuarial analysis is, inflation and other unpredictable
factors require that a facility be able to make adjustments to its cash flow based on future
circumstances. See id. CCFs can, to some extent, make up for insufficient up front charges by
increasing their monthly charges, which ranged in 1989, from $695 to $1,000, depending on
the size of the unit. See id. Of course, if monthly fees go up too much, residents will have lost
one of the primary benefits of their CCF contracts, the ability to limit future expenses. See
Floyd, supra note 48, at 38 (noting that "higher entrance fees reduce the risk that increasing
monthly fees in the future will outstrip residents' future ability to pay").
Out of fairness to residents, some states regulate fee increases by restricting the frequency
and the increments of such increases, similar to the way rent control statutes control costs in
landlord-tenant situations. See Fairbanks, supra note 48, at 6.
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on resident turnover to stay afloat.64 The CCFs' financial goal should be to set
money aside from entrance fees to meet the future needs of these residents.65 In
the past, however, many facilities have used the proceeds of new contracts to
meet current obligations to existing residents. 66
Another potential financial problem CCFs have faced is vastly
overestimating the demand for their contracts.67 Reduced sales figures cause
financial failures similar to those experienced in real estate developments. 68
Similarly, if monthly operating expenses are underestimated and undercharged to
residents, cash flow problems emerge.69 Some homes also have drastically
underestimated the cost of resident health care.70 Finally, if turnover is less than
64 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 38.
65 If CCFs are going to serve their populations, up front fees must be reserved or set aside
for the future needs of residents. See Howard A. Winklevoss, Continuing Care Retirement
Communities: Issues in Financial Management and Actuarial Prediction, in CONTINUING
CARE RErIREMENT COMMUNmES: POLmCAL, SOcIAL, AND FINANCIAL IssuEs 57, 59 (Ian A.
Morrison et al., eds. 1986). Fifteen states require that a portion of the up front fees be placed in
reserve for future use, so they are not depleted by short term construction and other needs. See
infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. In many states, pre-occupancy payments must be
escrowed and released according to a set schedule. See iaL These statutes may not sufficiently
protect residents, however, because the required reserves are far too small and moreover, the
CCFs need not maintain the reserves for very long. See id
Moreover, very few state statutes actually require that reserves be set up to handle future
obligations. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text While the American Association
of Homes for the Aging ("AAHA") recommends that CCFs establish a reserve fund equal to
the annual principle and interest payments on all debt service, plus enough to cover two to six
months of operating costs, only fifteen state statutes require any reserves whatsoever. See id.
66 While several of such instances are noted in Fisher, supra note 48, at 47, the most
notorious case involving a failure to reserve is Matthews v. Pacific & S. W. Annual Conference
of the United Methodist Church (In re Pacific Homes), I B.R. 574 (Banlcr. C.D. Cal. 1979).
Pacific Homes was a CCF originally formed to take care of retiring Methodist ministers. It
eventually expanded its facilities to serve almost 1900 people in seven facilities located in four
states. Residents could pay for their services in one of three ways: total up front cash fee,
transfer of all assets, or up front fee plus a monthly fee. See Fisher, supra note 48, at 50. In the
vast majority of the CCF contracts in place, residents paid no monthly fee, making the facilities
dependent upon reserves and sound investments for continued viability. Thus, when Pacific
Homes began directing its capital toward expansion, speculative investment, and financing its
resulting operating losses, its financial condition crumbled. It began entering into new CCF
contracts to finance not just operating expenses, but also losses, creating a "Ponzi scheme" that
ultimately resulted in bankruptcy. See Winklevoss, supra at 58.
67 See Topolnicki, supra note 59, at 152, 154-55.
68 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 66.
69 See id.
70 See id.
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one estimates, revenues will be lower than projected.71 All these factors must be
monitored constantly by facilities, and both entry fees and monthly fees must be
adjusted accordingly.72 Of course, if these fees become too high to be
competitive, this will affect the viability of the facility as well.73
While an underpriced facility is no bargain, paying dearly for a continuing-
care contract does not guarantee adequate future care. Media coverage of CCFs
has focused primarily on "worst case scenarios." 74 While the fraud involved is
probably not as prevalent as the media makes it sound,75 there are many things
that residents should be concerned about when entering into a continuing-care
contract.76 They must first understand the economics of prepaying for any
service. To remain viable, a facility must set aside a portion of the funds received
to care for residents in later years, when resident health care costs are far
higher.77 The facility cannot see surplus cash as profits, given these costs, which
are essentially defined financial obligations.78 As Dr. Windevoss, an expert on
CCFs, has aptly explained:
A major problem in the financial management of a life care community is
the very deceptive nature of the income and cash flow of these communities
over the first decade and a half of their existence. When you open up a
community, you get a tremendous influx of funds in the form of entry fees,
while the health care utilization of the residents admitted does not accelerate for
about 10 or 15 years. What that means is that the overseers of that community
have to have enough patience and fortitude to reserve the monies that they are
receiving during the first 10 years until there is an inevitable increase in health
care utilization. Lack of reserves has been a big problem. As was noted above,
71 Sarah Williams, Long-Term Care Alternatives: Continuing Care Retirement
Communities, in CONTINUING CARE RETIREMENT COMMUNMEs: POLMCAL, SOCIAL &
FINANCLAL IssuEs 15, 21, 40 (an A. Morrison et al., eds. 1986); see also Floyd, supra note 48,
at 40.
72 See Williams, supra note 71, at 22; see also Floyd, supra note 48, at 41.
73 See Topolnicki, supra note 59, at 155.
74 Id at 152-56 (showcasing the most flagrantly fraudulent CCF stories); see also
Michael Moss, For Retirees, Moving into 'Continuing Care' Offers No Guarantees, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 8, 1998, at Al (reviewing numerous problems in CCFs, including a discrepancy
between advertising and contracts, residents being forced from their apartments into the
nursing wing due to financial motivations, and lack of resident input over how entrance fees
are spent).
75 Other than the Pacific Homes case, see Matthews v. Pacific & S. W. Annual Conference
ofthe United Methodist Church (In re Pacific Homes), 1 B.R at 574 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1979)
there are no reported cases of fraud in CCFs.
76 See infra notes 183-99 and accompanying text
77 Seesupra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
78 See Winklevoss, supra note 65, at 59-61.
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when communities start out they have quite a bit of money, health care
utilization is low, and they run the finances of the community in such a way that
the amount of money coming in equals the amount going out Thus, a substantial
hidden liability begins to build up. Then if they should have a minor adverse
experience, such as a cash flow problem, they find out that there is a tremendous
unfunded health care liability, which is very difficult to remedy financially.
A number of factors contribute to lack of reserves. First, generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP) are not adequate for the management of these
communities if they are going to set fees to reserve for the long-term health care
obligation. This does not imply that GAAP should not be used; certainly they
should, but they are not adequate when running a "mini-insurance company."
Both the pension and the insurance industries have already recognized this.
Second, life care communities do not often have boards which have a lot of time
to spend on finance issues, and often they do not understand the tre nature of
the financial commitment of a CCRC. Moreover, they tend to be offended if in
the early years revenues exceed expenses. As soon as this happens, the board
feels that it does not need to increase fees or suggests only a modest increase
because it looks like the community is making a profit, and the last thing board
members want to do is profit from the people they are trying to serve. Generally,
GAAP accounting statements will show substantial profits every year during the
first 10 years if the fees are correct However, they are not really profits; they are
funds that are going to be needed to support the health care obligation later on.
But the combination of the deceptive nature of GAAP accounting, the non-profit
aspect of the homes, and the lack of understanding that the health care guarantee
is a deferred obligation that should be funded, causes communities to underprice
themselves. If they are lucky enough to get through the first 15 years, then the
chances are good that they can continue with revenues equaling expenditures,
because everything will have reached a fairly steady state. Unfortunately in the
last years, inflation has caused a lot of communities to be unable to get through
the maturation period, and they have run into trouble.79
79 Id. at 59-60. Accounting dictates that revenues should match expenses and that when
you have an expense stream that will escalate because of increased health care utilization, you
can avoid having monthly fees increased by more than inflation. See id. Dr. Winklevoss goes
on to note other problems with the way CCFs have traditionally done their accounting:
When you receive a $50,000 entry fee, it is important for the board to set up the right
mechanism by which that entry fee can be considered income to the community. If one
considers that the entry fee is to be income in the first year, one is going to lose money
every year thereafter. How can one assume that the $50,000 entry fee is earned over the
lifetime of the individual? Half of the communities earn it over the life expectancy of the
individual. If a person is going to live 15 years, they will receive their income stream at
the rate of 1/15 of the $50,000 per year. Half the people are going to live beyond the life
expectancy, a period during which their care will be more expensive. So if you earn all of
the money up until a person's life expectancy, obviously you have earned that money too
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Residents need a way of obtaining necessary data regarding how funds are
reserved, so they can weigh the relative financial strength of various facilities.80
They also need some means of determining the relative risks of fraud and
mismanagement.81 Much of this need, however, is a pipe dream.82 Most
residents have no access to truly relevant information in this regard and lack the
capacity to make meaningful comparisons between facilities.83 Information is
asymmetrically distributed in favor of CCFs, and typically the best prospective
residents can do is compare costs.84 Yet this could result in making the wrong
fast. The groups of communities surviving out there are the ones that have recognized that
this is a problemrL They earn the entry fee over a longer period than life expectancy.
However, when they do this, they must recognize that they violate the fundamental
principle of management-accounting which dictates that your revenues should match your
expenses and that when you have an expense stream that will increase because of
increased health care utilization, you can avoid having monthly fees increased only by
earning a very small portion of the entry fee initially and then by gradually increasing the
amount To date, no communities seem to be eaming entry fees correctly. Thus, they are
all in the unfortunate position of earning what looks like a profit Since boards of directors
(of nonprofit organizations) do not want to make a profit, they do not pass proper fee
increases on to residents, and they start creating an unfunded health care liability.
Id at 60-61; see also Ruchlin, supra note 59, at 160 (reporting that in a 1983 study, 1/3 of all
CCFs studied had either a negative net income or a negative net worth, and that 18.4% of the
sample had both a negative net worth and a negative net income).
80 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 44-45.
81 See id; see also Winklevoss, supra note 65, at 62 (noting how difficult it is to predict
whether a CCF will be a financial success or a financial failure).
82 First, there is absolutely no uniformity from state to state, or even from facility to
facility, regarding financial reporting requirements, or the actual use of funds paid up front to a
facility. See Semanson, supra note 45, at 785. Second, given how incredibly complicated these
arrangements are, it is doubtful that the average retiree could understand all of the disclosures
and financial information in any event. See Fairbanks, supra note 48, at 4 (describing the
typical amount of paper involved in a CCF transaction, as well as the reasons elderly persons
are drawn to such arrangements).
83 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 44. As Professor Floyd explains, given the complexity of
these contracts, providers of CCF services are much more likely to have relevant information
about the industry than prospective residents will have. See id
84 See id. Professor Floyd explains the risk of relying only on price in choosing a CCF:
[U]sing a hypothetical market for automobiles ... when goods of varying grades are
offered and buyers' expectations about the quality of the goods offered are lower than that
of sellers due to the seller's superior knowledge, a breakdown may occur in the market
and trades may cease. In effect, the inferior products drive the better products out of the
market because consumers cannot tell the difference and are only willing to pay the price
of a "bad" product
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choice based on data that is too limited. 5
The financial structure of these contracts also creates perverse incentives.
86
As Professor Michael Floyd noted in his comprehensive article on the financial
regulation of CCFs, resident turnover is the only means of drastically increasing
revenues.87 Thankfully, the relatively healthy and youthful residents in these
communities can protect somewhat against the macabre possibilities for raising
cash in these instances.88
Id. at 44-45. Thus, it is necessary to provide consumers with information that will cause them
to pay the higher price for the better (presumably more financially stable) CCF product.
85 It is difficult to determine what kind of information should be required, and of that
information, which is most valuable. Among the types of disclosures required by various states
are statutes attempting to illuminate the financial status ofnew facilities, which must require:
[IThe anticipated sources of funding and their application; the financial liability of
sponsors and affiliates; the planned expenditures on items such as legal counsel,
marketing services, and land; the nature of financing arrangements; and the estimated start
up funds. Assessment of the financial viability of ongoing facilities is assisted by
additional disclosures of. the reserves maintained; recent balance sheets and income
statements; the results of actuarial calculations; the results of forecasting studies; the
history of fee increases; the level of participation in Medicare and Medicaid programs;
and the changes in ownership or management
Steams et al., supra note 42, at 251. While one can get a feel for management's competence by
how well they fulfill any applicable disclosure requirements, see id., it is unclear how much of
this information is actually valuable. Clearly the most important information relates to the level
of reserves the facility maintains. Too much information could be overwhelming. Moreover, no
amount of information can actually predict the future. As one commentator has noted, no one,
no matter how knowledgeable, can assess the feasibility of a particular facility. See
Winklevoss, supra note 65, at 63. The best one is able to do is to check the reserve policies,
check the Better Business Bureau for complaints about the facility, and see how well the
facility has predicted its occupancy rates. Accurate occupancy rates, combined with
conservative reserve policies, predict success better than any other factors. See id at 62-63.
86 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 51-52. These perverse incentives are present even outside
of bankruptcy. See id
87 See id. at 52. As Professor Floyd notes, because death is virtually the only way to raise
additional entry fees, this could induce a desperate management to provide less than adequate
care or to even "hasten the demise of residents" in order to get the double benefit of reducing
health care costs for this individual while at the same time earning another entrance fee. Id.
88 See id. As Professor Floyd has noted:
CCRC residents are in a position to monitor the care they receive as well as that given to
their friends in the community. Furthermore, residents have a vested interest in
monitoring the performance of the community's nursing facility because the residents are
likely to be future consumers of its services.
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Other factors also support a need for regulation. 89 For many residents, the
large sum required under these contracts represents the last major financial
decision they will make.90 There will often be few resources left after this
contract is executed to make up for a poor choice.91 Additionally, unlike the
purchase of a home or condominium, residents do not obtain a fee interest in
their homes.92 They receive only the equivalent of a license to occupy the
premises as long as monthly fees are remitted.93 Generally, then, residents have
no recognized property interest in their "home," and their interests are
subordinate to those of all secured creditors and even some unsecured
creditors.94 As will be discussed in subsequent sections of this Article, this
Id Thus, residents can rely on a type of continuing buddy system to see that they are treated
fairly in the future, an option most nursing home residents do not have.
89 See William A. Wines, The Long March to Bildisco and the 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments: Establishment of a Limited Right to Reject Collective Bargaining Agreements,
20 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 221-22 (1985) (discussing how Marathon crippled the bankruptcy
system and how there was a desire to make the system as credible as possible in light of the
confusion). Virtually every scholar who has written about CCFs and regulation, except one,
has recommended more regulation. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 48, at 59-60; McDonald,
supra note 55, at 591; Steams et al., supra note 42, at 248-49. But see Floyd, supra note 48, at
33-35.
90 See Fisher, supra note 48, at 49 (noting that CCF bankruptcies are disturbing because
the central purpose and promise of CCFs is to provide security and certainty for the rest of a
person's life); see also Floyd, supra note 48, at 52; McDonald, supra note 55, at 588-89
(stating that "[t]he life savings of elderly persons have been lost under life care contracts which
refuse refunds even upon discharge of the resident. Moreover, the possibility of the life care
provider's bankruptcy is an ever-present risk").
91 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 45, 52.
92 See id. at 46. Maine's continuing-care statute provides that CCFs can sell
condominiums, therefore some residents in Maine may own a condominium at their facility.
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6207 (West 1989). Vermont's statute also infers that an
ownership interest in CCF real estate is possible. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 8005(d)(13)
(1993). This would certainly be the exception to the rule, however, and if the contract is silent
on the issue, the resident gets no ownership interest in the facility's real estate.
93 See Eastaugh, supra note 61, at 177-78. It is important for residents to understand that
the payment of the up front fee does not provide them with any ownership interest in their
CCF, but rather only with a license to occupy the premises. See id. at 178. This interest is not
even equal to a leasehold interest, which is at least a recognized interest in property. See
Upland Euclid, Ltd. v. Grace Restaurant Co. (In re Upland/Euclid, Ltd. Restaurant Co.), 56
B.R. 250, 252 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1985) (stating that lessor cannot deprive lessee of"possessory
property interest in the leased premises"); see Floyd, supra note 48, at 46.
94 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 46; see also infra notes 319, 328-35 and accompanying
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creates very unfair results for residents upon insolvency, particularly in federal
bankruptcy cases.95
These concerns have led to an extensive maze of state regulations in the area
of life care contracts, the prototypes of which are discussed throughout this
Article.96 Many attributes of these statutes are preempted by the Bankruptcy
Code after a bankruptcy is filed, and others are voidable under particular
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.97 The financial requirements and disclosure
statutes, however, pose no such problem.98 Some economists question whether
these regulations actually solve any problems and also believe their costs
outweigh their benefits.99 As an alternative, one scholar has suggested that we let
market alternatives protect citizens from harm, rather than continue to regulate
this industry.100 According to this scholar, industry accreditation, rating systems,
and increased training for CCF managers and financial planners could be more
beneficial than regulation, which has failed to uncover the most flagrant
frauds.101
I remain unconvinced. Given the unique costs to residents and perverse
incentives of CCF management, I believe some regulation is necessary. The way
states have gone about regulating CCFs, however-piecemeal and erratically-
continues to cause problems, particularly in the face of federal bankruptcy
laws.102
II. BALANCING BANKRuPTCY CODE SUPREMACY AND FEDERALISM: WHO
HAS THE RIGHT TO CONTROL CCF INSOLVENCIES,
THE STATES OR THE BANKRUPTCY CouRTs?
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the
95 See infra notes 284-405 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 169-220 and accompanying text.
97 See i d
98 See infra notes 171-220 and accompanying text.
99 See, e.g., Floyd, supra note 48, at 59-74.
100 See id. at 53-59. Professor Floyd discusses various market altematives that may work
to protect citizens from harm, including: (1) industry self-accreditation, with standards of
accreditation based on administration, resident life, finance, and health care; (2) the
development of rating programs that would identify degrees of quality, which would allow
consumers to make initial evaluations and, if the rating criteria were raised over time, would
encourage continuing improvements in the industry; and (3) facilities entering into insurance
contracts to pool the risks they face and protect their solvency. See id.
101 See id. at 61-63.
102 See infra notes 169-283 and accompanying text.
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Bankruptcy Code supercedes all state laws in the area of bankruptcy.' 03 Courts
have held that any state law that conflicts with the provisions or purposes of the
Bankruptcy Code is preempted by it,104 unless the state law protects the health
and welfare of its citizens. Other than in the areas of criminal law and
environmental law, courts have been vigilant in protecting bankruptcy rights
over virtually all state statutes that come in conflict with the Bankruptcy Code,
either directly or indirectly.106
Many provisions contained in CCF statutes are preempted by the
Bankruptcy Code and thus unenforceable in bankruptey.' 0 7 Some are simply not
enforceable during the pendancy of the case, but are otherwise enforceable and
very valuable.10 8 Others are entirely unenforceable in bankruptcy, are not
relevant otherwise, and mislead citizens about their extent of protection under
applicable state law.109 Other provisions may or may not be enforceable and
present issues that have not yet been decided by courts.110 These statutes raise
many unanswered questions. Are states aware of the Supremacy Clause and the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code when they enact legislation? Are they trying
to make law, or simply to provide for future changes in the law? Do they know
which of these provisions are enforceable and which are not? This Part reviews
bankruptcy supremacy and preemption, then reviews various provisions in CCF
statutes to determine which statutes survive a supremacy analysis.
A. Supremacy and the History of the Bankruptcy Code
It is unclear why the area of debt and credit became a matter of federal law.
While Congress was permitted by the Constitution to enact a uniform system of
bankruptcy laws as early as 1800, it did not do so until the Bankruptcy Act of
103 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause to the Constitution provides that:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
104 See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
105 See infra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
106 See infra notes 123-68 and accompanying text.
107 See infra notes 169-283 and accompanying text.
108 See infra notes 171-99 and accompanying text.
109 See infra notes 200-36 and accompanying text.
110 See infra notes 237-83 and accompanying text.
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1898, when it finally enacted a comprehensive bankruptcy law that applied to
both merchants and individuals, and to both voluntary and involuntary
bankruptcy cases. 111
While state insolvency statutes remained intact alongside the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 for a brief time, in 1929 the Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute that provided for a limited bankruptcy discharge because federal law
preempted state law on this issue.11 2 The Court reasoned that any other ruling
would create intolerable confusion, not to mention inconsistency, and would
improperly interfere with the federal Bankruptcy Act. 113 In 1971, in Perez v.
Campbell,114 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to bankruptcy
supremacy, again invalidating a state law that interfered with the bankruptcy
discharge provisions. As the Court reasoned, federal bankruptcy law must be
protected from state interference, regardless of the purpose behind the state
statute.115 The Arizona statute in question excepted from discharge any
judgment obtained in connection with an automobile accident.116 The Supreme
Court held that because this state statute interfered directly with the discharge
I1I See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3
AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 5, 13-14 (1995). Professor Tabb indicated that Charles Pickney of
South Carolina authored the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution, Article I, Section 3. See id.
at 13. Very little discussion or apparent thought went into the Clause, and the only clue we
have as to why it was enacted can be gleaned from the following remark by James Madison:
The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the
regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their
property may lie or be removed into different states that the expediency of it seems not
likely to be drawn into question.
Id
112 See id at 13. The Bankruptcy Act was enacted after several unsuccessful attempts to
come up with a comprehensive system. See Joseph Lamport, Note, The Pre-emption of
Bankruptcy Only Exemptions, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 583, 587-89 (1985).
113 See International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929). As the Court stated:
The national purpose to establish uniformity necessarily excludes state regulation. It is
apparent, without comparison in detail [of state and federal law] ... that intolerable
inconsistencies and confusion would result if that insolvency law be given effect while the
national Act is in force... States may not pass or enforce laws to interfere with or
complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or auxiliary regulations.
Id at 265.
114 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
115 See id. at 651-52.
116 See id at 642.
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granted by the Bankruptcy Code, it violated the Supremacy Clause and was thus
invalid. According to the Court, a state statute is preempted whenever it "stands
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." 1 7 As the Court reasoned, Congress' goal was to
discharge the obligations of the debtor, and states cannot enact statutes that
conflict with this goal.
In light of Perez, the law seemed to be that whenever a state statute
interfered with the Bankruptcy Code in any way-in other words, interfered with
its purposes or its implementation-the Bankruptcy Code preempted the state
statute.118 Since Perez, however, the Supreme Court has made it clear that this
11 7 Id. at 649. Interestingly, just before deciding Perez, the Supreme Court decided
Younger v. Harris, a seminal case in federal jurisprudence in which the Supreme Court found
that a federal court could not void a California criminal syndicalism statute on constitutional
grounds. The Court found that it could not enjoin the enforcement of the statute, because such
federal action would violate principles of comity and federalism, and would improperly intrude
on a state court proceeding. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 38-39, 41 (1971). According
to the Supreme Court, there must be a great and immediate danger of irreparable harm for such
an injunction to issue, and Harris had the ability to argue for a violation of his constitutional
rights, in defense to the criminal charges. See id at 46-49. Thus, no irreparable harm was
present and the state statute had to be given full effect.
1 18 In Perez, 402 U.S. at 637, in contrast to Younger, 401 U.S. at 37, the Supreme Court
took an entirely different analytical approach. Justice Black, who also wrote for the Court in
Younger, held that the Bankruptcy Act preempted a state statute that attempted to preclude a
person from discharging in bankruptcy, any judgment rendered as a result of an automobile
accident See Perez, 402 U.S. at 642. According to Justice Black, to whom the court cites at
length, the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to provide debtors with a fresh start could not be
firustrated by a state statute. According to Black, the state statute improperly hindered the
accomplishment of a Bankruptcy Act goal, thus interfering with the Supremacy Clause. See id
at 649; see also Duffey v. Dollison, 734 F.2d 265, 267 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
Supremacy Clause dictates that a conflict between bankruptcy and state interests be resolved in
favor of federal law); Erlin Manor Nursing Home, Inc., v. Rate Setting Comm'n (In re Erlin
Manor Nursing Home, Inc.), 36 B.R. 672, 677 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (holding that if a state
regulation conflicts with bankruptcy law, the regulation is invalid in the bankruptcy context);
Colin v. Fidelity Standard Mortgage Corp. (In re Fidelity Standard Mortgage Corp.), 36 B.R.
496, 499 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that bankruptcy law is unrestricted and paramount
and will preempt state law on similar subject matters); Layfield v. Director of Public Safety (In
re Layfield), 12 B.R. 846, 850 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981) (holding that the Director of the Public
Safety Commission was without authority to suspend the debtor's license, to withhold it from
the debtor, or to condition its return upon the requirement of purchasing special high-risk
insurance-all as a violation of the "Fresh Stare' doctrine); Henry v. Heyison, 4 B.R. 437, 442
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (holding that Pennsylvania's Financial Responsibility Act subverted the
Bankruptcy Code's policy of giving debtors a fresh start because it required bankruptcy debtors
to take extra steps in order to obtain a driver's license); Rutledge v. City of Shreveport, 387 F.
Supp. 1277, 1281 (W.D. La. 1975) (holding that a local regulation that dismissed plaintiff from
his job as a police officer because he filed for bankruptcy was unconstitutional in that it
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simple bright-line, "rock beats paper" analysis, is not applicable in every
situation.119 The issue is complicated by the interplay between concurrent state
and federal statutory systems, each designed to achieve different-and often
competing-goals. 120 Most scholars agree, however, that in all but the most
unusual circumstances, federal statutes do invalidate competing state statutes on
the same or similar subject matter, and that "within constitutional limits
Congress may pre-empt state authority." 21 It is also well-accepted that
preemption can be: (1) express, (2) implied by a federal regulatory scheme that is
so pervasive it leaves no room for states to supplement the scheme, or (3)
implied due to a direct, head-to-head conflict between state and federal law. 122
conflicted with federal bankruptcy law); Grimes v. Hoschler, 525 P.2d 65, 69-70 (Cal. 1974)
(holding that certain sections of the state's Contractors License Law, which threaten a
contractor with the loss of his license if his debts incurred as a contractor are discharged for less
than their full amount in a bankruptcy proceeding, and which forbid the reissuance of a
revoked license until the amounts of the discharged debts are paid in full, conflicts with the
Bankruptcy Act and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution).
119 See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47-53 (1986) (refusing to resolve all conflicts
between state and federal law by preempting state law, and instead balancing the interests of
both states and federal government).
120 See Ellen E. Sward, Resolving Conflicts Between Bankruptcy Law and the State
Police Power, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 403, 443-44 (noting the conflict in the context of
environmental laws).
121 Honorable William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Inequality, Among Creditors:
The Unconstitutional Use of Successor Liability to Create a New Class of Priority Claimants,
4 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 325, 346 (1996) (citing Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983)). In Pacific Gas, the
Court held that provisions in the 1976 amendments to California's Warren-Alquist Act, which
conditioned the construction of nuclear plants on findings by a state commission that adequate
storage facilities and means of disposal were available for nuclear waste, were not preempted
by the Federal Atomic Energy Act of 1984. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 194-95. The Court
found that the need for new power facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and services,
have characteristically been governed by the states. The Court reasoned that Federal interests
were national security, public health, and safety. See id. at 207. The Court further concluded
that the federal government occupies the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, while the
California statute addresses economic concerns. Because the statute fell outside the occupied
field of nuclear safety regulation, it was not preempted. See id. at 216.
122 See Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 121, at 346; see also Pacfic Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-
04 (discussing express preemption and implied preemption due to a pervasive regulatory
scheme); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de ]a Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(discussing implied preemption due to a pervasive regulatory scheme); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (discussing both express and implied preemption); Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (discussing implied
preemption resulting from a head-to-head conflict between state and federal law).
In Louisiana Public Service Commission v. FCC, the Supreme Court described
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B. Federalism and Supremacy
State interests that take priority over federal interests are often uniquely local
concerns, things that cannot be legislated from far away or that have always been
left to the states' domain.123 The clearest example is criminal law.
In 1986, the Supreme Court clarified that it would not allow the Bankruptcy
Code to run roughshod over state criminal laws. In Kelly v. Robinson,124 the
Court upheld a state statute requiring a bankruptcy debtor to pay criminal
restitution fees to a state.125 Mrs. Robinson had fraudulently received welfare
benefits from the state and was required to reimburse the state under a
purportedly criminal statute.126 When she tried to discharge the debt in
federal preemption as follows:
Preemption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal statute, expresses a clear intent to
preempt state law, when there is outright or actual conflict between federal and state law,
where compliance with both federal and state law is in effect physically impossible, where
there is implicit in federal law a barrier to state regulation, where Congress has legislated
comprehensively, thus occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the
States to supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress.
476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986) (citations omitted).
There are also constitutional limitations on what federal statutes can impose on
states, although these limits have not been fully articulated. See Pacific Gas, 461
U.S. at 203. The Court in Pacific Gas found it well established that within
constitutional limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in express
terms. See id. at 203. Preemption without explicit language is acceptable when there
is no room for states to supplement the law because the act of Congress may touch a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system may be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject or because the
object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. See id. at 203--04; see also Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding the
existing bankruptcy court system unconstitutional because it attempted to vest the
judicial power of the United States into non-Article III courts); Michael L Donovan,
Note, Criminal Restitution and Bankruptcy Code Discharge-Another Case for
Defining the Scope ofFederal Bankruptcy Law, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 107, 122-
23 (1989) (arguing that Congress' grant of power under the Bankruptcy Clause is
necessarily limited by bankruptcy's jurisprudential role in history).
123 See infra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
124 479 U.S. 36 (1986).
125 See id. at 53 (holding that because criminal proceedings focus on the states' interest in
rehabilitating and punishing criminals, rather than a victim's desire for compensation,
restitution orders fall within section 523(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code).
126 See id. at 38-39.
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bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court found the debt nondischargeable despite the
Bankruptcy Code's broad discharge policies.127 The appellate court reversed 128
and the Supreme Court reversed again,129 finding that the criminal restitution
obligations were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. While the Court relied in part
on a specific Bankruptcy Code provision, section 523(a)(7), that arguably made
the debt nondischargable, 130 the Court also held that the state must be allowed to
protect citizens by enacting and enforcing criminal statutes.1 31
127 See id. at 41; see also id. at 56-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing the broad
discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and denying that a state restitution statute could
interfere with them).
128 See In re Robinson, 776 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'd, Kelly v. Robinson, 479
U.S. 36 (1986). The Bankruptcy and District Court held that money Mrs. Robinson owed to
the state was not technically a debt, but was some other type of obligation. See Robinson v.
Director, Office of Adult Probation (In re Robinson), 45 B.R. 423, 424-25 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1984). The Second Circuit disagreed, noting that Congress had intended to give "debt" the
broadest possible meaning under the Bankruptcy Code and that all obligations of any dnd
were to be resolved through the bankruptcy proceeding. See In re Robinson, 776 F.2d at 34.
The Second Circuit also rejected a tortured argument many courts had made to explain why
this was not a debt or did not provide a "right of payment," which defines a bankruptcy
"claim." See id, at 33-34. According to some courts, the Office of Adult Probation (or some
other state office), rather than the crime victim, had the right to enforce the obligation. As long
as the victim of the crime does not receive any payments directly from the debtor, then the
obligation is not a debt and cannot be discharged. See In re Johnson, 32 B.R. 614, 616 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1983); State v. Magnifico (In re Magnifico), 21 BR. 800, 802-03 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1982). Apparently, if the restitution is seen as a penalty and not a reimbursement to the state, it
serves a deterrent purpose rather than a debt collection purpose and is not a debt. In reality,
however, restitution serves more of a compensatory goal than a punishment goal. See Richard
R Laster, Criminal Restitution: A Survey of Its Past History and An Analysis of Its Present
Usefulness, 5 U. RICH. L. REV. 71, 96 (1970).
129 See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 43.
130 See i at 50 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX7) (1994)) (making nondischargeable any
debt "to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of
a government unit and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss"). Since Mrs. Robinson
was paying back the money she improperly received from welfare, it is hard to see why this is
not "compensation for actual loss." Deborah A. Ballam, Kelly v. Robinson Revisited:
Dischargeability of Restitution Obligations in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Proceedings, 34 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 35 n.14 (1989) (citing numerous authorities for the proposition that restitution
is virtually always aimed at compensation rather than at rehabilitating the criminal); see also
Kelly, 479 U.S. at 55 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that by tying the amount of restitution to
the amount of actual money Mrs. Robinson received from welfare, the state strongly suggested
that the statutory goal is compensation).
131 'Me Court stated that it was required to interpret the Bankruptcy Code with deference
to federalism issues. See Kelly, 479 U.S. at 49. The Court further stated that the state's interest
in administering their criminal justice system, free from federal interference, was one of the
most powerful considerations affecting the Robinson decision and the Court's interpretation of
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While the Court held that federalism concerns required that the state be
allowed to enforce its criminal justice system, some scholars question whether
these concerns can ever outweigh the power of the Supremacy Clause. 132 In fact,
many lower courts that had considered the issue of discharging criminal
restitution obligations held that these obligations were clearly debts
dischargeable in bankruptcy, and that the statutes creating these obligations
violate the Supremacy Clause. 133 The Kelly decision contains a powerful dissent
by Justice Marshall, claiming that even if this were a "real" criminal statute that
actually did protect citizens in some way, rather than simply filling the state's
coffers, then any federalism issues are necessarily outweighed by the larger
concerns of separation of powers.134
In addition to federalism concerns, some commentators argue that the
the Bankruptcy Code. See id. These statements are highly controversial, however, because
collecting money relating to criminal activity is not the same as protecting the public from
criminal activity.
132 See Ballam, supra note 130, at 21-22. As Professor Ballam notes, by focusing only
on federalism concerns, the Supreme Court totally ignored a second constitutional
consideration, the Supremacy Clause, which generally takes priority over federalism concerns;
see also Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 121, at n.1 13 (explaining that once Congress acts under
the Bankruptcy Clause, state statutes are simply not permitted to conflict with the resulting
federal statute).
133 See In re Johnson-Allen, 871 F.2d 421, 426 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that restitution
obligations arising from the crime of welfare fraud constitute a debt and are thus
dischargeable); Gilliam v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville (In re Gilliam), 67 B.R 83, 85
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (relying on Brown v. Shiver (In re Brown), 39 B.R. 820, 829
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984), and stating that a debtor's obligations to pay a criminal fine and
court costs constitute debts for bankruptcy purposes and are thus dischargeable); Brown v.
Shriver (In re Brown), 39 B.R. 820, 829 (Bankr. M.D. Term. 1984) (relying on Perez and
holding that a restitution award is dischargeable in bankruptcy); Redenbaugh v. Gahle (In re
Redenbaugh), 37 B.R. 383, 387 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that a restitution award is
dischargeable); In re James, 10 B.R. 2, 4 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1980) (holding that the creditor
should not be allowed to proceed with prosecution of the debtor for writing a check on
insufficient funds unless the debt was determined to be nondischargeable).
134 Justice Marshall wrote:
While I am wholly in sympathy with the policy interests underlying the Court's
opinion, "in our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of powers is too
fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially decreeing what accords
with 'common sense and the public weal.' Our Constitution vests such responsibility in
the political branches."
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 58 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). These concerns about separation of powers and supremacy may explain
why the Kelly Court relied not only on federalism concerns, but also on section 523, in holding
the debt nondischargeable. See id. at 49.
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preemption doctrine is limited by the constitutional provision from which the
relevant federal law flow.135 In this situation, some argue that we must view the
particular conflict between state and federal law through the Bankruptcy Clause,
the constitutional enabling provision of the Bankruptcy Code, to ensure that
bankruptcy law does not improperly encroach on other aspects of the law.136
Other scholars argue that this constitutional purpose analysis is unnecessary. 137
According to one Bankruptcy Judge and his former clerk, "[t]he Bankruptcy
Clause itself stands for the proposition that once Congress chQoses to act under
the authority granted to it by the Bankruptcy Clause, this federal bankruptcy law
is the supreme law of the land and states have no jurisdiction to enact laws
governing the same.' 138 This comment, however, may put the rabbit in the hat.
After all, what authority is granted to Congress in enacting the Bankruptcy
Code? Congress can and occasionally does outstep its bounds, 139 and there are
limits to the ways in which the Bankruptcy Code can interfere with legitimate
powers of states.140
135 See Donovan, supra note 122, at 122; Michelangelo Scafidi, Comment,
Circumventing State Court Orders of Criminal Restitution: A Bankruptcy Loophole, 19 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 449, 453 (1986) (pointing out that bankruptcy cannot become a haven for
criminals). The first of these two student authors insists that all of bankruptcy law must be
viewed in light of its place in jurisprudential history, see Donovan, supra note 122, at 122,
which he presumably thinks is quite low. As to the second student author, I don't see the
recipients of fraudulent welfare funds as the kind of criminals that society is worried about
protecting through bankruptcy. See Scafidi, supra, at 453.
136 See Donovan, supra note 122, at 122-23. While Mr. Donovan insists that we look to
the Bankruptcy Clause to determine bankruptcy's rightful role in the hierarchy of law, he
provides no suggestions as to how to do this, nor cites any authorities that shed light on how
this would be accomplished.
137 See Ballam, supra note 130, at 24. Professor Ballam argues that whether a state statute
violates supremacy principles depends on the purpose of the statue. If the purpose is
compensatory, the statute is an invalid violation of supremacy, but if it is deterrent or
pecuniary, it is a valid exercise of state power. See Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 121, at n.1 13.
Neither of these scholars mentions the need to go back to the Bankruptcy Clause to determine
questions of supremacy.
138 Bodoh & Morgan, supra note 121, at n.1 13.
139 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)
(holding the existing bankruptcy court system unconstitutional because it attempted to vest the
judicial power of the United States in non-Article HI courts); see also Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3852 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The 1984 amendment added 28 U:S.C. § 157(d) (1994),
providing that decisions involving conflicts between bankruptcy law and other federal laws
enacted under the Commerce Clause should be heard by Article I courts, not bankruptcy
courts.
140 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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The task in determining if preemption occurs is to decide which of two
statutes takes precedence when they have conflicting goals. First, this requires a
determination that the statutes actually conflict, and if they do, then it requires an
identification of the goals of the two competing laws or systems. If there is such
a conflict, to the extent permitted by the Bankruptcy Code and the Supremacy
Clause, we can attempt to balance these goals.' 41 Normally, the federal statute
will preempt the state statute. Only truly local issues worthy of special treatment
can prevail over conflicting federal law. In the meantime, states will continue to
make political decisions, of which the federal government will be entirely
unaware. 142 Courts of various genres will then need to decide whether there is a
conflict, and if so, whether deference should be given to the state law out of
federalism concerns. 143
C. The Police Powers of States
The Bankruptcy Code defers to federalism concerns by allowing states to
141 Areas in which state statutes frequently have been invalidated on the basis of
supremacy include: (1) criminal statutes relating to restitutionary debts, for example, those
relating to negligently operating a vehicle, see Henry v. Heyison, 4 B.R. 437,442 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1980), or writing a bad check, see Barnett v. K-Mart (In re Barnett), 15 B.R. 504, 512
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); (2) spend thrift trusts, see In re Wimmer, 121 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr.
C.D. Ill. 1990); (3) exemptions, see Kanter v. Moneymaker, 505 F.2d 228, 231 (9th Cir. 1974);
and (4) environmental statutes, see United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 553 F. Supp. 1220, 1230
(D.R.I. 1982). While Congress clearly provided for some concurrent laws, such as in the case
of exemptions, see 11 U.S.C. § 522(b); Kanter, 505 F.2d at 231, and also agreed to borrow
certain concepts from state law, such as what constitutes property or a security interest; see In
re Gunder, 8 B.R. 390, 392 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980), this was probably done as much out of
convenience as for deference to state law. Whatever the reason, Congress has chosen to defer
to states on certain issues but not others.
This results from a hierarchy of laws that has been mandated by the Constitution. Based
on a recent Supreme Court case, the hierarchy seems to work as follows. The Fourteenth
Amendment rights trump a state's right to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment. See Robinson v. Department of Transp., 394 S.E.2d 590, 591 (Ga. App. 1990).
The Eleventh Amendment rights trump the Article I powers, which include those created under
the Bankruptcy Clause, the Indian Commerce Clause, and the Patents and Copyrights Clauses.
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996). These Article I powers
appear to trump other federal statutes enacted generally by Congress, such as the National
Labor Relations Act, but this is not completely clear. Finally, federal statutes enacted generally,
as well as under a particular provision of the Constitution, trump state laws on the same subject
matter. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). In a
nutshell, that explains why state statutes dealing with bankruptcy and insolvency may not
conflict with the Bankruptcy Code and survive.
142 See, e.g., supra notes 24-26.
14 3 See Sward, supra note 120, at 444-45.
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override the bankruptcy system in certain situations in which state interests or
policies outweigh federal bankruptcy policies. 144 While bankruptcy generally
stops all collection activity against the debtors and their assets through broad
automatic stay provisions, 145 the automatic stay does not apply to activities by
states exercising their police powers.146 In other words, states are free to
continue exercising their police power, without regard to the bankruptcy filing.
The police powers are often defined as those powers necessary to protect the
health and safety of citizens. 147 The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code apparently
recognized that health and safety concerns override the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code and remain within the rightful sphere of the states.148
To really balance health and safety concerns against bankruptcy policies,
however, one must know what bankruptcy goals these concerns are overriding.
The goals of the Bankruptcy Code vary, depending on the type of case
involved.149 For the individual debtor, the primary goal is to discharge all or
144 See Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 50 (1986) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX7) (1994),
which defines nondischargeable debts owed to a governmental unit as a fine or penalty but not
as compensation for a pecuniary loss); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(bX4) (exempting from the
automatic stay any attempt by a state to exercise its valid police power); id § 522 (giving states
the right to limit debtors to state exemptions).
145 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
146 See id § 362(bX4).
147 See, eg., Kisler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 171 (1962) (stating that
state powers protecting life and limb are as pervasive as any state powers and must be protected
from federal disempowerment); Airline Pilots Ass'n v. Continental Airlines (In re Continental
Airlines), 125 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding environmental injunction claims to protect
health and welfare and thus within states' police powers); Javens v. City of Hazel Park (In re
Javens), 107 F.3d 359, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding that demolition statutes protected the
public and were thus within the states' police powers).
148 The legislative history indicates that the police power should be applied narrowly. See
124 CONG. REc. H32350, H32395 (1978, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436,6444-45; see
also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6299 (listing
specific incidents in which the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay,
including when a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, similar police or regulatory laws, or
attempting to fix damages for the violation of such a law).
Courts also have consistently interpreted the police power narrowly. See TXIA Holdings
Corp. v. National Mediation Bd. (In re Continental Airlines Corp.), 40 B.R. 299, 304 (Bankr.
S.D. Tex. 1984); Heckler Land Dev. Corp. v. Montgomery (In re Heckler Land Dev. Corp.),
15 B.R. 856, 858 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 198 1). Some courts have gone as far as excepting only those
actions that are exercises of police powers "urgently" needed to protect the public health and
welfare. See Eisenberg v. Incorporated Village of Mineola (In re IDH Realty, Inc.), 16 B.R. 55,
57 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981); Schatzman v. Department of Health & Rehabilitation Servs. (In re
King Mem'l Hosp., Inc.), 4 B.R. 704,708 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
149 See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text; see also Sward, supra note 120,
2000]
OHIO STATEL4WJOURNAL
most debts and walk away from bankruptcy with a fresh start; unhampered by
stifling indebtedness and free to become a productive member of society once
again.150 For a corporate debtor who is liquidating its assets, and even one who is
reorganizing, a primary goal of the Bankruptcy Code is maximizing the assets
available for distribution to creditors.151 A closely related goal for the
reorganizing debtor is reducing economic waste by preserving the debtor's
business as a going concern, maximizing creditor returns by paying distributions
over time from future earnings, and preserving jobs and other economic
relationships. 152
The question is whether continuing-care statutes protect health and safety
and thus fall within the police power exception to the Bankruptcy Code. If they
do, the continuing-care statutes can be enforced despite conflicting provisions in
the Bankruptcy Code. Recognized exercises of police power include, at the very
least, the state's power to regulate the conduct of its citizens for the health and
safety of such citizens and for the community as a whole.1 53 These concerns are
legitimately "local" and thus should remain within the state's control because
one would need to "be there" in order to best regulate the activity.154 Moreover,
at 408. Professor Sward's article contains an extensive description of the various policies
behind the different types of bankruptcy proceedings. See id. at 408-14.
150 See Murphy & Robinson Inv. Co. v. Cross (In re Cross), 666 F.2d 873, 879 (5th Cir.
1982); Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. Vickers (In re Vickers), 577 F.2d 683, 686-87 (10th
Cir. 1978) (stating that a primary goal of bankruptcy is rehabilitation of the debtor through
discharge of indebtedness); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (stating that a
primary purpose of bankruptcy is to allow individual debtors the opportunity to be free of pre-
existing debts); see also Nathalie Martin, Fee Shifing in Bankruptcy: Deterring Frivolous,
Fraud-Based Objections to Discharge, 76 N.C. L. REV. 97, 108-19 (1997).
151 See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMrs OF BANKRUPrcY LAW 1-6 (1986)
(stating that bankruptcy law's primary concern should be with maximizing the assets available
for creditors).
152 See, e.g., Kathryn R. Heidt, The Changing Paradigm of Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
1055, 1078 (1994) (stating that the goal of bankruptcy is to distribute the effects of failing
business); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. M. L. REV. 775, 788 (1987)
(describing the many benefits to both businesses that are reorganized, as well as persons who
do business with a debtor that reorganizes); see also Nathalie Martin, Noneconomic Interests in
Bankruptcy: Standing on the Outside Looking In, 59 OHIo ST. L. 429, 436-39 (1998).
153 See RuTH LOCKE ROErriNGER, TBE SUPREME COURT AND STATE POLICE POWER: A
STUDY IN FEDERALISM 10-16 (1957). As Professor Roettinger notes in her doctoral
dissertation, the powers of the states are residual powers and consist only of whatever is left
over after the federal govemment exercises its powers "subject to certain constitutional
limitations." Id.; see also Sward, supra note 120, at 414.
154 In other words, some issues simply cannot be regulated from Washington, D.C.
because the people enacting such regulations are unfamiliar with local circumstances, physical
and cultural topography, or other local concerns. Examples include provisions for the disposal
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one would need a vested interest in regulating the activity, which can be absent
in massive federal regulatory schemes. 155
An area in which states have maintained a high degree of regulatory control
in bankruptcy is in environmental legislation, which clearly affects the health and
safety of citizens.156 Other heavily regulated areas include zoning, 157 housing,158
of radioactive waste, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992), and the
regulation of guns in schools, see Rachel J. Littnan, Gun-Free Schools: Constitutional
Powers, Limitations, and Social Policy Concerns Surrounding Federal Regulation ofFirearms
in Schools, 5 SErON HALL CONST. L., 723, 769 (1995).
155 See Littman, supra note 154, at 769 (suggesting that local regulation was the best way
to achieve the national goal of gun-free schools because federalization clogs local autonomy);
see also Julius Pohlenz, Note, New York v. United States-Invalidation of the Take Title
Provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 and Its
Consequences, 7 TUL. ENVrL. LJ. 221, 225 (1993) (pointing out that the Court noted that
accountability increases if state regulations are encouraged because state officials are more
responsive and more directly accountable to local concerns than federal officials).
While many economists and scholars would argue that both state and federal governments
regulate far more than they should, some forms of regulation are needed in order to correct
market failures that fall through the cracks in capitalism. For an excellent discussion of market
failure in the context of environmental regulation, see Sward, supra note 120, 416-20; see also
R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 6-7 (1960). This is particularly true
when a business or person externalizes costs to people who are outside the chain of production
and who have no control over the potentially harmful activity. See idt Environmental costs are
again a good example. Damaging pollutants can be released into a public water source, for
example, and people who depend on that water source will be damaged. The polluter may have
no incentive to clean up the damage or stop polluting because the injured people have no
market power to stop the activity. The same result would occur if the polluter knew it could
discharge the costs of such pollution in bankruptcy. In fact, this is one reason why many
environmental claims are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, despite that failing to allow
discharge often impedes rehabilitation and creates other societal costs. See Midatlantic Nat'l
Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 505 (1986) (refusing to allow the
discharge of environmental clean-up costs resulting from ongoing environmental pollution).
We have decided, as a society, that we cannot afford to allow businesses to externalize these
environmental costs. The health and safety costs to citizens are simply too high.
15 6 See Sward, supra note 120, at n.67. As Professor Sward points out, "[s]tates also
sometimes regulate the environment, because of incentives in the federal legislation." See, e.g.,
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(aX1) (1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. § 6926(e) (1994); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994). See generally Robert L.
Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies for Pollution, 134 U. PA. L. REV.
121 (1985) (discussing whether state common law environmental remedies are preempted by
federal environmental statutes); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregulation, Federalism
and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 607
(1985) (arguing that while states regulate many forms of conduct, these regulations often
advance state interests at the expense of national interests).
157 See Laurie Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the First
Amendment, 64 B.U. L. REV. 767 (1984); J. Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social
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employment,1 59 hospitals, 160 nursing homes,161 and financial markets and
investment regulations.162 These are all areas covered by numerous state statutes,
which were enacted to protect citizens' health and safety, to preserve the
integrity of financial markets, and to maintain a pleasant environment for people
to work and play.163 Some of these goals are probably sufficient to override the
policies of the Bankruptcy Code and some probably are not. While regulating
CCFs would appear to be within a state's police power, whether a particular
provision will be upheld in bankruptcy depends on what the particular provision
provides. 164
While states are permitted to continue enforcing statutes that protect the
Control, 1982 DuKE LJ. 761; Sward, supra note 120, at n.74 (citing ROBERT M. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING (3d ed. 1986)).
15 8 See Sward, supra note 120, at n.72 (citing various state statutes regulating housing
and landlord tenant relations).
159 See id. at n.68 (citing various state statutes regulating employment).
160 See id. at n.71 (citing numerous state statutes regulating hospitals).
161 See id. at n.70 (citing several state statutes regulating nursing homes).
162 See Floyd, supra note 48, at 61-74; see also Sward, supra note 120, at n.73 (citing
Titus, Uniform Securities Act (1985), 19 REV. OF SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 81 (1986);
Braisted, RUSA Draft: Regulation of Securities by States, 7 NAT'LLJ. 15 (1985).
163 See Sward, supra note 120, at 416; see also Sachs v. Ryan (In re Ryan), 15 B.R. 514,
519 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (discussing various reasons states enact statutes, but confirming that
only those designed to protect the health and welfare of citizens are excepted from the
automatic stay); Schatzman v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. (In re King
Mem'l Hosp., Inc.), 4 B.R. 704, 708 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that a state's revocation
of a hospital's certificate of need was subject to the automatic stay, absent evidence that
protection of health and welfare was an issue). Professor Sward uses many of these examples
of state regulation to demonstrate areas that states have found worthy of regulation. While
some of the motivations for enacting such statutes may serve valid goals, like maintaining a
pleasant work and home environment, these statutes will not necessarily fall within
§ 362(b)(4), which is defined rather narrowly. See Sward, supra note 120, at 414.
164 In hospital and nursing home cases, courts have refused to enforce certain state
certification statutes in bankruptcy because the statute is either related to financial condition or
would have a negative pecuniary effect on the debtor. See, e.g., St. Louis S. Park, 11, Inc., v.
Missouri Health Facilities Review Comm. (In re St. Louis S. Park, II, Inc.), 111 B.R. 260, 264
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990) (holding that a state cannot remove a nursing home's certificate of
need for failure to make required capital expenditures postpetition, even if a state statute
authorizes such an act); Schatzman, 4 B.R. at 708 (holding that a state cannot remove a
hospital's certificate of need for failure to make required capital expenditures); see also Erlin
Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm'n (In re Erlin Manor Nursing Home, Inc.),
36 B.R. 672, 679 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (holding that the state could not reimburse a Chapter
11 debtor nursing home at a lower rate merely because it had a negative equity, even though a
state statute permitted this rate-setting scheme).
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public health and safety,165 no creditor is allowed to collect a prepetition debt
during a bankruptcy, even a state trying to collect on a judgment. 166 Thus,
section 362(b)(4) does not allow a state to continue to collect a civil money
judgement, even if the judgement relates directly to police or regulatory
power.' 67 The police power exception is interpreted very narrowly to allow
states to protect health and welfare but not to collect a debt. This is a distinction
that makes perfect sense to most bankruptcy judges but must leave some
economists scratching their heads.168
Assuming the goal of a particular statute is to protect the public, we must
answer four questions to determine whether Bankruptcy Code supremacy
overrides a state statute. The first question is whether this is a legislative area that
is already regulated by the Bankruptcy Code, or an area that comes in direct
conflict with provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The second question is whether
this is an area of state or local control. The third question is whether the level of
state protection provided is necessary to protect health and welfare, thus rising to
the level of police power, as that term is used in section 362(b)(4) of the
165 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(bX4) (1994) (stating that all actions by states to protect health
and welfare are excepted from the automatic stay).
16 6 See id.
167 See Sward, supra note 120, at 422. As the House and Senate reports state:
Paragraph (4) [of section 362(b)] excepts commencement or continuation of actions
and proceedings by governmental units to enforce police or regulatory powers. Thus,
where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent or stop violation of fraud,
environmental protection, consumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory
laws, or attempting to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding is
not stayed under the automatic stay. Paragraph (5) makes clear that the exception extends
to permit an injunction and enforcement of an injunction, and to permit the entry of a
money judgment, but does not extend to permit enforcement of a money judgment. Since
the assets of the debtor are in the possession and control of the bankruptcy court, and
since they constitute a fund out of which all creditors are entitled to share, enforcement by
a governmental unit of a money judgment would give it preferential treatment to the
detriment of all other creditors.
Id (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 343 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6275-
77; S. REP. No. 95-989, at 52 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5787, 5788).
168 See id. While the House and Senate report explanations appear sensible, how much
protection can a state provide to citizens without funds from citizens? Thus, unless one
assumes that the public can be tapped for resources in an unlimited amount, collecting on a
judgment related to public safety is the only way to protect citizens' safety. This is particularly
true in the context of environmental problems, but even more problematic in the context of life
care contracts, in which the state is not going to make residents whole if they lose their life care
investments.
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Bankruptcy Code. Finally, one must determine whether the statute constitutes
protection from harmful activity or a form of debt collection.
D. Supremacy, the Bankruptcy Code, and State Continuing-Care Statutes
The regulation of CCFs, in general, seems justified to protect the health and
welfare of citizens, for much the same reason that states may regulate hospitals
and nursing homes under their police power. The primary goal of all CCF
legislation, however, is to protect residents' up front fees and protect against
facility insolvency. 169 While states can enact legislation to attempt to prevent
insolvency, they probably cannot preclude a CCF from filing for bankruptcy, or
control any CCF bankruptcy case that ultimately is filed.1 70 States may also be
unable to enforce their CCF financial requirements during a bankruptcy case. In
enacting state legislation regarding financial health and insolvency, states need to
be informed about the effect of federal law on these statutes. Yet some state
legislatures were not aware of these concerns when they enacted their CCF
169 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4600 (McKinney 1995 & Supp. 1999). According to
the section, the legislative purpose of New York's act is as follows:
The dramatic increase in the numbers of elderly people, especially those seventy-five
years of age and older, coupled with the special housing and health care needs of this
growing segment of the population, requires development of new and creative approaches
to help ensure the care of older people in residential settings of their own choice. If
carefully planned and monitored, life care communities have the potential to provide a
continuum of care for older people that will provide an attractive residential option for
such persons, while meeting their long term care needs for life. To ensure that the
financial, consumer, and health care interest of individuals who enroll in such
communities will be protected, such communities must be effectively managed and
carefully overseen.
The intent of the legislature, therefore, is to allow for the prudent development of life
care communities. The legislature further intends to require that the relevant state agencies
coordinate the regulation of such communities in order to ensure that there are adequate
safeguards for those elderly who become residents and to assist in the orderly
development, of such communities. Although lead responsibility for the interagency
coordination of the regulation and establishment of such communities is vested in the
department of health, the legislature does not intend that such communities become or be
perceived as primarily medically-oriented facilities. The legislature intends, instead, that
such communities be viewed as an attractive and innovative residential alternative for
older New Yorkers who are seeking to maintain, to the extent possible, an independent
and active life in a community in which their long-term care needs will be met.
Id
170 But see infra notes 257-83 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that
states can preclude CCFs from filing for bankruptcy).
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statutes. Thus, some of the CCF statutes are unenforceable because they violate
the Supremacy Clause.
1. Definitions, Initial Certification and Funding Requirements,
Disclosures to Residents, and Contract Requirements
Each continuing-care statute or act provides a definition of the entities or
contracts covered by the relevant statute, 171 a statement of who is responsible for
enforcing the statute, 172 a description of how CCFs get accredited 173 and how
171 Most statutes define life care or continuing-care as an arrangement to provide nursing
services, medical services, or other health-related services, either for life or for more than one
year, in exchange for payment of an entrance fee, a monthly fee, or both, with no change in the
monthly fee based on the level of service provided. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1771 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-13-101 (1997).
172 Typically, this responsibility is delegated to the Insurance Commissioner or Director
of Department of Insurance, see, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-1803 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 23-93-104 (Michie 1992); FLA. STAT. ch. 651.015 (Supp. 1999), the Department of Finance,
see IDAHO CODE § 67-2760 (1995), the Division of Financial Services, see COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-13-111 (1997), or the Health Department, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2173 (West
Supp. 1999).
173 Certification requirements vary considerably from state to state. Several states,
including Colorado, do not address the issue of certification at all. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-
13-104 (1997). Other states have minimal certification requirements. For example, Georgia's
statute merely requires that a $75 application fee accompany the application for a certificate of
authority, and Kansas's statute stipulates only that an application for a certificate must be made
on a commissioner-approved form and submitted with a $50 fee. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-45-
5 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2235 (1993). Other states, such as Indiana, Minnesota, and
Oregon, require both a small application fee and either disclosure statements or specific
financial information about the proposed facility (or sometimes both). See IND. CODE § 23-24-
3 (1992); MINN. STAT. § 80D.03 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 101.030, 101.040 (1996). In other
states, providers applying for certification must pay an application fee and provide a
considerable amount of information on the permit application. For example, a partial list of the
information that potential Arizona providers must reveal includes: information about all of the
community's owners and operators and their affiliations with not for profit or religious
organizations; a description of the physical facility, a description of the terms and conditions of
the life care contract; certified financial statements; and, if the facility has not been completed,
sources and uses of funds, a financial feasibility study, and an actuarial study to determine if
the project has sufficient funds. See AR7. REV. STAT. § 20-1802 (1998). New York is similar
in that, in the application, applicants must include, among other things: a feasibility study,
including market analysis; an actuarial study, a copy of the proposed contract; and full financial
and personal disclosure of directors, board members, and other controlling persons. New York
also involves various agency heads in the certification process. For example, the
Superintendent of Insurance must approve the actuarial methods and rate methodology to be
used, the Commissioner of Social Services must approve aspects pertaining to adult care beds;
and the Attorney General must approve as to those aspects relating to a cooperative,
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certification is renewed or revoked.174 Most statutes require initial financial
statements175 and, in a very few states, actuarial studies176 prior to certification.
Most CCF statutes also contain a list of required disclosures to residents and a
condominium, or other equity arrangement for the independent living unit. See N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4604 (McKinney 1995).
Still other states do not allow certification until certain minimum financial requirements
have been met. In California, for example, before a facility will be certified: a provisional
certificate of authority must be issued; the applicant must demonstrate that contracts have been
executed on the required percentage of total market test units in the facility and that a
satisfactory five-year financial plan of operation has been received by the department; adequate
reserves must exist; and all applicable provisions have been met See CAL. HEALTH & SAFE1!
CODE §§ 1771.2, 1771.4 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000). In Maryland, the provider's application
must contain, among other things, verification that agreements have been executed for at least
65% of the independent living units and proof that at least 10% of the total entrance fee for
each contracted unit that has been collected. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 70B, § 11 (1998).
In some states, such as Iowa and Connecticut, construction on new facilities cannot begin
until a certain number of living units have been presold and a certain percentage of the entrance
fees have been collected. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-526 (1998); IOWA CODE § 523D.5(4)
(1998). In Texas, before constructing or acquiring a facility or offering a continuing-care
contract to the public, a prospective provider must submit an application for a certificate of
authority and pay a $10,000 filing fee. See TEx. HEAILTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 246.021,
246.022 (West 1992).
On the other hand, some states have absolutely no certification requirements. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-45-1 (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2231 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 51:2171 (West Supp. 1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 93, § 76 (1998); MINN. STAT. § 80D.02
(1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 420-D:1 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-17-3 (Michie 1996); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 58-64-1 (1996); 40 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3201 (1992); RI. GEN. LAWS § 23-59-1
(1997).
174 In many states, such as Arizona, Illinois, and Pennsylvania, a certification or permit is
valid until it is revoked. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1803 (1998); 210 ILL. COMP. STAT.
§ 1/150-35 (West 1996); 40 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3205 (1992). In other states, such as Florida,
Missouri, and South Carolina, annual renewal procedures exist. See FLA. STAT. ch. 651.0235
(Supp. 1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.935 (1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-11-30 (Law. Co-op.
1999).
175 Some state statutes specifically require feasibility, market studies, or both. See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. § 20-1802 (1998); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1779.4 (West 1990 & Supp.
2000); FLA. STAT. § 651.022 (Supp. 1999); MD. ANN. CODE art. 70B, § 10 (1998); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 4604 (McKinney 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 8002 (1993); WIs. STAT.
§ 647.02 (1996).
17 6 SeeARjZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1802 (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-522 (1998); IDAHO
CODE § 67-2754 (1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6203 (West 2000); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 70B, § 10 (1998); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4604 (McKinney 1995); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 37-11-30 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1999); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.051 (West
1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 8002 (1993). New Mexico requires actuarial studies only for
facilities coming into existence prior to 1997. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-17-4 (Michie 1996).
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description of the provisions that must be contained in every CCF contract. 177
These initial certification, funding, and disclosure requirements are, by far, the
most common provisions in CCF statutes. Virtually all of the statutes contain
many of these provisions, and many statutes contain nothing other than these
initial requirements. 17 8
As a general rule, these initial certification, funding, and disclosure
requirements pose no supremacy issues because they are not laws in the "area of
bankruptcy." 17 9 Assuming certification occurs prior to bankruptcy,180 the initial
requirements do not have the purpose or effect of interfering with bankruptcy
law or policy and pose no obstacles to the fulfillment of the goals of the
Bankruptcy Code.18 ' Thus, it is unnecessary to address the question of whether
they constitute a valid exercise of state police power.18
2
2. Ongoing Financial Obligations and Regulations
In addition to the preliminary financial requirements discussed above, some
states also require a variety of ongoing financial disclosures and obligations. 183
177 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 17b-522, 17b-532 (1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 651.091
(Supp. 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-45-7 (1996); IDAHO CODE §§ 67-2754, 67-2755 (1995);
IOWA CODE §§ 523D.3, 523D.6 (1998); KAN. STAT. AN. § 40-2233 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 420-D:12 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-17-4, 24-17-5 (Michie 1996); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 58-64-28 (1996); S.C. CODEANN. §§ 37-11-35,37-11-60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
178 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit 18, § 4605 (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-45-7 (1996);
IDAHO CODE § 67-2755 (1995); IOWA CODE § 523D.6 (1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2233
(1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2178 (West Supp. 1999); MAss. GEN. LAWs ch. 93, § 76
(1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-17-1 (Michie 1996); OIO REV. CODE ANN. § 173.13
(Anderson 1994); RI. GEM. LAWS § 23-59-3 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-11-35 (Law. Co-
op Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-1305 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4903 (Michie
1999); Wis. STAT. § 647.05 (1996). Each of these statutes has very limited protections for
residents in the beginning of the contract period, but almost no additional protections for
residents to guard against insolvency. See infra notes 183-99 and accompanying text.
17 9 See supra notes 122 and accompanying text.
180 If not, these provisions probably will not be enforced during a bankruptcy case. See
infra notes 194-99 and accompanying text.
181 See id
182 Most initial certification requirements are quite helpful, especially those relating to
financial condition, market analyses, and actuarial studies. Extensive disclosures, on the other
hand, appear less helpful, as I doubt they are actually read.
183 See infra notes 184-93 and accompanying text. Naturally, states should continue to
have ongoing statutory financial obligations to residents. After all, enormous sums of money
are collected during the initial certification period, and this money dissipates over the life of a
CCF. In reality, however, many of the ongoing financial obligations are too minimal to protect
residents against loss.
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For example, many states that regulate CCFs require that CCFs escrow all or a
portion of a resident's entrance fee prior to the resident's occupancy, 184 and
provide that entrance fees are refundable for a period of seven days after the
contract is signed.1 85 Far more important than these minimal short-term entry
requirements are the financial obligations relating to the long-term viability of
the facility. These provisions are less common and typically require ongoing
actuarial studies, surety and fidelity bonds to protect resident investments, and
While most states require annual reports from CCFs, the requirements regarding the
contents of these reports vary from state to state. Some states' statutes are limited in their
description of the reports' requirements. For example, Arkansas's statute simply stipulates that
the annual disclosure statement include all of the information in the initial disclosure statement
and a financial statement audited and certified by a CPA, while Louisiana's statute merely
requires that a provider must file a disclosure statement annually within four months after the
end of its fiscal year. In addition, it must list any changes in the initial disclosure statement. See
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-106 (Michie 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2176 (West Supp.
1999). However, other states require much more information. Connecticut facilities must
include in their reports: financial and actuarial information; the average age of residents for the
next five years; health care utilization; admission rates; and occupancy rates. See CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 17b-527 (1998). Similarly, Maryland CCFs must include information on finances, the
projection of life expectancy for residents who will require nursing home care, information on
advertising campaigns, and every three years, actuarial studies. See MD. ANN. CODE art 70B,
§ 11 (1998).
184 The escrow provisions generally require that the CCF escrow a resident's entrance fee
until the resident begins occupying the premises. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1804 (1998);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-112 (Michie 1992); IND. CODE § 23-2-4-10 (1992); MINN. STAT.
§ 80D.20 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 8008 (1993). A few states use the word "escrow" to
describe a reserve fund, which protects residents from loss after occupancy. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ch. 651.035 (Supp. 1999); 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3210 (1992); TEx. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.077 (West 1992). Pennsylvania also has a regular escrow
requirement, see 40 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 3210 (1992).
185 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1802 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-109 (Michie
1992); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-13-105 (1991); GA. CODEANN. § 33-45-7 (1996); IDAHO CODE
§ 67-2755 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-59-6 (1997); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 246.056 (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4905 (Michie 1999). In some states, residents
can get refunds or a longer period of time. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 76 (1998); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 70B, § 14 (Supp. 1999) (for which refunds must be made available for the
entire pre-occupancy period). Other states permit refinds even after occupancy, for thirty days;
see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-523 (1998); IOwA CODE § 523.D6 (1998); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 51:2178 (West Supp. 1999); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-344 (West Supp. 1999); N.C.
GENt. STAT. § 58-64-25 (1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 8, § 8006 (1993); Wis. STAT. § 647.058
(1996); some states permit refunds for one year, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6212
(West 2000); some states permit refunds for an unlimited time up to the amount of the CCF's
accrued costs for that patient, see FLA. STAT. ch. 651.055 (Supp. 1999).
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most importantly, reserves of entrance fees.186 These provisions are designed to
protect residents from insolvency.'8 7
Only four states require CCFs to procure surety or fidelity bonds to protect
residents against loss and even then, typically in undesignated amounts.' 88 Only
eight states require CCFs to procure ongoing actuarial studies.1 89 Finally, while
reserving entrance fees for future nursing care costs is virtually the only way to
preserve ongoing financial viability in this industry, only fifteen states require
reserves, and most of these requirements are far from stringent.190
The most common reserve provisions require that the facility maintain, on a
current basis, an amount equal to the principal and interest payments due during
the next twelve months for any first mortgage or other long-term financing of the
186 See infra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
187 See id
188 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1774 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000) (requiring
bonds for employees and agents with access to substantial amounts of funds); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 33-45-4 (1996) (requiring a compliance bond of not less than $10,000); IDAHO CODE § 67-
2756 (1995) (requiring a surety bond, reserves, or a letter of credit or other financial
anangement in undesignated amount, to establish financial security); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-
11-40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999) (same). Michigan's statute proscribes that the state may
require a bond if necessary to protect residents. See MiCH. COMP. LAwS § 544.816 (West
1994).
189 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-1807 (1998) (requiring an actuarial study at least
every three years); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-527 (1998) (requring annual studies); IDAHO
CODE § 67-2754 (1995) (requring studies every five years); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,
§ 6223 (West 1989 & Supp. 1999) (requiring annual studies); MD. ANN. CODE art. 7013, § 11
(1998) (requiring studies every three years); MINN. STAT. § 80D.025 (1998) (requiring studies
annually, to establish reserves); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4604 (McKinney Supp. 1999)
(requiring studies annually); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.114 (West 1992 &
Supp. 2000) (requiring studies every five years). South Carolina requires a summary of an
actuarial report to be updated every two years. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-11-30 (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1999). New Mexico's statute requires that providers produce an annual disclosure
statement which must include--for those communities that charge an entrance fee that were
not in operation on the effective date of the Continuing-care Act--an actuarial analysis of the
community performed by an actuary experienced in analyzing continuing-care communities.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-17-4 (Michie 1996).
190 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1804 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-111 (Michie
1992); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1775 (West 1990 & Supp. 2000); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-13-107 (1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 651.035 (Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A,
§ 6215 (West 2000); MD. ANN. CODE., art. 70B, § 11 (1998); MINN. STAT. § 80D.06 (1998);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.945 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:8 (1998); NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 52:27D-339 (West Supp. 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 101.060 (1996); 40 PA. CONST. STAT.
ANN. § 3201 (West 1992); Tx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.077 (West 1992); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 8009 (1993).
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facility.191 These statutes require that the reserves be sufficient to cover long-
term debt for one year, but do not require reserves for ongoing operating
expenses for any period. Some states do require reserves for various minimal
operating expenses. For example, Florida requires that a facility set aside
operating reserves in an amount equal to thirty percent of the total operating
expenses projected in the facility's feasibility study for the first twelve months of
operation.' 92 Of course, these operating expenses must only be reserved during
the start-up phase, and most financial failure occurs after this period. Even states
that require reserves for ongoing operating expenses, beyond the start-up phase,
only require them for two orthree months.1 93
These ongoing financial requirements are underutilized in the state statutes.
191 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-1806 (1998); MINN. STAT. § 80D.06 (1998); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODEANN. § 246.077 (West 1992).
192 See FLA. STAT. ch. 651.035 (Supp. 1999).
193 New Hampshire requires facilities to set aside a portion of two months' operating
expenses relating to life care residents. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:8 (1998). Oregon
requires facilities to set aside a portion of operating expenses for three months. See OR. REV.
STAT. § 101.060 (1999). Still, having secured status in the first place is better than nothing. If
nothing else, holding a statutory lien provides some negotiating power, unless of course, the
statutory lien is only effective upon bankruptcy or insolvency. Other states have developed
alternative reserve methods. Pennsylvania requires each facility to hold twelve months' worth
of debt service payments in reserve, or 10% of the projected annual operating expenses of the
facility, whichever is greater. See 40 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3209 (1992). Vermont and New
Jersey's statutes are similar. Vermont requires facilities to set aside the equivalent of a year's
principal and interest payments or 15% of annual operating expenses, whichever is greater. See
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 8009 (1993). New Jersey requires the same yearly equivalent or 15%
of the projected annual operating expenses of the facility, exclusive of depreciation. See NJ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-339 (West Supp. 1999). Colorado's statute requires that each
facility maintain reserves equivalent to the next eighteen months' principal and interest on
those debt obligations that are collateralized by the provider's facility and require a balloon
payment, plus an amount equal to the next twelve months' principal and interest for all other
debt obligations that are collateralized by the provider's facility, plus an amount not less than
20% of the facility's operating expenses for the immediately preceding year. See COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-13-107 (1991). Other states base the reserve requirements on the actuarially
determined annual refund amount, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-111 (Michie 1992), which is
based on the amount residents have a right to receive, in cash, if they die or leave the facility.
Again, this figure is not based on what is necessary for the long-term survival of the facility and
constitutes a far lower number than what would support the operations of the facility over the
long-term. The most effective statute by far, and the only one that requires reserves in amounts
sufficient to support the facility over the long term, is Maine's statute, which requires that each
provider's reserves equal the excess of the present value of the future benefits promised under
the continuing-care agreement over the present value of the future revenues and any other
available resources, based on conservative actuarial assumptions. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
24-A, § 6215 (West 2000).
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The surety and fidelity bond requirements, the requirements for ongoing
actuarial studies, and the reserve requirements, all protect residents from
insolvency. If more frequently used, the surety bonds would help pay residents
for future care to be received elsewhere if a facility liquidates. The actuarial
studies would keep the facility informed of deteriorating financial conditions so
they could attempt to reverse them. The reserve requirements, more than any
other, would help avoid insolvency entirely by forcing facilities to prepare for a
strong financial future. These goals are all extremely important, and this subject
matter is clearly worthy of more state legislation.
While these provisions do not pose obvious supremacy problems, this is not
to say they will always be upheld during the course of a bankruptcy. They may
conflict with certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, but are unquestionably a
valid exercise of police power.194 Reserve and surety bond requirements are
unlikely to be upheld as valid exercises of state police power, however, because
they are likely to be seen as debt collection provisions rather than provisions
directed primarily at protecting health and welfare. 195 In analogous cases in the
hospital and nursing home contexts, states have been precluded from enforcing
state statutes that required withdrawal of certification from a facility,
postpetition, as a result of failing financial conditions. 196 Courts have seen such
statutory provisions as unrelated to health and welfare. Another reason that
courts have refused to allow states to enforce such statutes is that doing so would
arguably affect a pecuniary interest in the debtor's property. 197
The distinction between protecting health and welfare on the one hand, and
protecting pecuniary interests on the other, makes very little sense in this
context.198 It is impossible for states to protect residents in this context if they
cannot enforce the financial obligations contained in these statutes. There is
nowhere else for residents to go if they lose their money, and unlike insurance
194 See supra notes 144-64 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text. As for the ongoing actuarial studies,
I doubt these would be enforceable if getting the study would be too expensive for the debtor.
Public companies are often permitted to cease making S.E.C. disclosures during a Chapter 11,
due to the expense of complying with S.E.C. requirements during the rehabilitation period.
196 See St. Louis S. Park, II, Inc. v. Missouri Health Facilities Review Comm. (In re St.
Louis S. Park, II, Inc.), 111 B.R. 260 (Bankr. WD. Mo. 1990) (denying a state the right to
revoke a nursing home certification of need based on the home's financial condition, as a
violation of the automatic stay); Erlin Manor Nursing Home, Inc. v. Rate Setting Comm'n (In
re Erlin Manor Nursing Home, Inc.), 36 B.R. 672, 678 (Bankr. D. Mass 1984) (refusing to
allow revocation of hospital certification solely because of hospital's poor financial condition).
197 See St. Louis Park 111 BR at 263 (stating that the home needed its certification of
need to continue its business); Erlin Manor, 36 B.R. at 678 (stating that lower reimbursements
would take money away from the estate and its creditors).
198 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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insolvencies, there is no general state fund from which to reimburse residents.199
Fortunately, these provisions are extremely valuable, and fully enforceable, prior
to and after bankruptcy and are thus well worth enacting.
3. Statutory Liens
The best way for states to protect residents from the harm that occurs once a
bankruptcy has been filed is to create security interests in favor of the residents.
To be effective, these security interests must be recognized in bankruptcy, and
should also be higher in priority than general unsecured claims as well as many
secured claims. At least nine states have tried to achieve secured status on behalf
of residents by providing CCF residents with a statutory lien in their facility's
assets. Some of these statutes are effective, while others are ineffective.200 The
two primary things states can do to make their statutory liens enforceable in
bankruptcy is to make them effective upon occupancy, not insolvency, and to
make them as easy as possible to perfect.20 1
The holder of a statutory lien obtains a secured interest in specific goods and
thus obtains the status of a secured creditor even though the holder did not
bargain for collateral. 202 While statutory liens are created by state political
processes and interfere with the Bankruptcy Code's established priority system,
they are as valid in bankruptcy as consensual liens and judgment liens.203
Because state legislatures enact these liens, they naturally vary from state to
19 9 One state, Indiana, does have a fund that purportedly pays the claims of residents
whose CCF becomes insolvent See IND. CODE § 23-24-13 (1992). The state collects $100
from each resident who signs a CCF contract, to be used to reimburse residents whose facilities
have ceased operation. See id. This seems like an excellent idea, although the amount collected
in Indiana appears to be too low to actually compensate for losses of any substantial size.
200 See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text
201 The reason for this last suggestion is obvious. To err is human and the fewer prospects
for botching perfection, the more likely that residents will receive the protections intended by
the legislature.
202 See Margaret Rosso Grossman & Keith G. Meyer, Agricultural Credit Institutions,
Operations and Guarantees in the United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 275, 315 (1998).
203 See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1994). Section 506 grants secured status to any creditor with a
lien on property in which the debtor has an interest. This status is not limited to voluntary or
consensual security interest granted under Article 9 of the U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 9-101 to 9-504
(1994) (revised 1977); In re Brentwood Outpatients, Ltd., 43 F.3d 256, 260 (6th Cir. 1994)
(holding that only the consensual lienholders, holders ofjudicial liens that are oversecured, are
entitled to interest, penalties, fees, and costs that accrue prepetition); see also United States v.
Ron Pair Indus., 489 U.S. 235, 243 (1989) (holding that statutory or judicial tax liens that are
oversecured are entitled to recover costs and fees under section 506); 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(6)
(excepting liens that are valid under section 545 from preference statutory liens).
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state.204 These liens generally are provided to people who have improved or
repaired goods on credit or who otherwise have given value to the debtor, and
who also have preserved or enhanced the value of the property subject to the
lien.205
Statutory liens may be invalidated in bankruptcy, however, in one of two
ways. Some are invalid because state law requires perfection and the liens are
unperfected under relevant state law. Others are avoidable because they do not
become effective until the debtor becomes insolvent or files for bankruptcy; in a
sense, these liens are thus not perfected soon enough. The unperfected statutory
liens are avoidable under section 545(2),206 because they are invalid against a
judicial lien holder or a bona fide purchaser.20 7 Liens that are perfected upon
bankruptcy are invalidated under section 545(1), which provides that statutory
liens that come into existence only upon bankruptcy or insolvency are
voidable.20 8 The Bankruptcy Code invalidates these legislatively created
economic priorities to ensure that the priority system set out in the Bankruptcy
204 Grossman & Meyer, supra note 202, at 299 (discussing how agricultural liens enacted
by states are not uniform from state to state). Statutory liens are also very different from
consensual and judgment liens because they are provided to everyone in the population in
certain categories, regardless of the contractual or tort-related obligations of a particular citizen.
They have been provided to warehousemen, garagemen, agricultural creditors, and most
commonly, to mechanics and subcontractors. Virginia is one state in which these individuals
have been provided statutory liens. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-29,43-33 (Michie 1999).
2 05 See Grossman & Meyer, supra note 202, at 315. Given that the residents have prepaid
for services, but unlike mechanics or subcontractors, have provided no specific benefit related
to any particular property, fitting these liens into the traditional statutory lien model is
somewhat forced. See id
206 11 U.S.C. § 545(2).
207 Liens that are not perfected under state law, that can be avoided under the trustee's
strong-arm provisions, are also avoidable in bankruptcy. Examples of liens that have been
defeated under the strong-arm powers include unperfected landlord liens for unpaid rent, see,
e.g., MINN. STAT. § 514.960 (1999); In re Waldo, 70 B. 16 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986), and
agricultural liens, see, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3051-52, 3061 (West 1993). These statutory
liens create no recognizable property rights and are void as improper attempts to circumvent
the priority system set forth in section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
20 8 See Buckmaster de Wolf, Comment, Strange Things Are Afoot at the Circle K:
Agency Action Against Leased Sites in Environmental Bankruptcy, 21 B.C. ENVrL. AFF. L.
REv. 145, 169 (1993); see also Lamport, supra note 112, at 611. Mr. Lamport notes that state
statutory liens that exist only upon insolvency or bankruptcy are disguised state priorities,
which are not permitted to take priority over the Bankruptcy Code priority system. See id.; see
also Margaret Russo Grossman, Troubled Times: The Farm Debtor Under the Amended
Bankruptcy Code, 38 OKLA. L. REv. 579,609 (1985).
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Code, rather than those enacted individually by particular states, is the sole
priority system utilized in the bankruptcy arena.209
State statutes that impose or permit the imposition of statutory liens in favor
of residents against the assets of CCFs21 ° can be extremely beneficial to
residents, assuming they survive bankruptcy. Statutes such as those enacted in
Arkansas, California, and North Carolina, however, purport to impose a lien only
20 9 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994) (setting out the Bankruptcy Code's priority system).
States are not permitted to interfere with this system, although statutory liens that are
enforceable as of bankruptcy are still valid in bankruptcy, presumably because secured status is
determined by reference to state law. This is an area of law that remains confused. While one
court plainly proclaimed that a precode bankruptcy amendment eliminated all state priorities
except a claim for rent in landlords, see Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749, 755 (9th Cir. 1966), it is
clear that statutory liens remain enforceable in bankruptcy, see Selby v. Ford Motor Co., 590
F.2d 641-42, 645 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that a statutory lien is not effective against the
claims of a bankruptcy trustee unless it is effected prior to the filing of a bankruptcy); see also
W. Mark Rasmussen, Comment, Grain Elevator Bankruptcy-Has Illinois Successfully
Provided Security to Farmers?, 1983 S. ILL. U. L.L 337, 345. In this comment, Mr.
Rasmussen discusses the interesting question of whether grain elevator liens must be levied
upon and also whether the liens actually provide any protection to farmers when there is a
federal bankruptcy. Id.; see also Grossman & Meyer, supra note 202, at 324; Keith G. Meyer,
Should the Unique Treatment of Agricultural Liens Continue?, 24 IND. L. REV. 1315, 1326
(1991) (discussing how and why section 545 invalidates state statutory liens).
Another category of statutory lien that is voidable under section 545 consists of those that
are not perfected or enforceable at the time a bankruptcy is filed against ajudicial lien holder or
a bona fide purchaser. See 11 U.S.C. § 545(2). The debtor or trustee can avoid such a lien
under power that is analogous to a trustee's strong-arm power to avoid consensual liens in
certain situations. See In re J.R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188, 193-94 (1st Cir. 1971);
Grossman, supra note 208, at 608. Statutory liens that are not valid against both judicial lien
creditors and bona fide purchasers are simply disguised priorities, which create eleventh-hour
preferences in favor of certain creditors at the expense of general unsecured creditors. See John
C. Anderson & John A. Hollister, The Effect of Bankruptcy of Liquidations on Louisiana
SecurityDevices,31 LOY. L. REV. 1, 48 (1985).
210 See, e.g., AR1z. REV. STAT. § 20-1805 (1998); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-113 (Michie
1992); MiNN. STAT. § 80D.08 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:9 (1998); NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 52:27D-341 (West Supp. 1999); 40 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3211 (West 1992); TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODEANN. § 246.111 (West Supp. 2000). Florida and North Carolina have
enacted provisions providing that residents shall have preferred claims in any liquidation, but
do not use the word "lien." See FLA. STAT. ch. 651.071 (Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-
64-60 (1996). New Hampshire's rehabilitation provisions provide that, in any liquidation of a
facility, the proceeds of liquidation shall be used to provide for residents. See N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 3211 (1998). This language essentially provides for the same preferred status, but
cannot possibly be reconciled with the Bankruptcy Code's priority system or the respective
claims of other creditors. If a state wants to create a lien that is valid in bankruptcy, the safest
course is to use the word "lien."
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upon bankruptcy, insolvency, or receivership, in clear violation of section 545.21 1
Arkansas' statute for example, provides that "[in the event of the
bankruptcy... of [a] provider resulting from the financial difficulties of the
provider, the residents of the facility shall have a statutory lien on the real and
personal property of the facility."212 These statutes-which provide that the lien
comes into being upon bankruptcy, insolvency, or receivership--create no
benefits whatsoever for residents and are dangerously misleading.213 As long as
CCFs remain eligible for bankruptcy, these statutes constitute a waste of
legislative energy.214 In fact, they are more hamful than helpful because they
create an incentive to file for bankruptcy in order to invalidate the lien under
section 545. These liens also create a false sense of security.
Other attempts to create valid liens fail because they are too vague or do not
use language that creates an interest in property. Florida's and New Hampshire's
statutes create a "preferred claim" in favor of residents in any liquidation,2 15 but
211 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-113 (Michie 1992); CAL. HEALTH & SAFET CODE
§ 1772 (West 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-64-60 (1996).
2 12 ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-93-113 (Michie 1992).
2 13 See 11 U.S.C. § 545. Section 545 provides that:
The trustee may avoid the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the debtor to
the extent that such lien-
(1) first becomes effective against the debtor-
(A) when a case under this title concerning the debtor is commenced;
(B) when an insolvency proceeding other than under this title concerning
the debtor is commenced;
(C) when a custodian is appointed or authorized to take or takes
possession;
(D) when the debtor becomes insolvent;
(E) when the debtor's financial condition fails to meet a specified standard;
or
(F) at the time of an execution against property of the debtor levied at the
instance of an entity other than the holder of such statutory lien;
(2) is not perfected or enforceable at the time of the commencement of the case
against a bona fide purchaser that purchases such property at the time of the
commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists;
(3) is for rent; or
(4) is a lien of distress for rent.
IM.
214 Perhaps there is some deterrent effect created even by the ineffective statutes, but
I question if this effect is outweighed by the effort spent enacting these statutes and the
harms caused by them.
2 15 See FLA. STAT. ch. 651.071 (Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-64-60 (1999).
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these preferred claims are not interests in any particular property.216 These
preferred claims are similar to priority claims in bankruptcy, which are satisfied
from all assets remaining after secured claims (including valid statutory liens)
have been paid in full.2 17 Similarly, New Hampshire's statute provides that in the
event of liquidation, the proceeds of the facility shall be used to provide for
residents.218 The "proceeds" referred to are the proceeds left after satisfying
secured claims. 2 19 These provisions, purporting to create state priorities, are
preempted by the Bankruptcy Code's priority system and are thus
unenforceable.220 Needless to say, these.statutes do not protect residents as well
as valid statutory liens.
Other states have enacted effective statutory liens. For example, in
Minnesota, a statutory lien in favor of residents is imposed automatically as soon
as the first resident occupies the facility.2 21 Similar statutes have been enacted in
Arizona, Colorado, and Texas.222 the Texas statute provides that a lien exists on
the real and personal property of the provider or facility to secure the obligations
of the provider pursuant to existing and future contracts for continuing care223
when the facility is first occupied by a resident.
These statutory liens do not become effective only upon bankruptcy,
insolvency, or other deteriorating financial conditions; rather they are imposed
regardless of insolvency.224 As a result, they appear to be impervious to section
2 16 See United States v. Saidman, 231 F.2d 503, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (stating that to be
effective, a lien must indicate the specific property to which the lien attaches); see also In re
Lobel Enters., 126 F. Supp. 792, 793 (D.D.C. 1954) (stating that specific language granting a
lien on specific property takes precedent before language creating a "preferred" or "first-
satisfied" claim). In both the latter instances, the claims are to be "preferred" or "first satisfied"
from general assets of the estate, once all secured claims are satisfied.
2 17 See Lobel, 126 F. Supp. at 793.
2 18 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:16 (1998).
2 19 See Lobel, 126 F. Supp. at 793.
220 See McCarroll v. Jean (In re R.W. May Co.), 119 F.2d 71, 74 (8th Cir. 1941) (holding
that in the context of a tax claim, only priorities recognized in the Bankruptcy Act are given
priority treatment in bankruptcy); In re Elliott Wholesale Grocery Co., 98 F. Supp. 1017, 1018
(S.D. Cal. 1951) (stating that severence benefits recognized in the Bankruptcy Act are given
priority treatment); see also In re Unit Lock Co., 49 F.2d 313, 316 (N.D. Okla. 1931) (stating
that bankruptcy priority takes over state priorities).
221 SeeMINN. STAT. § 80D.08 (1998).
222 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1805 (1998) (providing that a director must record a lien
as a condition to granting a permit); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.111 (West
Supp. 2000) (providing that a lien effective for ten years attaches upon first occupancy by a
resident).
2 23 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.111 (West Supp. 2000).
224 See 11 U.S.C. § 545(1) (1994).
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545(1) and valid in bankruptcy.2 25 Thus, statutes like those enacted by
Minnesota, Arizona, Colorado, and Texas are enforceable in bankruptcy and
protect the interests of residents, assuming that there are assets over and above
secured claims available to satisfy such claims.
To make sure that statutory liens are perfected under state law, and are thus
impervious to section 545(2) as well, three other issues must be considered: (1)
whether the liens are automatically effective or must be recorded or filed; (2)
what priority the liens should have; and (3) whether the liens can be subordinated
to other voluntary liens if the facility requires additional financing. Ideally, the
liens should be effective automatically upon certification, without the need to file
anything.226 However, such a lien may be effective only against personal
property, and thus the best statute would also require that the commissioner
record any lien in favor of residents against real property.227 The priority of the
225 Id.
226 This may be impossible under some state laws, particularly if real estate is involved.
Most states permit liens on personal property to be effective automatically, by specifically
providing for automatic perfection in the statute creating the lien. Thus, secret liens on personal
property seem to be enforceable, even in bankruptcy, assuming the lien is perfected validly
under the applicable state law. See Merchants Grain, Inc. v. Adkins (In re Merchants Grain,
Inc.), 184 B.R. 52, 58 (S.D. Ind. 1995). Compare In re Fennelly, 212 B.R. 61 (D.N.J. 1997)
with Graffen v. City of Philadelphia, 984 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1992). In both Fennelly and
Graffen, the liens in issue had to be perfected by recording or filing under the relevant statute
creating the lien. Because the creditor failed to properly perfect, the liens were voidable. A lien
governed by automatic statutory perfection without any need for filing, would appear to be
perfected upon the event triggering the lien. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 80D.08 (1999). As for
liens on real estate, it seems necessary to file something with the relevant recorder of deeds in
order to make the lien effective against a bona fide purchaser, although I have been unable to
find a source that actually says this. Some secret liens are effective against real estate, though I
suspect that most are not. See North Gate Corp. v. North Gate Bowl, Inc., 149 N.W.2d 651,
654-55 (1967). The court in North Gate discusses a former federal tax statute that was later
revised because it created the undesirable-though not impermissible-result of creating a
secret lien. See id. To be safe it is most advisible to require filing against any real estate and
make this requirement crystal clear in the statute itself. The statute should also specify where
the lien must be filed.
Admittedly, I have lingering doubts about whether bankruptcy courts will consistently
uphold unfiled statutory liens against personal property either, even if there is full compliance
with a state statute. According to the most comprehensive research that has been done on
statutory liens, most statutory liens do not fare well against voluntary lien-holders because lien
statutes normally fail to address the priority of the lien. See Meredith S. Jackson & Jennifer L.
Kercher, Report of the ABA Business Law Section Uniform Commercial Code Committee,
Subcommittee on Relation to Other Law, Re: Inclusion of Nonpossessory Statutory Liens in
Article 9,51 CONSuMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 108, 110 (1997).
227 Existing statutes address these issues in a variety of ways. Arizona's statute
requires the director to record a notice of lien in favor of residents as a condition to
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lien probably should be either first or second only to the primary lender.228
While it could weaken residents' collateral position, it is probably necessary to
provide in the statute that the residents' lien can be subordinated, to permit the
facility to obtain additional financing when needed.
The most common form of statutory lien in favor of residents makes filing a
lien in favor of residents optional. California, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont have enacted statutes that permit the commissioner
or agency in charge of CCFs to file a statutory lien whenever the commissioner
finds it is in the best interests of residents. 229 Pennsylvania's statute provides
that:
Prior to the issuance of a certificate of authority under this act or at such other
times as the commissioner may determine it in the best interests of residents of a
facility, the commissioner may file a lien on the real and personal property of the
provider or facility to secure the obligations of the provider pursuant to existing
and future contracts for continuing care.230
granting a permit See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-1805 (1998). The lien takes priority over all
subsequent liens and may be subordinated by the director against any subsequent first
mortgage liens or other long-term financing. See id. The Texas statute, by comparison,
provides that a lien in favor of residents automatically attaches to the facility's property
when a resident first occupies the premises. See T-x HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 246.111 (West Supp. 2000). This lien is subordinate to any first mortgage used for
construction or any subsequent refinancing. The lien may be removed by the
commissioner if the facility is financially sound and if removing the lien will not harm
residents. It is unclear why this statute provides for the complete removal of the lien rather
than just further subordination. Moreover, practically speaking, it is unlikely that the
commissioner will take a decision to remove the lien lightly. The commissioner would
need to determine that the facility is sound, and that removing the lien would not harm
residents.
228 The reason that the lien may need to be prioritized second to the primary secured
lender, rather than first, is that it may be impossible to get a lender to lend to a CCF if the
resulting lien is always second to the claims of residents. Thus, market realities need to be
considered when determining the priority of resident liens. Providing for subordination when
deemed necessary could at least partially solve this problem, although the discretion involved
in making a decision about subordination could cause other problems. See infra notes 229-32
and accompanying text
2 2 9 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1793 (West Supp. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 420-D:8 (1998); N. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-341 (West Supp. 1999); 40 PA. CONST. STAT.,
§ 3211 (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 8, § 8004 (Supp. 1999).
230 40 PA. CONST. STAT.,§ 3211 (1992). These liens are valid for 10 years and can be
extended if the commissioner deems it necessary for these liens to be foreclosed, with the
proceeds used to pay claims of residents. Their priority falls behind a first mortgage on real
property but presumably ahead of all other consensual and non-consensual liens. However, the
lien may be subordinated with the commissioner's written consent, if advisable for the efficient
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While these discretionary statutes are not per se invalid under section 545,
they may be voidable as a practical matter, because the statutes leave it up to the
discretion of the commissioner whether to file a lien.2 31 If a commissioner
decides to file a lien after certification, based upon concerns for financial
viability, the statute would probably be voidable under the spirit of section
545(1).232 Yet it is hard to imagine any other reason why a commissioner would
decide to impose such a lien after certification. Moreover, from a practical
perspective, exercising the right to create a discretionary lien in favor of residents
subjects the commissioner to potential lawsuits by both facilities management
and residents. Imposing a lien by discretion could make it impossible for a
facility to obtain financing or to refinance. It could cause a lender to call a loan
into default and could havc other negative financial ramifications for the
facilities. As a result, mandatory lien statutes, which are effective automatically
are more effective, perhaps with voluntary subordination where necessary.
When enacting statutory liens, there is one additional factor to consider.
While a valid statutory lien is better than no lien, these liens do have their
limitations. Once a bankruptcy is filed, if the statutory lien does not take priority
over voluntary security interests, their relatively junior priority can make the
liens worthless.233 Most bankruptcy debtors have little equity in their assets over
and above that required to satisfy voluntary secured creditors.234 This means
operation of the facility. See id.
The big question raised by statutes in this form is whether the filing of such a lien simply
perfects the lien or also creates the lien. Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code,
attachment occurs when, among other things, the debtor signs a security agreement See U.C.C.
§ 9-203 (1994) (revised 1977). This security interest can then be perfected by filing a U.C.C.-1
financing statement See U.C.C. § 9-301. While attachment and perfection could take place
simultaneously, through one event, as in certain narrow situations under Article 9, see, e.g.,
U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-308, 9-309, this is somewhat uncommon.
231 See 11 U.S.C. § 545 (1994).
232 See id
233 Statutory liens that do not take priority over consensual security interests receive
compensation from the debtor only after voluntary secured claims are satisfied in full from the
proceeds of the secured property. See de Wolf, supra note 208, at 169 (discussing this issue in
the context of environmental liens imposed by states). Outside bankruptcy, the effect of these
statutes on state priorities varies depending on the specific statute. Some state statutes, such as
New York's garagemen's lien, take priority over voluntary secured liens, assuming that the
work done by the garagemen was necessary to protect or preserve the collateral. Under most
state statutes, however, statutory liens created by statute are lower in priority than security
interests created by agreement. See id (discussing how most environmental statutory liens are
losing in priority to consensual security interests).
234 See id. (stating that a bankruptcy debtor is more likely than most other debtors to have
granted other consensual security interests, leaving few assets left to satisfy statutory lien
holders).
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that, practically speaking, the lien may provide no benefit because there may be
no assets left to collateralize it.235 These liens are certainly worth enacting but do
not guarantee protection for residents in the event of insolvency.
In summary, enacting a statutory lien that is effective only upon bankruptcy
or insolvency does not provide residents with a secured claim in the facility's
bankruptcy, and may even encourage CCFs to file for bankruptcy by creating an
incentive to avoid the liens. Similarly, enacting a statute creating "preferred
status" for residents does not create a lien. Enacting discretionary lien provisions
is also risky because it is unclear whether such liens survive a section 545
analysis. The most effective statutory liens are those that are imposed and
perfected automatically by statute upon certification or the first residency, and
that make the resident lien first in priority but subject to subordination, if
necessary and appropriate. This form of lien survives bankruptcy, and assuming
there are assets available to satisfy such claims, will protect residents to the
highest extent possible.2 36
235 The practical result of having a secured claim in property that has insufficient value to
cover the claim is that the "secured" claim becomes an unsecured claim. See id. (stating that a
secured claim without collateral from which to collect becomes an unsecured clairn, that often
provides little or no payment); see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (stating that a secured claim is
secured "to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's
interest.., is less than the amount of such allowed claim").
236 Most CCF statutes also give residents a right to organize for the purpose of exercising
some quality control over their living conditions. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. § 651.018 (West
1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 523D.6 (1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6227 (West
2000); MD. ANN. CODE art. 70B, § 13 (Supp. 1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:15
(1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:2713-345 (West Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-17-13
(Michie 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-64-40 (1996); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 173.13
(Anderson 1994). Some statutes provide for specific resident grievance procedures that are
more narrowly defined than the general right to organize, see WIs. STAT. § 647.04 (1996), and
some provide for specific roles for residents on resident committees and boards of directors,
see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAW § 544.812 (West 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 173.13
(Anderson 1994); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4612 (McKinney Supp. 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-64-40 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 23-59-11 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4910 (Michie
1999). Drafters of statutes who do not address residents' rights regarding organizing, filing
grievances, or participating in management may simply have felt that these rights were too
obvious to even mention. I certainly hope that is the reason for the omission.
The right to organize, and to participate in some way in the quality of care received, seems
fundamental and obvious. These provisions provide few real rights to residents, however, and
in some cases, provide a painful reality check about the lack of control and dignity many
people have-even in these relatively upscale facilities. Statutes discussing residents' rights
often provide for meetings between management and residents and some minimal participation
by at least one resident in facility decisionmaking processes. Most of the provisions provide
very few opportunities to actually participate in any meaningful way, however, and thus, the
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4. State Rehabilitation Provisions
Various states have attempted to create rehabilitative powers in a
commissioner or other person or department in charge of CCFs in that state.
237
Many of these provisions are unenforceable because they purport to give the
state, rather than the bankruptcy court, power over both state insolvencies and
bankruptcies.2 38 While states probably cannot exercise the control they desire
over CCF insolvencies, it is possible that states can preclude CCFs from filing
for bankruptcy.239 One question worth asking is whether giving such control to
states would benefit residents. If so, there may be ways to provide this control to
states.
A common provision allows the appropriate state official to institute a state
rehabilitation or insolvency proceeding, if the facility becomes insolvent
improperly uses reserve fbnds, or goes bankrupt 2 40 In all but the last instance,
these statutes are effective initially but do not create much benefit for residents.
provisions appear to be pro forma. Some common residents' rights provisions are demeaning
to residents, such as the common provision stating that "no retaliatory conduct shall be
permitted against any resident for membership or participation in a residents' organization or
for filing any complaint" VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-4910 (Michie 1999). Florida, which probably
has as much experience with continuing-care as any state, is extremely explicit about what a
resident gets in exchange for his or her enormous entrance fee: "[T]he right to (a) Live in a safe
and decent environment, free from abuse and neglect. (b) Be treated with consideration and
respect and with due recognition of...the need for privacy. (c) Unrestricted private
communication .... (e) Exercise civil and religious liberties." FLA. STAT. ch. 651.083 (West
1996). It is as if without providing these rights statutorily, a resident would not have them. Yet,
as United States citizens they are still entitled to the same constitutional and other protections
as everyone else. It is disturbing that these needs must be spelled out.
Residents' rights provisions do not violate the Supremacy Clause and would certainly be
upheld in bankruptcy. In fact, specifically providing the right to organize by statute might
encourage residents to do so, which could be helpful if a bankruptcy is filed. The residents
would already have an organized means by which to participate in the bankruptcy case as a
group. It might also encourage residents to request a separate residents committee in a Chapter
11 case, which could greatly improve their treatment in the case.
237 See, eg., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1808(D) (1998); FtA. STAT. ch. 651.119 (1996);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:16 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-11-105 (Law. Co-op Supp.
1999); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.092 (West 1992).
23 8 See infra notes 239-56 and accompanying text
23 9 See infra notes 257-83 and accompanying text.
240See, e.g., ARJZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1808(C), (D) (1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-
532(a) (1998); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.092 (West 1992). South Carolina
provides that CCFs may, among other requirements, have to submit a financial plan to the
department, detailing the methods by which the CCF proposes to overcome the deficiencies
noted by the department See S.C. CODE. ANN. § 37-11-105 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1999).
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Once a facility is put into receivership, it is still free to file for federal bankruptcy
protection,241 which could hurt residents more than it will help them.242
Many of these rehabilitation provisions are modeled after similar provisions
for insurance company insolvencies. Insurance companies are not eligible for
bankruptcy, therefore their insolvency proceedings are always in state court 243
Moreover, state funds are established to compensate failed insurance companies'
customers, who are generally made whole regardless of the type of insolvency
proceeding involved.244 Because CCFs are generally eligible for bankruptcy,
placing a facility in a state insolvency proceeding may simply cause the facility
to file for protection under. Chapter 11, where its rights vis-i-vis residents are
even greater.245 Moreover, a statute providing that a state can put a CCF into
receivership after it has filed a bankruptcy petition simply will not be upheld.
The federal bankruptcy court will already have jurisdiction over the case under
the Bankruptcy Code, which preempts the state statute.246
For the same reason, legislation purporting to take powers away from the
bankruptcy court also violates the Supremacy Clause. Many statutes provide that
the state official may move for the appointment of a trustee, a provision that may
or may not be upheld. 247 For example, the Texas statute provides that whenever
a facility improperly uses its reserves, or is at risk of insolvency, the
commissioner must request that the Attorney General move for an order of
insolvency or for the appointment of a trustee.248 Of course, when deciding such
a motion, the bankrupicy court will decide whether to appoint a trustee in a
reorganization case, based on the rights of all parties in interest in the case, not
based solely on a demand made by the state.249
Some statutory provisions create other supremacy problems. For example,
New Hampshire's statute provides that in any liquidation of a facility, the
proceeds of the liquidation shall be used to pay resident entrance fees at other
facilities or be otherwise used for the benefit of residents.250 This provision flies
241 See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994); In re Florida Brethren Homes, Inc., 88 B. 445,447
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988).
24 2 See infra Part IV.
24 3 See 11 U.S.C. § 109.
244 See Patrick Collins, Note, HMO Eligibility for Bank-uptcy: The Case for Federal
Definitions of 109(b)(2) Entities, 2 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 425,447 (1994).
24 5 See infra notes 284-305 and accompanying text.
24 6 See supra notes 111-22 and accompanying text
247 See, e-g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:16 (1998); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. § 246.092 (West 1992).
24 8 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 246.092 (West 1992).
249 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(1994).
250 See N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 420-D:16(IV) (1998). Interestingly, the New Hampshire
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in the face of the Bankruptcy Code priority system, which articulates in detail the
order of payment to general unsecured creditors.251
Another goal of some CCF statutes is to give residents standing in any case
filed by a CCF. Minnesota's statute, for example, provides residents standing to
move for the appointment of a trustee.252 Some statutes require any bankruptcy
court or any commissioner in a state receivership to consider the interests of
residents in adjudicating the CCF's case.253 The residents already have standing
in the case because they are creditors of the facility.254 When a state statute
directs the court to consider the residents' interests, however, it is not clear which
interests the court should consider. Presumably, the court considers residents'
interests differently from the interests of other creditors. In other words, to
consider residents' noneconomic as well as their economic interests. While I
certainly feel that a federal bankruptcy court should consider all of these
interests,255 I question whether a state is in a position to order a bankruptcy court
to do so. Congress recently passed federal bankruptcy legislation that would give
patients in all health care facilities standing in any bankruptcy case filed by such
a facility.2 56 This would be preferable to state legislation granting residents
standing, which may or may not be binding on federal bankruptcy courts. This
and all other CCF legislation relating to rehabilitation and insolvency is
potentially preempted and thus potentially unenforceable.
E. The Enforceability of State Statutes that Make CCFs Ineligible for
Bankruptcy
There may actually be a solution to the supremacy problems facing CCF
statutes that is within states' control. States may be able to make all of their
otherwise preempted legislation valid by treating their CCFs as insurance
legislature must have known that this provision did not create a lien, because it has a separate
provision allowing the commissioner to grant residents a lien, if necessary to protect them. See
id. § 420-D:5(l).
251 See 11 U.S.C. § 507.
25 2 See MINN. STAT. § 80D.11 (1999).
253 See id.; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-D:16(V) (1998); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-
346(f) (West Supp. 1999); 40 PA. CONST. STAT. § 3216(f) (1992).
254 Maryland's statute, which provides that CCF residents shall be deemed creditors in
any CCF bankruptcy, states the obvious. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 70B, § 21 (Supp. 1999).
255 See generally Martin, supra note 152, at 446-61,464-65 (discussing the obligations
of bankruptcy courts to consider both economic, as well as noneconomic, interests when
deciding an issue in a case).
256 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 is currently in conference committee. See H.R.
833, 106th Cong. § 1104 (1999).
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companies under state law.257 In every state in the nation, domestic insurance
companies are ineligible for bankruptcy under section 109(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code258 because they are subject to regulated state liquidation and rehabilitation
proceedings.2 59 One state, Maine, has enacted a statute that provides that CCFs
are insurance companies and are subject only to the state liquidation and
rehabilitation laws for insurance companies.260 While this may be an ineffective
attempt to override the clear eligibility requirements of the Bankruptcy Code, it
is possible that such a provision would be upheld, thus precluding CCFs in the
state of Maine from maintaining a bankruptcy case.
While no court has decided whether a CCF may be deemed an insurance
company, several courts have decided the analogous issue of whether an HMO
may be deemed an insurance company during insolvency proceedings.
Somewhat surprisingly, half of the courts deciding this issue have held-at least
indirectly-that Congress has delegated to the states the determination of what
constitutes an insurance company for the purposes of section 109(b).261
Three separate tests have been used to decide if an HMO constitutes an
insurance company, which have created wildly inconsistent results. Under the
"state classification" test, the test used by the only circuit court to decide this
issue, courts generally defer to a state's own classification of whether an entity
constitutes an insurance company.262 Assuming the state has set up a full
regulatory scheme for liquidating or rehabilitating these entities, and assuming
257 See, e.g., M. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6225 (West 2000).
258 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994).
2 59 See S. REp. No. 95-989, at 31 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5817;
Collins, supra note 244, at 447.
2 6 0 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 6225 (West 2000).
261 Compare In re Estate of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d 436, 446 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that HMOs were both "classified explicitly [under Illinois law] as insurance companies
excluded from bankruptcy protection, [and] that HMOs [were] also the substantial equivalents
of domestic insurance companies"); In re Beacon Health, Inc., 105 B.R. 178, 186-87 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1989) (holding that an HMO was a "domestic insurance company" within the meaning
of §§ 109(b) and 109(d) and finding that, "[flrom the viewpoint of the subscriber/policy holder,
there [was] no functional difference between an HMO and an insurance company"); In re
Family Health Servs., Inc., 101 B.R. 636, 640-43 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989) (holding that HMOs
are eligible for bankruptcy relief for several reasons: (1) they are not specifically excluded
under section 109; (2) Louisiana statutes distinguish between HMOs and insurers; (3) HMOs
differ significantly from insurance companies; and (4) the fact that HMOs are regulated and
liquidated under a state statutory scheme does not make them the substantial equivalent of
insurance companies); In re Michigan Master Health Plan, Inc., 90 B.R. 274, 275 (ED. Mich.
1985) (holding that an HMO "certainly was not an insurance company under Michigan state
law").
2 62 See Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d at 442.
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the resulting state liquidations are regulated by the insurance commissioner, the
state's classification will generally be upheld.2 63 Form cannot entirely prevail
over substance even under this test, however, so the entity must also share the
essential attributes of an insurance company.264 For some courts, this means that
the HMO must assume a third party's risk in exchange for a premium.265 For
others, the entity or HMO must be quasi-public.266
Under the second test, the "independent classification" test, courts are asked
to look to section 109, rather than state law, to determine what Congress'
intention was in enacting section 109 and to determine if the section is
exhaustive or illustrative.267 Under one court's analysis, if Congress wanted to
make HMOs ineligible for bankruptcy, it could have done so expressly.2 68 Thus,
most courts using this test have held that HMOs are not insurance companies.
Under the third test, the "alternative relief' test, courts ask whether, assuming
there is a state regulatory scheme in place, the goals of the Bankruptcy Code can
be equally served by allowing the state to exclude the entity from bankruptcy
263 See id. at 442-43; Beacon Health, 105 B.R. at 183-84.
264 See Medcare H-!MO, 998 F.2d at 445; Beacon Health, 105 B.R. at 185 n.1 ("Suffice it
to say that if a sign is placed on the neck of a duck saying it is 'not a duck' that doesn't mean it
is not a duck."); Family Health Servs., Inc., 101 B.R at 643 ("Whether or not HMOs are
regulated and liquidated under a state statutory scheme... is of little assistance in deciding
whether an HMO is the substantial equivalent of an insurance company under state law.").
265 See In re Portland Metro Health, Inc., 15 B.R. 102, 105 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (stating
that insurance involves risk spreading and an indemnity element).
2 66 See Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d at 446; Beacon Health, 105 B.R. at 181. Plenty of
quasi-public entities are eligible for bankruptcy, however, including utilities, hospitals, and
even municipalities. Thus, I fail to see the significance of this factor in determining eligibility
for bankruptcy.
2 67 See In re Family Health Servs., Inc., 101 BR. 636,639-40 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
2 68 See In re Beacon Health, Inc., 105 BR. 178, 179-80 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989); Family
Health, 101 B.R at 640. These two cases reach different results, though purporting to apply the
same test. In Beacon Health, Judge Yacos analyzed whether the HMO in issue was the
"substantial equivalent" of an insurance company. He ultimately concluded that it was, despite
the fact that the HMO contract in issue did not contain an indemnity relationship. Although
Judge Yacos claims to have applied the "independent classification" test, his analysis was more
similar to the "state classification" test. See Beacon Health, 105 B.R. at 186. In Family Health,
by contrast, the court looked at the legislative history of section 109, and concluded that
Congress knew about the existence of HMOs and still failed to exclude them from bankruptcy
protection under section 109. See Family Health, 101 B.R. at 640. The decision in Family
Health is somewhat weakened by a subsequent district court decision, reversing a decision that
a Wisconsin affiliate was eligible for bankruptcy, due to particular provisions in that state's
laws. See Selcke v. Medcare HMO, 147 B.R. 895 (N.D. Ill. 1992), affd, In re Medcare HMO,
998 F.2d 436 (7th Cir. 1993). Natu-ally, however, whether an entity constitutes an EMO
depends not only on the tests used by the courts, but also on particular provisions of state law.
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eligibility.269 This test considers the interests of all the parties, tries to balance
them, and then determines what is best for all involved.270 This test resembles a
"police powers" analysis in some respects, which is comforting given that this
ultimately is a preemption issue.271 None of the tests are all that different in any
event.272 All three look to see if the entity in issue resembles an insurance
company. The main difference is in the presumption of validity, and whether it
favors state law, the intention of the Bankruptcy Code drafters, or general public
policy.
While HMOs and CCFs are analogous in some ways, there are also
differences between them. As far as patients or consumers are concerned, HMOs
are insurance companies, or are at least closely related to a company that
provides health insurance.273 CCFs are a hybrid between a nursing home and a
provider of annuities. While the former is clearly eligible for bankruptcy, the
latter may not be. HMOs are also far more heavily regulated than CCFs. They
are governed by state legislation in forty-seven states as well as by federal
legislation.274 There is a model HMO statute, which provides that HMOs are
insurance companies for the purposes of liquidation or rehabilitation. 275 HMOs
typically have an indemnity component, whereas CCFs do not.276 Thus, CCFs
share fewer of the attributes of an insurance company and are subject to less state
regulation.
While it is impossible to determine whether this provision in Maine's statute
269 See Family Health, 101 B.R. at 644.
270 See id.
271 It is unclear how these three tests fit with the general supremacy analysis or with a
"police powers" analysis. Seesupra notes 111-67 and accompanying text. The Seventh Circuit
in Medcare HMO acknowledged that this issue is ultimately a supremacy question, that must
be analyzed under Perez v. Campbell. See In re Estate of Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d 436, 442
(7th Cir. 1993) (citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 652 (1971)). Thus, it is necessary to
ask whether the state's classification of HMOs frustrates the full effect of the Bankruptcy Code.
See id. at 442.
272 See id. (stating that all three tests require the same thing, namely an analysis of the
"actual operation" of the HMO, the impact of the state classification on the objectives of the
Bankruptcy Code, plus a determination of whether excluding HMOs from bankruptcy
protection is consistent with the policies of the code).
273 See Medcare LiMO, 998 F.2d at 444 (noting that whether an HMO is licensed under
the HMO Act or the Insurance Code is without consequence to the services the HMO provides
its enrollees).
274 See Jay M. Howard, The Aftermath of HMO Insolvency: Considerations for
Providers, 4 ANNALs HEALTH L. 87, 93-95 (1995) (discussing federal regulation of liMOs).
275 See HEALTH MAMrENANCE ORG. MODEL Acr § 21(A) (Nat'l Assoc. Ins. Comm'rs
1995).
276 See In re Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d 436,445 (7th Cir. 1993).
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would be upheld, particularly given the split of authority on the issue in the
HMO industry, the possibility is not foreclosed. If states were to enact a
provision such as Maine's and it were deemed enforceable, this would make
virtually every supremacy problem raised in this Article moot. In addition to
adding the "insurance" language, however, states that wish to control this issue
must liquidate CCFs under the provisions of the insurance statutes, must fully
integrate CCFs into their insurance industry scheme, and must appoint the
commissioner of insurance to regulate the industry.277 Just calling a CCF an
insurance company is not enough to make the CCF ineligible for bankruptcy.
One court briefly considered whether a CCF constituted an insurance
company for the purpose of Chapter 11 eligibility, but in that case, none of the
above requisites had been met.278 The statute at issue did not state that CCFs
were insurance companies and provided no scheme under which to liquidate
CCFs under state law.279 Language in the case implies, however, that if these
problems were solved, a CCF might well be an insurance company, if a state
statute says that it is.280 Somehow, it seems hard to believe that this could be
effective-any more than calling a duck a rabbit would turn it into a rabbit.2 81 It
still seems worth a try, however. Legislating that CCFs are insurance companies
would express a state's clear intention regarding control of these cases, and it
would be more valuable than much of the current legislation that is preempted
without this additional language.2 82
277 See Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d at 446; In re Beacon Health, Inc., 105 B.R. 178, 181
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1989). There is disagreement about whether HMOs must use the liquidation
and rehabilitation procedures in order to qualify as insurance companies, or whether they can
instead have their own tailored provisions. The Beacon Health court held that because the
HMO at issue in that case was to be liquidated under the statute in exactly the same way as an
insurance company, it was an insurance company. See Beacon Health, 105 B.R. at 178.
Another case held, however, that HMOs can constitute insurance companies under section 109,
even if the statute provides for separate and different liquidation procedures for HMOs. See
Medcare HMO, 998 F.2d at 445.
27 8 See In re Florida Brethren Homes, Inc., 88 B.R. 445,446-47 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
27 9 See id.
280 See id. (stating that, assuming the state's legislative classification did make the CCF
involved an insurance company, the CCF was still eligible for bankruptcy because the Florida
statute did not provide an alternative provision for liquidation of the CCF under the
circumstances).
281 See Beacon Health, 105 B.R. at 185 n.1.
282 Given the almost desperate attempts by states to control CCF insolvencies, it is
surprising that only one state has enacted legislation proclaiming CCFs to be insurance
companies. It makes one wonder what tipped off Maine and why Maine has kept its own
information a secret. In fact, the enormous discrepancies in the various aspects of the CCF
statutes makes national coordination very desirable.
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In summary, states have enacted a host of legislation relating to the
insolvency and reorganization of CCFs which expresses a clear desire to exercise
power, control, and jurisdiction over CCF insolvencies. Many of these provisions
are ineffective in federal bankruptcy cases because most states are currently
unable to preclude a CCF from filing for bankruptcy protection. This makes
many continuing-care statutes worthless at the very time when residents need
them most. There may be a way to enforce these provisions, as well as the others
previously discussed. Specifically, states can attempt to make CCFs ineligible for
bankruptcy, leaving states free to enforce their entire regulatory scheme in state
court. I am not convinced that this will work, but find the prospect interesting.
Perhaps all of the provisions giving states power over bankruptcy cases, as
well as state attempts to make CCFs ineligible for bankruptcy, can also be
enforced through the police power exception to the automatic stay. The questions
to answer include: (1) is this uniquely a local domain, such that states should be
left unfettered to regulate it, and (2) do these provisions actually protect the
health and safety of citizens to the extent necessary to fit within section
364(d)(4)? There is no clear answer to either question. Continuing-care is an area
of heavy state regulation and to some extent, the concerns seem local. Once
insolvency occurs, however, there is no reason to believe that the resulting cases
are best handled locally under state insolvency statutes, or that states should be
telling bankruptcy courts how to adjudicate their cases. Moreover, it would seem
inconsistent to deny access to bankruptcy to the CCFs in one state but not to
those in another state. In short, there seems to be no reason to defer to the states
on the subject of CCF insolvencies.283 Rather, it would be more effective to
provide extra protection to residents by amending the Bankruptcy Code to
remove some of the incentives to file.
IV. ADDRESSING CCF INSOLVENCIES THROUGH THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Chapter 11 provides many important rehabilitation mechanisms, but one of
the most powerful is contract rejection.284 The debtor-in-possession has the
option to either assume the contract, in which case the contractual obligations
become administrative expenses of the estate,285 or to reject the contract, which
283 This conclusion could be incorrect, however, because the current Bankruptcy Code
creates the wrong incentives for CCFs, who benefit too much in federal bankruptcy cases, at
the expense of residents. In a sense, facilities have been able to externalize costs in a way
generally precluded in the environmental context. Moreover, residents are at great risk of loss
in facility bankruptcies. Perhaps residents can be protected against this risk by moving all of
the cases to state forums where states can control them.
284 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994).
2 85 See id. § 503. Unlike prepetition unsecured claims that can be paid at a very low rate
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relieves the debtor of all obligations to perform the contact, and leaves the
nondebtor party with a claim for damages.286 This damages claim is paid at a
rate of far less than one hundred percent, typically, at about ten percent of its
original value.2 87
When it comes to contract rejection, fairness does not come into play at all.
Although they are courts of equity, bankruptcy courts are not permitted to
balance the interests of the parties. They must instead allow rejection if doing so
will benefit the debtor. 288 Rejection is permitted because, in order to rehabilitate
a business, one must be free to discard unprofitable obligations.289 As a result,
of distribution, see Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts,
74 MINN L. REv. 227, 252-53 (1989) (calling the dollars distributed to unsecured creditors tiny
"bankruptcy dollars"), administrative claims must be paid in fill by the debtor, making the
decision to assume unsecured claims very important and potentially costly. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b)(1)(A). As a result, courts look far more critically at a debtor's decision to assume than
a decision to reject, as a poor decision could destroy the debtor's business, and thus reduce
returns to creditors. See In re Food City, Inc., 94 B.R. 91, 92 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988);
1 DAviD G. EPSTEIN ETAL., BANKRUPTCY 231, 245 (1992).
286 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). Section 365(g) treats the breach as a prepetition breach by the
debtor. See id. The nondebtor party then becomes a creditor, as defined in section 101(10)(13).
See id. § 101 (10)(B). Section 502(g) then classifies the nondebtor party's rejection damage
claim as a general unsecured claim. See id. § 502(g).
287 There is no one definitive study indicating the average bankruptcy distribution to
unsecured creditors. However, the several studies that have been completed show that most
companies that successfully reorganize in Chapter 11 pay distributions of 15% or less. See
Susan Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter II Plans Consummate? The Results of a Study
and Analysis of the Law, 97 CoM. LJ. 297, 322-23 (1992) (finding that of 42 confirmed
reorganization plans, 7 paid unsecured creditors less than 10%, 15 paid between 10% and 16%,
11 paid between 16% and 30%, and 1 paid 53%); Robert M. Lawless et al., A Glimpse at
Professional Fees and Other Direct Costs in Small Firm Bankruptcies, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
847, 869 (1994) (finding that in 27 small Chapter 11 cases, 15 paid distributions of less than
10%, 7 cases between 11% and 20%, and 5 between 21% and 60%). But see Michelle J.
White, Bankruptcy Costs and the New Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. FIN. 477, 483 (1983) (stating
that distributions generally fell below 32%). A 10% distribution has become a common
"benchmark" or estimate of what a hypothetical case might pay in distributions, so some
scholars have come to assume that the average case does pay 10%. See Westbrook, supra note
285, at 253, 289 (assuming a 10% distribution in his hypothetical involving the rejection of a
contract to sections). Of course, some cases pay even less. See, e.g., United Food &
Commercial Workers Local Union v. Appletree Mkts., Inc. (In re Appletree Mkts., Inc.), 155
B.R. 431,435 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (noting that the union's contract damages were between $7
million and $11 million, and that as unsecured creditors, the union would get 8 cents on the
dollar, but as a party to a breached postpetition contract, the union would recover on their claim
in full).
288 See In re A.J. Lane & Co., 107 B.R. 435,440-41 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
289 Section 90(b) of the Bankruptcy Act also contained a similar provision, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(b) (repealed 1978), as did the Bankruptcy Act of 1938, which provided that a trustee had
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the Bankruptcy Code permits the rejection of most contracts freely, including
continuing-care contracts. 290 This could create a strong incentive for a CCF to
file for Chapter 11 in order to rid itself of unprofitable resident continuing-care
contracts.
The Code recognizes that although debtor rehabilitation is important, some
nondebtor parties to contracts have equally important, or perhaps even more
important, interests. As a result, Congress has limited or prohibited contract
rejection in some situations in order to protect these particular nondebtor parties.
This Part analyzes how and why this special protection was provided to certain
nondebtor parties to see if similar legislation might be appropriate to protect CCF
residents. After discussing how CCF contract rejection could be limited by
further bankruptcy legislation, this Part discusses another general way to protect
residents, namely by creating a higher priority for their claims, either by making
their claims secured through effective state legislation, or by giving their contract
rejection claims priority status under section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, this Part considers the option of simply making CCFs ineligible for
bankruptcy through an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code.
A. The Problems Created by Section 365"s Rejection Powers
One has to wonder what Congress was thinking when it enacted section 365
of the Bankruptcy Code.291 By giving debtors the virtually unlimited ability to
to be able to abandon burdensome property whenever doing so was in the best interests of the
estate. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY § 365.01, at 365-68 (Lawrence P. King ed. 1996).
290 At least one court has found that CCF contracts are rejectable-no other reported
opinions discuss the issue. See In re Bretheren's Home, 24 B.R. 336, 339 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1982). While I am currently conducting empirical research regarding whether there is any
difference of opinion on this subject among courts that have considered the issue in
nonreported opinions, there certainly is no exception for life care contracts in section 365. See
II U.S.C. § 365 (1994).
If rejection is indeed possible, the incentive to reject contracts is always present when
someone pre-pays for a service or right that he will enjoy over a long period of time. I
remember the bankruptcy of Sullivan Stadium in Boston in the late 1980s. The Chapter 11
trustee moved to reject the superbox contracts, pursuant to which big companies paid tens of
thousands of dollars to use luxury superboxes, for a period of one to ten years. Rejection
created obvious benefits. If the old users could have been replaced with new "paying"
customers, the debtor could have benefited from the same space twice. The same incentive is
created here. If residents who have already paid for the care can be replaced with new residents,
the debtor can both raise the contract fee and collect twice.
291 The idea that contracts could be rejected had its origins in the English common law
doctrine that permitted bankruptcy trustees to abandon burdensome property. See 2 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 289, at 365-16, 365-17; see also Vein Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy, (pt. 1) 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973). According to the
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reject or disavow contracts, debtors have a powerful incentive to file for
bankruptcy.292 Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to assume
or reject any contract, subject to bankruptcy court approval, under the "business
judgment" test.293 Generally, one need not show that a contract is particularly
burdensome in order to reject it, but only that the debtor would be better off
without it.294 Rejection constitutes a breach of the contract, permanently
releasing the debtor of all performance obligations, and leaving the nondebtor
party with only the right to file a general unsecured claim for damages. 295
As if it were not enough to allow complete disavowal of a contract that is
otherwise enforceable,296 section 365 and the cases interpreting it, create a host
legislative history of section 365, Congress' primary goal in enacting the section was to allow
debtors to shirk off unprofitable business obligations, similar to the way a trustee is permitted
to abandon any unprofitable asset. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 58-60 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 347-50 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,6303; see also Westbrook, supra note 285, at 248-49.
292 This is particularly true of debtors with large contractual obligations that they no
longer wish to perform. Rejection is permitted with very little judicial scrutiny under the
applicable business judgment test. See In re A. J. Lane & Co., 107 B.R. 435, 439 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1989); see also In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc., 18 B.R. 612, 617 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1982) (holding that rejection should be denied only where the trustee's decision based solely
on profitability of the contract to the debtor is clearly erroneous).
293 The business judgment test is virtually a no-brainer for courts, which must simply
decide if rejection is financially beneficial to the debtor. See EPsTEIN ET AL., supra note 285, at
244-45 (noting that some courts interpret the business judgment test as requiring no review of
a rejection decision); AJ. Lane, 107 B.R. at 439; Sombrero Reef, 18 B.R. at 617. According to
another court, the only issue in a rejection case is "whether the decision of the debtor that
rejection will be advantageous is so manifestly unreasonable that it could not be based on
sound business judgment, but only on bad faith, or whim or caprice." In re Constant Care
Community Health Ctr., Inc., 99 B.R. 697, 709 (Bankr. D. Md. 1989) (citing Lubrizol Enter. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 765 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985)).
2 94 See A.J. Lane, 107 B.R. at 439; Sombrero Reef, 18 B.R. at 617. Jay Howard's
informative article on HMO bankruptcies contains an interesting and almost upbeat discussion
about what doctors and other professionals can do to protect themselves while they are waiting
to see if their contracts are rejected. See Howard, supra note 274, at 104-05. Despite its
hopeful tone, the answer is still "not much."
2 95 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(1), 502; Christopher D. Cameron, How "Necessary"
Became the Mother of Rejection: An Empirical Look at the Fate of Collective Bargaining
Agreements on the Tenth Anniversary of Bankruptcy Code Section 1113, 34 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 841, 850 (1994).
296 Section 365(a) states that the trustee may assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994). Through section 1107, the debtor-in-
possession in a Chapter I 1 has the same right. See id § 1107. The most common definition of
an "executory" contract is "a contract under which the obligation of both the [debtor] and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
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of unfair imbalances during the waiting period, while the debtor decides whether
to reject or disavow the contract or perform under it.29 7 During at least some of
this time period, the debtor is allowed to ignore its own payment and
performance obligations under the contract, while at the same time enforcing the
contract against the nondebtor party.298 In some cases, courts have forced
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other."
Countryman, supra note 291, at 460. Under the more modem "functional" approach, the focus
is not so much on the contract, but rather on the debtor's benefits and burdens under it. See
Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U.
CoLO. L. REV. 845, 892-93 (1988). Under this analysis, whether a contract is executory only
matters if the debtor wants to assume it. See id. at 890. If the debtor does not want to assume it,
then no matter what the obligation is called, it is nothing more than an unsecured claim for
damages. See id.; see also Westbrook, supra note 285. Under Professor Westbrook's analysis,
one looks at the debtor's required performance and the future benefits to be gained by the
debtor. Then one determines whether it makes sense for the debtor to assume the contract and
thus perform it or reject the contract and cease performance of it. See id. at 335-36. While one
hombook claims that Westbrook's definition is similar to Countryman's rather than Andrew's,
see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 285, at 245, 1 do not see much difference between the Andrew
approach and the Westbrook approach. See also S. REP. No. 9-89, at 58 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6303. Rejection frees the debtor from all obligations to perform the
contract. But rejection also constitutes a default or breach under the contract, requiring the
debtor to pay the nondebtor party a distribution on any resulting unsecured claim for damages
resulting from the breach. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(6); Wainer v. AJ. Equities Ltd., 984 F.2d
679, 684 (5th Cir. 1993). After such a distribution is made, and of course it can be quite small
in percentage, the remainder of the damages claim is discharged. See Wainer, 984 F.2d at 684.
297 Section 362(a) prevents unilateral action by the nondebtor party to a contract. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(a). Until rejection, however, the contract is fully binding on the nondebtor party
and the debtor-in-possession can obtain an injunction directing the other party to perform. See
Data-Link Sys., Inc. v. Whitcomb & Keller Mortgage, Inc. (In re Whitcomb & Keller
Mortgage, Inc.), 715 F.2d 375, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1983) (enforcing a contract for computer
services); Continental Energy Assocs. L.P. v. Hazleton Fuel Management Co. (In re
Continental Energy Assocs. Co.), 178 B.R. 405, 408 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1995); Chuck Smith
Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Credit (In re Chuck Smith Ford, Inc.), 46 BR. 515, 519 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1985); Ike Kempner & Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp. (In re Ike Kempner & Bros., Inc.), 4
B.R. 31, 32-33 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980) (enforcing a shoe supplier contract).
Moreover, an assumable contract is not enforceable against the debtor-in-possession
before assumption. See Skeen v. Denver Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (In re Feyline Presents, Inc.)
81 B.R. 623, 627 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (holding that the nondebtor party can be liable to the
debtor for breaching the contract during the "limbo" period but that the debtor need not
perform).
298 Pending the debtor's decision whether to assume or reject an executory contract, the
nondebtor party must continue to perform. See Continental Energy Assocs. L.P. v. Hazleton
Fuel Management Co. (In re Continental Energy Assocs. Co.), 178 B.R. 405, 409 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1995). In fact, according to one recent decision, the main purpose of section 365(a) is
to relieve the debtor of burdensome obligations, while at the same time providing a means
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suppliers to deliver goods to debtors against their will, and have even been
willing to reduce the price the debtor must pay for such goods below the contract
price.299
This discussion merely demonstrates that there is nothing unusual about the
rejection of a contract. All rejections are unfair to the nondebtor party. While
allowing rejection may seem unfair, this important Bankruptcy Code benefit was
purposefully provided by Congress to aid rehabilitation. 300
Nevertheless, if there is a particularly good reason to prohibit or limit some
rejections, it can be done. Congress has chosen to make rejection more difficult
for certain types of contracts and leases, most notably real estate leases to which
the debtor is the landlord, 301 software license agreements to which the debtor is
through which the debtor can force the nondebtor party to continue to perform under the
contract. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 10 F.3d 944,954-55 (2d Cir. 1993).
299 See Continental Energy, 178 B. R. at 409. In Continental Energy, the Chapter 11
debtor operated a cogeneration facility. The debtor sought a preliminary injunction to compel a
fuel supplier to continue to deliver natural gas essential to the debtor's operations pending the
debtor's decision to assume or reject the parties' gas supply contract Hazleton Fuel
Management Company ('CHazleton") did not want to continue to supply gas to the debtor
pending assumption or rejection of the contract because the debtor had threatened to seek
disgorgement by Hazleton of any payment made over and above the reasonable cost of such
natural gas. The debtor did not want to assume the gas supply contract because it did not have
an immediate alternative source of natural gas, although the market rate for gas was
significantly lower than the contract rate. See id at 407.
Hazleton argued that it could not be compelled to perform under the contract on terms
different than provided in the contract Although Hazleton refused to deliver the fuel at less
than the contract price, the court granted the requested relief pursuant to Bankruptcy Code
section 105. See id at 407-08. The court reasoned that the debtor would be paying in advance
and would be paying at least as much as determined to be "reasonable amounts" for the fuel.
Further, the debtor was required to assume or reject the contract within thirty days of the
preliminary injunction hearing. Thus, 'Hazleton's 5th Amendment rights [were] vigilantly
being guarded by [the] court." Id. at 407. The court left open the determination of the price
ultimately to be paid for the fuel. This essentially compelled performance by a nondebtor party
to a contract prior to assumption or rejection, on terms that were potentially different than those
required by the contract
300 See id.
301 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h). This section provides that if the debtor is the landlord under
an unexpired real estate lease, the debtor landlord can reject the tenant's real estate lease.
Further, this section provides that the tenant has the right to choose to remain in tenancy on the
premises and set off any expenses related to the tenancy against the rent due. See id. Because
this is typically unprofitable for the debtor-landlord, the section generally discourages debtor-
landlords from rejecting tenant leases. See, e.g., In re Lee Rd. Partners, Ltd. v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 169 B.R. 507, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that due to the provisions of
section 365(h), there would be no benefit to granting a motion to reject a lease to which the
debtor is the landlord, and thus the motion should be denied); In re Friarton Estates Corp., 65
B.R. 586, 593 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that the tenants in a rent controlled building
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the licensor,302 time share interests to which the debtor is the time share interest
seller,303 real property leases under which the debtor is an airline that leases
aircraft gates from an airport, 304and collective bargaining agreements to which
the debtor is the employer.30 5 The question is whether continuing-care contracts
to which the debtor is the CCF should be added to this list.
1. Limitations on Rejection of Certain Real Estate Leases, Time Shares,
and License Contracts
Real estate leases to which the debtor is the landlord, timeshare interests to
which the debtor is the timeshare interest seller, and license agreements to which
the debtor is a licensor, are all treated in similar ways under the Bankruptcy
Code.306 These interests in property cannot be eliminated as easily as other
could not be removed from the debtor's apartments through rejection of their contracts).
302 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3) (1994). This section provides that while the debtor-licensor
to a software agreement can reject its contract with the licensee, the licensee can choose to
retain certain rights under such contract, including retention to all software received as well as
some updates of the software. However, the licensee must continue to pay for the software and
make any royalty payments. It is not permitted to set off or reduce its loyalty payments to the
debtor to take into account the debtor-licensee's nonperformance. See also Encino Bus.
Management, Inc. v. Prize Frize, Inc. (In re Prize Frize, Inc.), 32 F3d 426, 428-29 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that after the debtor's rejection of patent for its french fry machine, the licensee
who chose to retain the software was required to make other outstanding "royalty payment as
well as" monthly installment payments); In re El Int'l, 123 B.R. 64,66 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991)
(interpreting section 365(n) and holding that if the licensee elects to retain its rights under the
agreement, the licensee must make all royalty payments and further is deemed to waive any
right to setoff and any section 503(b) claim the licensee may have against the bankruptcy
estate). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2), with 11 U.S.C. § 365(h).
303 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(2)(A). Purchasers of real property under a loan installment
contract, who are in possession of the property, also receive special protections. See id.
§ 365(i).
304 See id § 365(d)(5). This provision was added to the Bankruptcy Code to protect the
public and the transportation industry. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6199; see also Western Pac. Airlines, Inc. v. GATX Capital (In re
Westem Pac. Airlines, Inc.), 221 B.R 1, 10 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (discussing the purposes of
section 365(d)(5) and related section 1110). Because this situation is so different from that of
CCF residents, this code section is not analyzed here.
305 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113; see also infra notes 348-89 and accompanying text.
306 Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(h)(1), (2), with 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(3). Under both
sections, the nondebtor party to the contract can opt to maintain certain rights under the
contract, even after rejection. For example, tenants to real estate leases can remain in
possession of leased premises and licensees can maintain possession of the licensed software.
See id §§ 365 (h)(1), (n)(3). Section 365(h)(2) also significantly limits the debtor's ability to
reject timeshare interests. See id. § 365(h)(2). The big difference between the two is that tenants
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leases and contracts in bankruptcy, although a debtor can easily reject its own
tenant's interest in a lease.30 7 Real estate leases to which the debtor is the
landlord create a real property interest in favor of the tenant.30 8 Under section
365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor technically is permitted to reject a real
estate lease to which it is a landlord.309 If the debtor does reject the leases,
however, the tenants can choose to continue to occupy the premises.310
Moreover, while the debtor need not provide any essential services to the tenants
after rejection, the tenants have the right to offset any expenses they incur to
obtain replacement services at the leased premises against the rent owed the
debtor-landlord. 311 This right of set-off makes it financially infeasible for most
to real estate leases can set off the costs of essential services against the rent due, while the
licensee to a rejected software agreement cannot set off the cost of services it fails to get from
the debtor. See i. § 365(hXl)(B), § 365(nX2XCXi).
307 Section 365(a), which permits rejection, applies to the debtor-tenant's interest in a
lease, as this particular interest does not fall within the exception described in section 365(h).
Section 365(h) applies only to be rejection of the landlord's interest in a real estate lease. See id
§ 365(a), § 365(hX1XA); see also id § 365(e) (allowing a landlord whose tenant has assumed a
lease to request an additional security deposit, and maldng it clear that the debtor can
alternatively reject the lease).
In several nursing home cases in which the debtor was the nursing home operator, as well
as a tenant under a lease for the building, courts have acknowledged the debtor nursing homes'
unequivocal right to reject the tenant's interest in such premises. See, eg., In re Care Givers,
Inc., 113 B.L 263, 268 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1989) (holding that a lease for nursing home
premises was not a nonresidential lease that had to be assumed within 60 days of the filing
because residents lived there, and acknowledging in dicta that if the debtor had wanted to reject
its lease, it could have done so); In re Sonora Convalescent Hosp., Inc., 69 B.R 134, 137-38
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that a lease of convalescent home premises that has not been
assumed was automatically rejected 60 days after the filing); In re Independence Village, Inc.,
52 B.R. 715, 722 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (holding that a facility lease was not a
nonresidential real property lease but implicitly acknowledging that such a lease could be
rejected).
308 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (1994). The legislative history of § 365(h) indicates that
Congress' goal was to retain the former Bankruptcy Act's policy of preserving tenants
possessing real estate tenancy. See id § 110(b) (repealed 1978). The idea was to preserve the
expectation of the real estate transaction parties by codifying the balance between the
competing interests of the parties. See In re Lee Rd. Partners, Ltd., 155 B.R 55, 60 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1993), affid, 169 B.R. 507 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994).
30 9 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h).
310 See id
311 See id Section 365(h) was structured to preserve the lessee's possessory interest in the
leasehold, while at the same time relieving the debtor-lessor of the obligation to provide
continuing services to the lessee, presumably because some debtors would be financially
unable to provide these services in any event SeeLee Rd Partners, 155 B.R. at 60.
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debtor-landlords to actually reject the contracts. 3 12 As a result, debtors rarely
reject their landlord's interest in a real property lease.313
One important benefit to a nondebtor tenant that flows from section
365(h)(1) is that if the debtor sells its real estate, it cannot sell it free and clear of
the tenant's interests. 314 Thus, just as would be the case outside bankruptcy, the
tenant's possessory interest is retained regardless of who owns the leased
property.315
When timeshare interests became popular in the 1980s, one debtor who sold
time shares rejected the contracts creating such an interest 316 While the
timeshare interest purchasers tried to argue that their interests constituted leases
under existing section 365(h) 317 and were thus protected from dispossession, the
court was unwilling to find the timeshare interests to be "real property interests,"
and thus within the protection of existing section 365(h).318 Thereafter, Congress
decided that holders of timeshare interests should be protected from rejection and
enacted section 365(h)(2).319 Congress provided this protection to timeshare
interest holders, even though that they do not qualify as true "real property
312 As some authors have noted, reported opinions on section 365(h) are rare. See
Thomas C. Homburger et al., Conflict Resolved: Bankruptcy Code § 365(h) and the
Contradictory Cases Requiring Its Amendment, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 869, 873
(1995). Because the requirements of section 365(h) are onerous, most debtor-lessors do not
reject tenant leases. Instead, most debtor-lessors view the income stream from tenant leases as
part of the estate's assets, and simply continue the tenancy as usual. See id. at 873-74.
3 13 See id.; see also Lee Rd. Partners, 169 B.R. at 512.
3 14 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(h), 363(b) (1994).
315 Despite the section 363(f) claims that a debtor can sell its property "free and clear of
all interests," see id. § 363(f), section 365(h) clearly trumps 363(t). See In re Churchill
Properties 111, 197 B.R 283, 287 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1996) (stating that section 365 was more
compelling and ruled the day over section 363(1)).
316 See, e.g., In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc., 18 B.R. 612, 620 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
Sombrero Reef was the only case reported on the issue of rejection of timeshares prior to
enactment of section 365(h)(2). According to a later court decision, Sombrero Reef led to the
enactment of section 365(h1)(2). See In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc., 89 B.L at 992-93
(deciding on the amount of compensation due debtor's counsel in this case, given the novelty
of the issues involved and the fact that the case led to amendment of the Bankruptcy Code). In
light of this, it seems unbelievable that residents of life care contracts are not already protected
from rejection in section 365. It is hard to believe this legislation was not enacted in 1980, right
after the court in Brethren's Home permitted the rejection of life care contracts. See In re
Brethren's Home, 24 B.R. 336,339 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
317 At the time, section 365(h) only applied to tenants holding leasehold interests.
318 See Sombrero Reef, 18 B.R. at 612-18 (concluding that the timeshare contracts did
not constitute leases under section 365(h), and while the owners had purchased "something"
with their initial fee-that something did not seem to be an interest in real property).
319 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(2).
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interests," and that doing so unquestionably hinders a timeshare seller's
rehabilitation.320
Not long after enacting the timeshare legislation, Congress enacted special
legislation to protect a third interest group from contract rejection-licensees to
software license agreements.321 Before section 365(n) was enacted, section
365(a) allowed a debtor in possession or trustee to reject software licenses, which
would cause the licensed material to revert back to the debtor and become
property of the debtor's estate.322 Because software licensees were unusually
dependent on licensors, some courts felt licensees needed extra protection from
rejection.323 Moreover, Congress feared that the United States, a clear leader in
software technology, would begin losing its competitive edge in the world
market if licensees could lose all of the value of their software license whenever
an American licensor filed for bankruptcy protection. 324 As a result, Congress
enacted section 365(n), which essentially provides that, while a debtor-licensor
can reject a software license agreement, the licensee can retain its rights under
32 0 See Mark C. Eriks, Note, Treatment of Time-Share Interests Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 59 IND. LJ. 223, 248-49 (1984). This student note, apparently written just before
Congress enacted section 365(hX2), concludes that timeshare interest holders do not present a
strong case for special priority under section 365(i) because timeshares are used only for
vacation and the loss of this right would not result in the holders being displaced from their
homes. See id. at 243. The author further notes that this protection would be provided at a great
cost to the debtor, whose only business might be selling timeshares. See id at 250-51. Despite
this fine logic and an almost complete lack of case law or legal commentary describing the
need for this special protection, this legislation sailed right through. See 130 CONG. REC.
S20013, S20083 (June 29, 1984) (statement of Sen. Dole), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N.
586,587.
321 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1994).
322 See id § 365(a).
323 See Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal
Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985). But see In re Logical Software, Inc., 66
B.R. 683, 686-87 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986) (rejecting any notion that software license
agreements were different from other agreements, and thus allowing rejection under the
business judgment test). In many respects, the Lubrizol case led to the enactment of section
365(n). In that case, the court recognized that it had no choice but to allow rejection under
section 365(a), but clearly stated that it wished it could also consider the severe harm that
would result to the licensee. The licensee in Lubrizol was going to lose its entire business if
rejection were permitted. See Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. Moreover, according to the court, this
would have a "chilling effect" on the development ofintellectual property. See id.
324 See Marjorie F. Chertok, Structuring License Agreements with Companies in
Financial Difflculty: Section 365(n)-Diining Rod or Obstacle Course?, 65 ST. JoHN's L.
REV. 1045, 1046 (1991); Mary A. Moy, Comment, The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy
Protection Act: An Unbalanced Solution to the International Software Licensing Dilemma, 11
U. PA. J. INT'L. Bus. L. 151, 153-54 (1989).
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the contract, including the right to continue to use the software, enforce any
exclusivity provision, and protect its confidential information.325
Each of these pieces of specialty legislation was enacted for a different
reason.326 Starting with tenant real estate laws under section 365(h), Congress
was continuing the policy of the old Bankruptcy Act of elevating state-created
property interests above bankruptcy laws.327 Apparently, Congress also wanted
to preserve the benefit of the tenant's bargain.328 As the legislation protecting
timeshare interest holders demonstrates, however, Congress did not feel that it
could only protect nondebtor parties with recognized real property interests.329
Congress protected timeshare interest holders with specialty legislation, despite
the lack of a real property interest in their favor, and even though those timeshare
interests could be the only items that some debtors have to sell.330 Licensees to
software contracts were protected for still different reasons, namely to protect the
party with presumably less bargaining power and to protect the market for U.S.
software licenses in general. 331
While too much specialty legislation can make the bankruptcy process
325 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). The debtor is not required to provide any additional services
to the licensee, however, and need not continue updating the software. See id. Moreover, the
licensee cannot offset this maintenance or other costs against the license fees it owes the debtor
and must continue paying the license fees pursuant to the contract terms. See id
According to at least one author, Congress may have gone too far in protecting licensees
in enacting section 365(n). See Moy, supra note 324, at 186-91. Ms. Moy would rather see
courts balance the interests of both parties and then decide how to rule based on the relative
harms and benefits. See id. at 192. Another author, however, feels that the purpose of enacting
section 365(n) was to ameliorate what he calls judicial "rejection abuse," resulting from too
much reliance by bankruptcy courts on traditional bankruptcy mechanisms--even when
considering the rejection of an intellectual property license. See John P. Musone, Comment,
Crystallizing the Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act: A Proposed Solution to
Achieve Congress' Intent 13 BANKR. DEV. . 509, 524-34 (1997). Accordingly, Ms. Musone
also favors a "balancing of interests" approach over section 365(n), although obviously for
different reasons. See id.
326 See supra notes 307 and 319-25 and accompanying text
327 See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
328 See id.
329 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(2) (1994); see also Eriks, supra note 320, at 250.
330 See id. at 250-51. As Mr. Eriks notes, timeshare interest holders are protected at the
expense of rehabilitation of the timeshare seller. See id. This is, of course, true in the case of all
of the section 365 specialty legislation.
331 See supra notes 321-25 and accompanying text. It was most likely the threat of losing
the world-wide competitive edge in intellectual property that led Congress to enact section
365(n). I find it hard to believe that it was an imbalance of power that fueled this legislative
effort because power imbalances are present in contracts of many different kinds, including
many areas for which no special section 365 protection is provided.
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inefficient, none of these special interest groups seem any more deserving of
special protection from section 365(a) than CCF residents. History does elevate
real property interests above bankruptcy rights,332 but it is not necessary to hold
a real property interest in order to be worthy of section 365(a) protection. 333
Similar to timeshare interest holders, CCF residents do not hold a recognizable
property interest in their facility.334 CCF residents' interests in their CCF
contracts are certainly more important than the interests that timeshare holders
have in their vacation timeshares.335 CCF residents' interests also seem more
compelling than the interests of software licensees. While it is true that rejection
of a licensee's software license could put the licensee out of business, this is also
true of many nondebtor parties subject to rejected contracts.336 By comparison,
CCF residents could be removed from their homes at a time in life when
relocation often results in death.337 Finally, the financial incentives to reject
seem greater in the CCF context than in these other contexts. This would be true
anytime a nondebtor party made a huge prepayment at the beginning of a
contract and paid very little money under the contract terms thereafter, but this is
exacerbated when the contract term is potentially very long.338
Assuming that residents should be protected through some form of
bankruptcy legislation, section 365 could be used as a model for such legislation.
Such legislation need not mimick existing provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in
protecting CCF residents, however. The best solution might be different from
that provided in section 365, based on the different needs of both residents and
CCFs. All specialty legislation found in sections 365(h) and (n) allows the debtor
to reject certain contracts while providing that the nondebtor party can retain
332 Seesupra note 307 and accompanying text.
333 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(hX2) (protecting timeshare interest holders); iad § 365(n)(3)
(protecting licensees to software contracts).
334 See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
335 Timeshares are typically used for vacations and never, as far as I know, as a primary
residence.
336 Commentators and courts think that softvare license contracts present this problem.
See Chertok, supra note 324, at 1046-47; Moy, supra note 324, at 190; see also Lubrizol
Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. (In re Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.), 756 F.2d
1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985). However, this result can occur in any industry.
337 Moving can be very taxing on an elderly person. Even moving an elderly person from
one room in a nursing home to another can be frightening and traumatic. See Marilyn Denny,
This Is Who I Am, Don't Let Them Move Me: Autonomy in Nursing Homes, 2 QUINNwIAC
HEALTH L.J. 203,204 (1999).
338 Obviously, a debtor-CCF facility cannot make money (or even stay in business) if it
has spent all of the residents' entrance fees and has no way to raise more entrance fees without
replacing existing residents.
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certain rights with respect to the property in issue.339 CCF residents are probably
most similar to tenants in real estate leases or to holders of timeshare interests.340
Under a provision similar to section 365(h), a debtor facility could reject its CCF
contracts, but the residents would have the right to continue residing in the
facility.34 1 While a debtor would be free of its obligations to provide essential
services to the residents, under a provision similar to sections 365(h)U) and
365(h)(2), residents could obtain such services elsewhere and then set off the
resulting costs against the amounts it owes the debtor.342 This precise model
would not protect residents, however, because residents have prepaid for lifetime
nursing care and would have few, if any, ongoing obligations to the debtor from
which to set off the costs of essential services. Moreover, some residents would
have no way to pay for such services while waiting for reimbursement from the
debtor.
The goal in looking to section 365(h) for guidance is not to replicate its
language exactly, but to create the same practical result that section 365(h)(1) has
created, namely to make it infeasible for debtor-CCFs to reject resident
contracts. 343 The incentives are completely different in the two different
situations, however. Debtor-lessors view their on-going rental stream as an asset
and thus keep their tenant leases in place in order to continue receiving that
income.344 CCFs, on the other hand, typically have little ongoing income from
existing residents. 345
One way to replicate the result created by section 365(h) would be to permit
residents to receive essential services from third parties, who would then have a
direct right to be paid by the debtor, an administrative expense claim in the
amount of the cost of such services.346 This would discourage rejection, but I am
339 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(h)(1), 365(h)(2), 365(n) (1994).
340 Compare id. § 365(h)(1), with id. § 365(h)(2). The main difference is that tenants may
set off the costs of essential services against the rent paid. In addition, the timeshare interest
holder can set off the value of any damage caused by the debtor's nonperformance against any
amounts still owed to the debtor. The main difference between section 365(h) and section
365(n) is that under the latter, licensees can retain the software in question, but cannot set off
the costs of servicing and updating the software, which the debtor is no longer providing.
Obviously, a statute modeled on this provision would provide no protection to residents. It
would do them no good whatsoever to be able to stay in the facility.
341 See icL §§ 365(h)(1), 365(h)(2).
342 See id.
343 See supra notes 309-13 and accompanying text.
344 See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
345 See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
346 This would be quite unusual. I can think of no other Bankruptcy Code provision that
creates rights in third parties, but that does not mean that it cannot be done.
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not sure other service providers would want to extend credit to a facility with
obvious financial problems. Another alternative to drafting legislation that
merely creates strong disincentives to rejection would be simply forbidding or
severely limiting the right to reject these kinds of contracts, as has been done
with collective bargaining agreements.3 47
2. The Treatment of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Bankruptcy
Rather than permitting rejection, but making it unprofitable, Congress took
an entirely different tack in addressing the question of whether collective
bargaining agreements could be rejected in bankruptcy.348 Collective bargaining
agreements have always been treated somewhat differently than other contracts
in bankruptcy, in recognition of their special status under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).349 Prior to the enactment of special legislation in favor of
labor unions, in order to decide how and whether rejection could be achieved,
one needed to compare the language and policies of two federal statutes, the
National Labor Relations Act and the Bankruptcy Code,350 and balance the
interests at stake. On the question of whether collective bargaining agreements
could be rejected, the two federal statutes are clearly at odds.351
Congress ultimately enacted very special protections against rejection of a
347 See infra notes 348-89 and accompanying text.
348 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994) (providing that collective bargaining agreements could
only be rejected under very unusual circumstances and after jumping through many hoops).
349 See id.; 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69. The NLRA was enacted in 1935, to rectify the
inequality of bargaining power between labor and management. See id. § 151. As this section
provides:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom
of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the
corporate or other forms of ownership association substantial burdens and affects the flow
of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing power of wage eamers in industry and by preventing the
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between
industries.
Id.; see also David L. Gregory, Labor Contract Rejection in Bankruptcy: The Supreme Court's
Attack on Labor in NLRB v. Bidlisco, 25 B.C. L. REv. 539, 543-44 (1984) (stating that before
federal labor legislation, employers dominated the work).
350 see 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69; 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330.
351 While the NLRA tried to protect employees, see id. § 151, the Bankruptcy Code's
goal for reorganizing a company was primarily to rehabilitate the debtor company
(management) and create the largest distribution possible for creditors. See supra notes 151-52
and accompanying text.
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collective bargaining agreement.352 In doing so, Congress protected the labor-
employee parties to the contract and made rejection extremely difficult for
management-employer debtors.353 Congress sent a strong message to employers
of organized labor, namely that while bankruptcy serves many goals, union
busting is not one of them.354 In other words, bankruptcy could not be used
solely to reject a collective bargaining agreement.355 Current bankruptcy
legislation precludes this result primarily by providing that collective bargaining
agreements can only be rejected or modified to the extent "necessary to permit
the reorganization of the debtor." 356 A number of other procedural and
substantive steps are also required before a collective bargaining agreement can
be rejected, if it can be rejected at all.357
The current law regarding the rejection of collective bargaining agreements
was enacted after the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Bildisco &
352 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (providing the steps necessary to and the specific circumstances
under which a company could reject a collective bargaining agreement).
353 According to some courts, a collective bargaining agreement can only be rejected if a
failure to do so will result in imminent liquidation of the debtor. See United Steelworkers of
Am. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. (In re Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel), 791 F.2d 1074,
1085 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that when Congress required that contracts could be rejected only
when management's proposed contract modifications were "necessary" to the debtor's
reorganization, it meant that absent the modification, the debtor could not survive). But see
Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1987) (adopting a far
less stringent standard for debtors rejecting collective bargaining agreements and instead
requiring only that the proposed modification, or out-and-out rejection, increase the likelihood
of reorganization).
35 4 See 130 CoNG. REc. S8653, S8887 (Apr. 11, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 583. As Senator Thurmond stated, by requiring that
rejection be "necessary" to reorganization, debtors would be prevented from using a
bankruptcy filing merely to rid themselves of features of the labor contract that have no bearing
on their financial condition.
355 See id.
35 6 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1)(A) (1994).
357 See id. In total, section 1113 requires that the debtor complete nine steps before
rejecting a collective bargaining agreement, which are described in detail in Cameron, supra
note 295, at 845-46.
The nine steps are: (1) The debtor must make a union proposal; (2) that is based on the
most complete financial information available; (3) provides for those modifications to the
existing contract that are necessary to permit the debtor's reorganization; (4) the modifications
must treat all effected parties fairly and equitably; (5) the debtor must provide the union with
information necessary to evaluate the proposal; (6) the debtor must meet with the union to
discuss the proposal; (7) the debtor must meet in good faith; (8) the union must refuse to accept
the proposal without good cause; and (9) the balance of equities must favor rejection.
Professor Cameron notes, however, that courts seem fixated on the necessity requirement
rather than the other eight requirements. See id. at 841.
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Bildisco,358 which one commentator called a "devastating blow" to labor.3 59
After balancing the interests of both labor and management, the Bildisco court
allowed rejection of the collective bargaining agreement because it was
expensive to the debtor's estate.3 60 While the Court admitted that the test for
rejection of a collective bargaining agreement should be somewhat higher than
the business judgment test and that balancing the equities was required, it did not
flesh out the details.3 61 Labor groups immediately lobbied Congress to enact
legislation repealing Bildisco, which they claimed gutted section 8(a)(5) of the
NLRA and made union busting an appropriate goal for Chapter 11.362
Simultaneous to responses to much larger issues being raised about bankruptcy
court power and jurisdiction, Congress quickly passed section 1113.363
Section 1113 attempts to merge the goals of the Bankruptcy Code and the
NLRA, by requiring a Chapte 11 debtor to negotiate with an authorized union
representative before rejecting a collective bargaining agreement 364 Moreover, a
court may not approve rejection unless it finds, among other things, that: (1) the
358 See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco (In re Bildisco), 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
359 See Gregory, supra note 349, at 588.
360 See id
36 1 See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526. The Court rejected a strict rejection standard that would
require the debtor in possession to show that liquidation would invariably occur absent court-
authorized rejection. See id Ironically, the Second Circuit had adopted a strict standard, but
once section 1113 was adopted, it began adopting a more lenient interpretation of section 1113
than many courts. Compare Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., Inc., 816 F.2d 82, 89
(2d Cir. 1987), with United Steel Workers of An v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp, 791 F.2d
1074, 1085 (3d Cir. 1986).
3 62 See Cameron, supra note 295, at 866.
3 63 See Northem Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,50 (1982).
The Supreme Court held that the subject matter jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts over certain
civil claims, as established by Congress under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, violated
the judicial power clause contained in Article aII, section 1 of the United States Constitution.
The problems caused by this decision (or by the original congressional grant of power) were
obviously far more important and complex than the question of whether labor contracts could
be rejected. In fact, the whole bankruptcy court system was up in the air and no one knew the
true extent of bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction. As Congress set about trying to address this
jurisdictional problem, it apparently wished to also resolve the question of rejection of
collective bargaining agreements. See THOMAS R HAGGARD & MARK S. PULLWA, CONFLICTS
BETWEEN LABOR LEGISLATION AND BANKRUPrcY LAW 73-76 (1987). Because rejecting a
collective bargaining agreement was never an intended purpose of the Bankruptcy Code, it
seemed best to clear up any problems created by Bildisco without added negative publicity. See
Frances McGinley, Bankruptcy Code Section 1113: The Standard for Rejection of Collective
Bargaining Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors-Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United
Steel Workers, 791 F.2d 1074 (3d Cir. 1986), 60 TEMP. L.Q. 757,757-59 (1987).
364 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113(bX2) (1994).
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debtor has proposed modifications that are necessary to reorganization; (2) the
proposal was made to the union representative; (3) the union representative
rejected the modification without good cause; and (4) the balance of equities
clearly favors rejection.365 By the language of the statute, management's
proposed modifications to the contract must be "necessary to permit the
reorganization of the debtor."366 While the statute requires that employers jump
through a large number of procedural hoops prior to rejectio, 36 7 most
commentators agree that the most important requirement for rejection is the
"necessity" requirement.368 While some courts have held that this means
"necessary" to the debtor's long-term survival,369 others have held that the
modifications or rejection must be "necessary" to avoid immediate liquidation of
the debtor.370 Obviously, far fewer contracts are rejected under the latter
interpretation. 371
According to at least one empirical study, rejection is attempted and granted
365 See id. § 1113(c).
366 Id. § 1113(b)(1)(A).
3 6 7 See idJ § 1113(b), (c). Some modification can also be made on an interim basis, if
necessary to "continuation of the debtor's business," in other words, to avoid liquidation. Id.
§ 1113(e).
368 See Cameron, supra note 295, 845-46 at n.36 (listing a large number of articles
discussing the "necessary" requirement). Professor Cameron argues that because so much
emphasis has been placed on this particular requirement, that the other requirements have been
largely ignored by scholars and even some judges. See id. at 846. One reason for this may be
that if some courts interpret "necessary" to mean "necessary to avoid immediate liquidation,"
this test will be extremely hard to meet. As a result, the quickest way for a court to make a
decision may be to look at this requirement first.
369 See Truck Driver's Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816 F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1987); see
also In re Mile Hi Metal Sys., 899 F.2d 887, 893 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that necessary does
not mean "absolutely" necessary); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R 515, 524-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding 'necessary to accommodate confirmation of Chapter 11 plan"). This
interpretation seems to make the most sense under typical statutory construction. In section
1113(e), Congress states that a debtor is only entitled to make interim (rather than permanent)
modifications to a collective bargaining agreement if it is "essential to the contribution of the
debtor's business ....." 11 U.S.C. § 1113(e). The language in section 1113(h) relating to
permanent modifications or rejection, "necessary to permit reorganization" is far less specific.
370 See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steel Workers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1085
(3d Cir. 1986); see also In re Sol-Sieff Produce Co., 82 B.R. 787, 795 (W.D. Pa. 1988)
(holding that debtor met the statutory requirements, the nine steps under section 1113, and
allowing the rejection of the collective bargaining agreement); In re William P. Brogna & Co.,
Inc., 64 B.R. 390, 393 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that the debtor did not satisfy the nine steps
under section 1113 in order to reject the collective bargaining agreement).
371 Compare Carey, 816 F.2d at 89, with Wheeling-Pittsburgh, 791 F.2d at 1085.
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less frequently now that section 1113 is in place.372 Thus, this statute appears to
have achieved the goals for which it was enacted, namely to halt unilateral
changes by employers in collective bargaining agreements protected under the
NLRA and to reduce the likelihood that bankruptcy judges will approve rejection
of these agreements without proper regard for national labor policies.373
Studying section 1113 may be helpful in drafting legislation protecting
continuing-care residents from rejection, but there are some obvious differences
between union workers and continuing-care residents. To start, unionized
workers are protected by the NLRA,374 a federal statute. As we have seen, there
is plenty of state legislation purporting to protect CCF residents but no federal
statute mandating such protections. 375 From the outset then, there is less head-
to-head competition between statutes protecting residents and the federal
Bankruptcy Code, than there is between the NLRA and the Bankruptcy Code.
Second, labor groups began lobbying Congress to legislate against Bildisco the
day the decision was rendered.376 There is no strong and organized lobbying
effort on behalf of CCF residents.377 Finally, there are probably fewer people
affected by CCFs than by union contracts.378
On the other hand, numbers do not always govern which bankruptcy
legislation is passed, nor should numbers dictate which legislation is passed.
372 See Cameron, supra note 295, at 895 (finding that since section 1113 was created, the
rate of rejection of collective bargaining agreements has declined by about 9%, which the
author believes is statistically significant and supportive of labor).
3 73 See id. at 841-42 (citation omitted); Gregory, supra note 349, at 565-72.
374 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1994).
375 However, the National Continuing-Care Residents Association is currently working
on federal legislation regarding CCFs, see Moss, supra note 74, at Al.
37 6 See 130 CoNG. REc. H7489, H7489 (June 29, 1984), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N., at
576 (bill introduced by Rep. Rodino). This bill became law five months later. See Bankruptcy
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 390 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11 U.S.C.). The bill was later incorporated into an omnibus bankruptcy bill that was
passed on March 19, 1984, less than a month after Bildisco. See Bruce H. Chamov, The Uses
and Misuses of the Legislative History of Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 40 SYRACusE
L. REV. 925, 947 (1989). For an extensive review of the legislative history, see id at 946-69.
377 While the Center for Aging has supported the passage of the various state statutes, it
has not proposed any federal legislation.
37 8 See Chinhui Juhn, Wage Equality and Demand for Skill: Evidence from Five
Decades, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 424,443 (1999). The percentage of workers covered by
union contracts was 23.2% in 1980 and 16.1% in 1990. See id This translated to
approximately 5,271,600 people in 1980 and 4,016,000 people in 1990. See Population
Estimates Program, Population Division, U.S. Census Bureau Historical National Population
Estimates: July 1, 1900 to July 1, 1998 (June 4, 1999) <http-//www.census.gov/population/
estimates/nation/popclockest.txt>. By contrast, about one million people are parties to CCF
contracts. See Moss, supra note 74, at Al.
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Some interests are simply more important than others. Moreover, the policies
behind protecting workers are at least analogous to those protecting CCF
residents.379 Their life care contracts are unique to them and at least as important
as terms of employment.
If section 1113 were to form the basis of model legislation for CCF
legislation, the resulting CCF legislation could be far simpler than section 1113.
Section 1113, after all, involves the rejection of contracts by which employees'
rights are determined.380 Thus, section 1113 requires that a whole host of
process-oriented steps be taken by the debtor-employer, such as presenting
current financial data to the! union, making proposals to the union, negotiating in
good faith, and so on.381 If all these steps are taken and modification or rejection
of the contact is necessary to the debtor reorganization, the labor contract can be
rejected.382 The workers must then find new jobs.3 83
Given the different circumstances surrounding CCF contracts, I question
whether contract rejection should ever be permitted.384 If it is to be permitted,
however, I believe that the CCF contract should be harder to reject than a labor
contract. Workers can presumably find new jobs. Residents cannot find new
homes without great difficulty. Moreover, the whole purpose of CCFs is to
provide homes and nursing care for residents, and if a facility cannot do that, it
probably should not be in business. Employers, on the other hand, generally are
not in business for the primary purpose of employing workers.
Looking at section 1113's requirements, it is clear that little is gained by
requiring homes to jump through various procedural hoops in order to reject
resident contracts. 385 Residents have few real options. They will have nothing to
say about current financial information and no real way, at least as a group, to
379 Both types of contracts cover issues related to essential human needs. In the case of
labor contracts, making money and providing for one's self and one's family, and in the case of
CCFs, having a place to live and guaranteed nursing care, during the final stages of life.
380 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (1994).
38 1 See id
382 See id
383 Defeated workers can, of course, agree to continue working for the debtor after
rejection at a lower rate. This happens from time to time, when the debtor stays in business. See
In re Appletree Mkts., Inc., 155 B.R. 431,434 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (discussing, in the context of a
question about mootness, how reversal of an order allowing rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement would affect the rights of workers who continued to work for the debtor after
rejection).
3841 also question whether it is possible to simply forbid rejection. This has not been
done yet for any interest group.
385 See 1I US.C. § 1113,
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accept modifications to their CCF contracts.386 The only model that I could
imagine borrowing from section 1113 is a trumped-up necessity requirement.
New legislation could provide that CCF contracts could only be rejected to avoid
immediate liquidation of a CCF. In other words, a CCF contract could never be
rejected to improve profitability, but could be rejected if it were necessary to
keep the facility in business, either under existing management or under the
management of a new purchaser.387
Even under those conditions, I question whether there is any reason not to
just forbid rejection. What is to be gained by letting such a facility stay in
business? One possible reason to allow rejection would be that demand for these
arrangements exceeds supply, and it is better to provide these services to new
residents, even if some contracts are rejected along the way. This does not seem
to be true, however. Demand does not exceed supply, and in fact, some CCFs
that have filed for Chapter 11 have found it necessary to convert continuing-care
residences to condominiums or rental units to fill unneeded space.388 Second,
demand for this type of service may decrease if rejection of resident contracts
continues to be permitted.389 This could affect the financial viability of the entire
industry and hurt many existing residents. Finally, if a new Bankruptcy Code
section limited rejection of these contracts but still permitted rejection when a
facility changed hands, any CCF purchaser could buy a facility free of resident
contracts. This would advance the interests of other creditors at the expense of
CCF residents and definitely should be forbidden.
In the final analysis, then, even if rejection were permitted only to avoid
liquidation, this approach would still be too lenient. I see little benefit to
permitting rejection under any circumstances. An amendment to section 365, that
made rejection financially infeasible, and at the same time precluded debtors
from selling their assets free and clear of resident contracts, would be much
preferred.
386 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
387 This would mean making it very clear in the legislation that rejection needed to be
necessary to avoid immediate liquidation. See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp., 816
F.2d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that necessary means necessary to rehabilitate in a
nongeneral way); Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steel Workers, 791 F.2d
1074, 1085 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that necessity means necessary to avoid liquidation).
388 See, e.g., In re Florida Brethren Homes, Inc., 88 B.R. 445, 446 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(noting that the economic decision was made to convert continuing-care units to
condominiums).
389 These arrangements have already suffered from some bad press, see Moss, supra note
74, at Al; Topolniki, supra note 59, at Al. These arrangements have also been subject to
unusual levels of insolvency. See Ruchlin, supra note 59, at 56. Yet, they are still in demand.
Allowing contract rejection would surely give the industry a further black eye and could cause
financial and health problems for those who currently rely on such facilities.
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B. Another Bankruptcy Solution: Improved Priority
Another option is simply improving the status of resident claims. This could
actually be done in conjunction with a 365-type amendment, and together these
two options would be very protective of CCF residents.390 There are two
potential ways to improve a resident's likelihood of being able to continue
residing at her CCF or having some of her entrance fee returned upon
insolvency. Resident claims could be given priority under section 507 of the
Bankruptcy Code,391 or they could be made secured claims through appropriate
state legislation.392
Priority claims are still unsecured claims and this improved status creates
meaningful benefits to claim-holders only if the debtor has unencumbered assets
from which to satisfy unsecured claims.393 Some debtors will have
unencumbered assets, but many will not. One way to provide protection to
residents would be to provide that all resulting rejection damage claims will have
priority status under section 507 even though the debtor can reject resident
contracts to which it is a party as of the filing. This would eliminate many of the
benefits of rejection for the debtor-facility. 394 Even then, however, the resulting
priority claims would be unsecured claims, lower in priority than all secured
claims.395
Giving residents a secured claim for their rejection damages would be even
more beneficial than providing priority status for their rejection damage claims.
State law defines what constitutes a secured claim, however, so the only way to
do this uniformly would be to convince all states to enact statutes providing
residents with valid and enforceable statutory liens.396 While these liens will still
be lower in priority than some other liens and security interests in a debtor's
property, thus not guaranteeing payment or special treatment, they would still
provide strong protection to residents, who would be paid before general
unsecured creditors. If this protection were combined with protection against
3 90 See supra notes 332-47 and accompanying text.
391 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994) (providing a federal bankruptcy priority scheme).
392 See supra notes 200-35 and accompanying text.
393 Rejection damage claims are unsecured claims, see 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g),
that can only be paid a distribution if there are assets over and above those needed to satisfy
secured creditors. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text.
394 This is true because without the right to reject, all damages due under the contract
must be paid in 100 cent dollars, rather than reduced "bankruptcy dollars." See Westbrook,
supra note 285, at 253-55, 335.
395 Priority claims are unsecured claims, which means that they are not protected by
collateral. See II U.S.C. § 507.
3 96 See supra notes 200-36 and accompanying text.
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rejection under 365(a), a typical case might progress as follows. A facility files
for Chapter 11. Because section 365, as amended, provides that if resident
contracts are rejected, either (1) the debtor has to pay whatever third party
provides essential services to residents, or alternatively, (2) residents get a
priority claim for all of their damages because both of these options will be very
expensive for the debtor, any debtor that can reorganize, either through a plan or
section 363(b) sale,397 will leave the contracts in place. The debtor who must
liquidate in a Chapter 7 obviously will need to reject the contracts,398 but
residents will receive some of the first available distribution dollars, after the
payment of higher ranking liens and security interests.399 This would seem to be
the best residents can do, once a bankruptcy has been filed, and would be worlds
better than the protections residents receive now. If they are to receive secured
status, rather than unsecured priority status, however, all states need to enact
397 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1994) (allowing the debtor to sell its assets free and clear of
most claims).
39 8 A liquidating debtor must either reject its contracts or assume them and assign them to
a third party, see id. § 365, because the debtor will cease to exist and thus be unable to perform
the contract. Moreover, without amendment to the Bankruptcy Code, rejection will relegate the
resulting rejection damage claim to an unsecured claim. See id. §§ 365(g)(1), 502(g); NLRB v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 530 (1984); Steward Foods, Inc. v. Broecker (In re Steward
Foods), 65 F3d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 1995).
399 This assumes that states enact statutes giving the residents valid statutory liens. If they
do not, and if the Code ultimately gives resident claims priority status, then the resident claims
would be satisfied after all perfected secured claims and all administrative priority claims. See
11 U.S.C. § 503 (explaining that a secured creditor's collateral can only be surcharged with the
administrative expenses of the estate if incurring the expense preserved the secured creditor's
collateral). Then, depending on the rank of the priority assigned to resident claims, the claim
would be paid ahead of most, but probably not all, other claims. Administrative claims are
always paid ahead of all priority claims, as costs of preserving the estate. See id
§ 503(b)(IXA). Incidentally, these costs include the fees and expenses of the debtor's
attorneys. See id. § 503(bX1XC)(4).
While I would like to see residents receive an administrative priority claim if their claims
are rejected, such status is generally reserved for postpetition debts that are incurred in order to
keep the debtor alive. I see no real way to fit resident claims into this paradigm. Thus, as a
practical matter, resident claims will always be paid after at least some other priority claims in
any event. Creating a priority for resident claims is a sound idea, and unlike some similar
priorities that have been proposed in recent years, I do not believe that creating a priority for
resident claims will unduly burden debtor-companies or the bankruptcy system. See Jill L.
Uylald, Note, Promises Made, Promises Broken: Securing Defined Benefit Pension Plan
Income in the Wake of Employer Bankruptcy: Should We Rethink Priority Status for the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation?, 6 ELDER L.L 77, 77 (1998) (proposing that Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) claims receive a priority under the Bankruptcy Code,
which I feel could have an enormous impact on companies' ability to reorganize).
2000]
OHIO STATE LAWJOURNAL
effective statutory lien statutes. 400 I know of no way to make this happen, other
than by educating states about the benefits of such statutes.
C. Making CCFs Ineligible for Bankruptcy
As a final possibility, section 109 of the Bankruptcy Code, which currently
provides that banks and domestic insurance companies are ineligible for
bankruptcy, could be amended to make CCFs ineligible for bankruptcy as
well.40 1 While this would certainly leave states free to legislate CCFs, it is
impossible to amend section 109 in this way at this time because many states
have not yet passed any CCF legislation40 2 This would leave some CCFs with
no state regulatory or insolvency scheme40 3 It would also be inconsistent with
the bankruptcy eligibility of the rest of the health care system, which currently is
eligible for bankruptcy protection.404 If Congress ultimately decides that CCFs
are enough like insurance companies to warrant such an exclusion, and if states
fully regulate this industry, CCFs ultimately could be excluded from bankruptcy
protection.4 05 The question that must be answered first, however, is whether this
would be beneficial to residents. Given bankruptcy courts' extensive experience
with reorganization and insolvency, I am not convinced that excluding CCFs
from bankruptcy protection would benefit residents.
V. CONCLUSION
Health care and bankruptcy are intersecting more and more due to financial
problems in this industry.4 06 Among the many people affected by the higher
400 See supra notes 200-236 and accompanying text.
401 See 11 U.S.C. § 109. The legislative history of section 109 indicates that banking
institutions and insurance companies are excluded from liquidation under the bankruptcy laws
because various regulatory laws provide for their liquidation. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 318
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CA.N. 5963, 6275.
402 See supra notes 169-283 and accompanying text.
403 See In re Florida Brethren Homes, Inc., 88 B.R. 445,447 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (stating that
even Florida's CCF statute, which contains rehabilitation provisions, does not contain an
adequate state regulatory statement for CCFs).
4 04 See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (1994); see generally Sullivan v. University Med. Ctr., (In re
University Med. Ctr.) 973 F.2d 1065 (3d Cir. 1992). This case raises the question of whether
CCFs are more like health care providers or more like providers of annuities.
405 States probably also need to form guaranty finds. No industry has ever been
precluded from bankruptcy protection unless the state has created a guaranty fund from which
to pay claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 109; H.R. REP. No. 595, at 318-19 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6275-77.
4 06 See Michael Kraten & R Michael Yesh, Health Care Organizations-The Business
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rates of health care facility insolvency are parties to continuing-care contracts,
who have prepaid for nursing care with some or all of their life savings. 40 7 States
have seen these risks and enacted statutes that protect residents from harm.4 08
These statutes aptly address a number of important issues, but do not adequately
protect residents in the event of a facility's insolvency.409
Enacting a state statute, to protect citizens against insolvency in a particular
industry, is of limited utility. Because the Bankruptcy Code preempts much of
this legislation, much of it is unenforceable at the time when citizens need it
most. That does not mean that all of this legislation is worthless, however.
Statutes subject to preemption fall into three categories. First, some
legislation-such as financial reserves, reporting requirements, and actuarial
studies-may not be enforceable during a bankruptcy case due to the debtor's
financial limitations, but are fully enforceable outside bankruptcy, and may even
prevent bankruptcy.410 These types of legislation are very valuable, despite
preemption possibilities. Second, some statutes like those imposing statutory
liens that are voidable in bankruptcy, are never effective, are a waste of
resources, and actually harm citizens by misleading them about their rights and
creating an incentive for a facility to file for bankruptcy.411 Needless to say,
these statutes should be repealed and replaced with more effective ones. The
third category of statutes, those relating to the rehabilitation of a CCF, create
more complicated issues. Many of these provisions, which attempt to exert
control over both state insolvencies and federal bankruptcies, are probably
unenforceable at this time.412 These statutes may serve another purpose,
however. States may be aware that they are ineffective, but may hope that the
provisions will deter CCFs from becoming insolvent or misusing reserves. States
also may hope that someday, given the public health and welfare issues involved,
they will be given control over these cases. In other words, the statutes may
Implications of Capitation Revenue Methodologies, 14 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 15 (1995). As
healthcare is evolving, organizations must evolve by offering their members new programs.
Providers have evolved by joining managed care plans. See id. This has led to changing
reimbursement policies. The managed care arena has caused providers to agree to
reimbursement methods that may not cover their costs. Organizations have opted for methods
that may lead to potential profits and increased risk. See id.
407 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
40 8 See supra notes 167-283 and accompanying text.
409 This creates a strong risk that people will be misled because some statutes purport to
protect residents from insolvency but are not enforceable in bankruptcy. See supra notes 201-
36 and accompanying text.
4 10 See supra notes 171-99 and accompanying text.
411 See supra notes 201-36 and accompanying text.
4 12 See supra notes 237-56 and accompanying text.
2000)
OHIO STATELA WJOURIVAL
express states' wish lists, rather than their understanding of the actual law. This
may be an acceptable way to legislate, assuming no one is misled into thinking
that the provisions are effective. On the other hand, statutes are not reflections of
legislative intent. They represent actual attempts to make law, and it is far
preferable that the laws enacted be enforceable.
The problems caused by CCF statutes raise interesting questions about the
state legislative process. Some of the statutes indicate that state legislatures are
unaware of the existence of federal statutes on the same subject matter that they
are legislating.413 Given the sheer volume of both state and federal statutes, this
is not surprising. While the state legislative process may at times be uninformed
and arbitrary, the same can be said of the bankruptcy legislative process. 414
Problems are often considered in a vacuum and through narrow exceptions,
rather than by looking at the big picture.415 Amending the Bankruptcy Code to
protect residents would admittedly be another form of narrow, piecemeal
legislation, and the same would be true of creating a new priority status for
residents. Bankruptcy Code amendments may be necessary despite these
downfalls, however.
CCFs provide a valuable service to society. If these facilities are going to be
useful, they must be financially viable, and residents must be protected from the
loss of their investment in the event of insolvency. State statutes can, and often
do, effectively regulate financial viability.4 16 Given the existing provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code and the uncertainty about whether states can preclude CCFs
from filing for bankruptcy, the only certain way to protect residents against CCF
insolvency is to amend the Bankruptcy Code. This cannot be accomplished
through state legislation, much of which is not enforceable in bankruptcy, and
creates a dangerous and false sense of security that this important issue has been
adequately addressed.
413 For example, federal statutes provide that statutory liens are effective only in
bankruptcy, see supra notes 201-36 and accompanying text, and allow a state official to
appoint a trustee in a bankruptcy case, see supra notes 237-56 and accompanying text.
4 14 See supra notes 316-21 and accompanying text.
415The section 365 exception to rejection for timeshare holders, for example, is not
particularly useful legislation and was enacted without any indication that the legislation was
needed. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text. No doubt, amending section 365 to
make it more difficult to reject life care contracts is far more necessary.
4 16 One way to improve this state legislation is to strengthen the certification and reserve
fund requirement to keep facilities from filing for bankruptcy in the first place. See supra notes
183-99 and accompanying text.
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